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ABSTRACT

INTERPRETING THE SACRED IN AS YOU LIKE IT: READING THE “BOOK
OF NATURE” FROM A CHRISTIAN, ECOCRITICAL PERSPECTIVE

Candice D. Wendt
Department of Humanities, Classics, and Comparative Literature
Master of Arts

Since the advent of the environmental crisis, some writers have raised
concerns with the moral influence of Christian scripture and interpretive
traditions, such as the medieval book of nature, a hermeneutic in which nature and
scripture are “read” in reference to one another. Scripture, they argue, has tended
to stifle sacred relationships with nature as a non-human other. This thesis argues
that such perspectives are reductive of the sacred quality of scripture.
Environmental perspectives should be concerned with the desacralization of
religious texts in addition to nature. Chapter one suggests that two questions
surrounding the medieval book of nature’s history can help us address ways that
such perspectives reduce religious interpretation of sacred texts. The first question
is the tension between manifestation and proclamation, or the question of how
scripture and nature reveal sacred meanings. The second is the problem of evil, or
v

the question of where evil and suffering come from. It also proposes that
Shakespeare’s As You Like It and religious philosophy, particularly Paul
Ricoeur’s writings, can help us address these problems and provide a
contemporary religious perspective of the “book of nature.” Drawing on scenes in
the play in which nature is “read” as a book and Ricoeur’s essay on
“Manifestation and Proclamation,” chapter two argues how manifestation often
works interdependently with proclamation. Chapter three discusses how
anthropocentric worldviews in which natural entities are exploited also distort
interpretive relationships with scripture. Overcoming desacralization requires
giving up desires to suppress contingencies, particularly suffering, in nature and
in interpreting religious texts. Only as the characters in As You Like It accept
contingencies are they able to engage hidden sources of hope, which is
comparable to the need to let go of mastery in interpretation Ricoeur describes.
Chapter four discusses problems with attempts to uncover the origins of the
environmental crisis by discussing what Ricoeur writes about the problems with
theodicy and Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of evil. Assumptions that
specific human origins for evil can be blamed confirm deceptively humancentered worldviews and can mask valuable messages about how to morally
respond to suffering that are taught in Judeo-Christian narratives.
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The Problem of the “Book of Nature”
In the medieval period, there was a hermeneutic called liber naturae or the
“book of nature” that had been theorized by Christian theologians in late
antiquity. As the creation of God, nature was considered analogous to His written
words and capable of revealing His purposes. Nature and scripture were
considered “two books” of divine revelation intended to be interpreted side-byside. The possible meanings of each “text” expanded through this relationship,
producing endless insights (Dupré 37). This mode of biblical exegesis peaked
during the twelfth-century, but then diminished toward the late medieval era
(Otten 267-83). However, the memory of this tradition lived on. In many
subsequent eras, religious groups, scientists, and others have drawn on the
analogy to promote faith in the power of human reason to unfold God’s mysteries
(Harrison 6), to argue that no human theory can compare to God’s great “book of
nature” (Harrison 15-18), and at other times to reconnect readings of scripture
with nature (Numbers 261-63).
In the context of the contemporary environmental crisis, medieval
traditions that encompass the book of nature are sometimes remembered in a
negative light. The most famous example of this is found in Lynn White’s essay,
“The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis,” which identifies the Bible and
medieval exegesis as sources of the West’s anthropocentricism and indifference to
the natural world. The Judeo-Christian hermeneutic between nature and scripture,
White and others have suggested, is what initially led the West to let language and
1
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reasoning dominate over any sense of the sacred in nature, making contemporary
culture deaf to nature’s moral claims. Three publications I will draw on in my
argument are White’s essay, Christopher Manes’s “Nature and Silence,” and
David Abram’s Spell of the Sensuous. These environmental perspectives are
concerned with currents needs for the West to reconnect with a sense of sacred in
nature that would help improve moral practice. The solutions they propose look to
the kind of experience animistic cultures had (before book religions) to deter
anthropocentric language and are critical of religious textual interpretation.
However, they overlook important questions about what it means to interpret
scripture as a sacred text. In my argument, I will build on the assumption that one
of the distinctive traits that defines the sacred is its presentation of itself as at least
partially non-human, or irreducible to human-derived meanings. By this
definition, the sacred appears irreconcilable with anthropocentricism; it seems
illogical that something non-human and yet held in spiritual reverence by humans
would be immorally human-centered. Sensing the sacred in nature, as Manes,
Abram, and other environmental thinkers have suggested, involves recognizing
and engaging its otherness, its own “voice,” which helps to deter immorally
human-centered worldviews (Manes 15-17; Abram 91-92). Because it claims to
be partially other-than-human, scripture offers meanings that may similarly deter
immoral anthropocentricism. Yet, if scriptural language may potentially perform
the same function as the sacred quality of nature, what does it mean to criticize
Judeo-Christian scripture and interpretive practice as anthropocentric? Two
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questions that have long been associated with the book of nature can help us
explore this problem.
The first concerns what Paul Ricoeur calls the tension between
“manifestation” and “proclamation” (encompassed in the distinction between
“religious” or “holy” and “sacred”), which raises the question, what is the
relationship between how the divine manifests itself in nature and how it is
revealed in scripture? As Ricoeur explains in his essay “Manifestation and
Proclamation” published in Figuring the Sacred, Judeo-Christian faith has
struggled with this problem since Hebraic civilization (55-56). Proclamation is a
“hermeneutic … where the accent is placed on speech and writing, and generally
on the word of God,” and in which interpretation, including building on the
readings of past generations, is central (48). In contrast, manifestation refers to
hierophanies or sensory encounters with the sacred in nature. Manifestation
initially has little to do with language, although language becomes involved later
as the experience is interpreted (49). As Ricoeur describes, it is possible to
distinguish manifestation from proclamation in such a way that the two appear
irreconcilable. Religious texts or a sacred sense of nature prevails, leading to
either a nature-centered or scripture-centered worldview (48, 55-56).
Environmental perspectives sometimes appear to polarize nature from scripture
by assuming scripture has eclipsed the sacred in nature. However, Ricoeur argues,
scripture and nature are intended to work through harmonious relationships in
which both scriptural language and the natural world reveal sacred meanings that
shape our relationships. Distinctions between proclamation and the sacred in
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nature collapse in the sense that manifestation and proclamation are both ways of
engaging divine meanings (Ricoeur 65-67).
The second question concerning the sacred nature of scripture is the
problem of evil, or, if God created the world and God is good, how is it that He
allowed or willed evil and suffering to enter it? In late antiquity, Gnostic groups
perceived Judeo-Christian scripture and the God of the Old Testament as flawed
and not sacred in the sense Christians believed. They asserted that the presence of
adversities in nature disproved Christian claims that the earth and scripture are of
divine origin. The book of nature was conceptualized partly as a means of
defending the Judeo-Christian faith. Origen, Basil and Augustine wrote of how
when nature and scripture are interpreted side by side, divine grace is perceptible
in the midst of evil and suffering. Ironically, while the book of nature began as a
means of understanding how scripture helps us to understand and accept
suffering, environmental perspectives sometimes treat such interpretive traditions
as if they are sources of moral evil and suffering in the natural world. The history
of the book of nature suggests how the way we theorize the problem of evil
shapes our perceptions of religious texts’ capacities to reveal divine meanings.
We can extend lessons from late antiquity to criticisms of medieval exegesis. If
scripture is treated partially as a source of moral evil in the environmental crisis
(not unlike Gnostics in late antiquity believed both nature and the Old Testament
were flawed and unfit for their spiritual engagement), this may eclipse reception
of sacred meanings that would help us to live in greater harmony with the natural
world.
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This introductory chapter will argue that the exclusion of these two
questions from environmental discussion of Christian interpretive traditions is a
reduction of scripture as text that can aid us in engaging sacred meanings in
nature. This reduction is comparable not only to Gnostic assumptions about
Judeo-Christian scripture and evil in late antiquity, but also to reconceptualizations of scripture and nature during the early modern era. During the
beginning of the modern era, interest in the connections between divine words
and creation diminished. Engagement of the phenomenological world became
more grounded in reason’s capacities to make nature intelligible rather than in
beliefs that divine meanings and purposes are concealed within the natural world.
Science began to be applied to technology in order to take greater control over
human suffering..Whether for good or ill, such shifts led Western perceptions of
what it means to interpret religious texts and nature in more human-centered
directions.
The danger of reducing the two questions I have raised concerning the
sacred quality of scripture in environmental criticisms is that doing so may
deceive us into inadvertently confirming technological worldviews. Modern
technology is correlated not only with failure to sense the sacred in nature, but
also to engage sacred meanings in scripture. The lack of a strong sense of
“contingency” and a desire for “transparency,” evident in contemporary science
and technology, diminishes concern with the question of “the precinct of grace”
and “God’s presence in our world” Our loss of contingency, especially in relation
to suffering, distances us from the West’s religious traditions in addition to the
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natural world (Borgmann 65-66, 78-79, 85-89). If we wish to overturn
anthropocentricism, we should be concerned not only with the loss of sacred
meanings in nature, but also with the desacralization of the religious or holy.
Criticisms of Christian traditions may also be understood as inadvertently
affirming technological assumptions about evil and its sources. It is partly by
treating suffering as having causes that are to be identified and repressed that
Western culture exploits the natural world. Searching for and accusing specific
sources of the moral evils of the environmental crisis may only uphold such
conceptualizations of how to appropriately respond to suffering and evil.
This thesis will offer a religious perspective of the “book of nature” as it
concerns the environmental crisis, the tension between proclamation and
manifestation, and the problem of evil. My argument will be based primarily on
an ecocritical approach to the questions I have raised. William Shakespeare’s As
You Like It carries special significance in the context of environmental
perspectives of medieval religious traditions. Shakespeare lived in a culture that
was transitioning from a medieval to a modern world, and in which there were
conflicting views on whether and how nature should be “read” in reference to
scripture and emerging scientific discourses. Discussion of the medieval book of
nature had drawn interest during his time, and Shakespeare alludes to the tradition
throughout the play. The play is also thematically relevant to the problem of evil.
While working within pastoral conventions, Shakespeare overthrows idyllicism in
favor of more realistic portrayals of nature’s adversities. In some ways, the play’s
scenes focus more on the consequences of Adam’s fall in the book of Genesis
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than on traditional pastoral narratives. Characters’ experiences in the forest raise
questions about how nature can be a source of hope when it is also a source of
suffering. In addition to the problem of evil, the play explores how nature and
other sources of religious wisdom, including preaching, convey sacred meanings
in relation to each other.
To discuss the interpretive relationships with nature and religious
meanings in the play and their relevance to an environmental perspective of
Judeo-Christian traditions, I will also draw on continental religious philosophy,
particularly the essays of Paul Ricoeur collected in Figuring the Sacred. Like As
You Like It, Ricoeur’s essays provide paths through which to talk about both the
problem of evil and the question of how religious text and the sacred convey
meanings in the context of contemporary environmentalism. His arguments are
conscious of the evils of Western culture and reductive interpretations from the
past, but nevertheless assert that reconnecting with scripture as a sacred text can
help the West better face moral questions in its future.
This thesis will argue that the “book of nature” analogy offers a
meaningful way to conceptualize how sacred meanings can help us overcome the
immoral worldviews and practices that have led to the environmental crisis. In
this chapter, I will discuss how early Christian theologians conceptualized the
analogy of the “book of nature” in relation to the tension between the holy and the
sacred, and the problem of evil. To them, the “book of nature” was a means of
teaching how despite evil and suffering, nature and scripture reveal sacred
meanings and that scripture is a crucial means through which we perceive divine
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purposes and meanings in creation. Each consecutive chapter will discuss one
implication of the hermeneutic conceptualized in their writings. The second
chapter will address the issue of manifestation and proclamation in the play and
discuss how nature and scripture can work together to reveal sacred and moral
meanings in human relationships with nature. Drawing on Ricoeur’s essay
“Manifestation and Proclamation,” it will argue that in a world that has been
desacralized, sometimes learning to engage religious texts as sacred may be
necessary to help restore capacities to perceive our moral obligations toward
natural life. The third chapter will address the implications of scripture’s
capacities to reveal sacred meanings in relationship with nature. By engaging
Ricoeur’s essays and Martin Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning
Technology,” it will discuss how learning to perceive sacred meanings involves
becoming sensitive to the contextual and unpredictable way they unfold in the
text. To interpret the sacred in nature and scripture, we need to acknowledge the
contingent quality of suffering in particular to avoid reducing both scripture and
the presence of suffering in the natural world. The fourth chapter will address the
problem of evil in relation to the “book of nature” and environmental perspectives
and argue that overcoming technological paradigms includes letting go of seeking
definitive sources of evil and suffering. Judeo-Christian narratives offer special
moral meanings about how to respond fully to suffering without seeking specific
sources of evil to repress. Engaging scripture can help us respond fully to
suffering in natural and human realms without perpetuating suffering by
suppressing it. These various facets of the “book of nature” hermeneutic suggest
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ways religious interpretive relationships with scripture and nature can be balanced
in such a way that scripture adds a vital dimension to our relationships with nature
and can serve as an important source of moral guidance and restraint as we
respond to the ecological crisis.

ORIGEN
It was in the context of a discussion concerning the problem of evil and the
tension between manifestation and proclamation that the book of nature was first
conceptualized in the West. Theologians who drew parallels between nature and
scripture such as Origen, Basil, and Augustine did so in response to Gnostic
criticisms of belief in the goodness of creation and its creator and of Christian
scripture in general. Gnostic thought can be characterized by three tendencies: (1)
fascination with the problem of evil and tracing sources of evil and suffering, (2)
“a sense of alienation and recoil from man’s environment,” and (3) a desire for
esoteric knowledge with the belief that self-knowledge is saving. One of the
foundational assertions of Gnostic thought was that evil suffering is traceable to
supernatural or divine cause (Nock 256-57, 267).
Origen (c. 185-254), the first Christian theologian to draw parallels
between nature and scripture, lived in a time of interest in and confusion about
Christian scripture and its teachings about creation. Christians had just begun to
teach the doctrine of ex nihilo creation and defended the sacredness of both
creation and scripture, facing criticism inside and outside of Christian circles.
Christians Gnostics taught that the earth was a creation of an inferior God, and
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that the Old Testament testified of a God lower than Christ and God the Father
(Benjamins 13-14). Since nature is flawed and was assumed to be the work of a
lower God, and because the Old Testament refers to the earth’s creator, the two
gods were identified as the same. Gnostic thinkers cross-referenced their
“readings” of nature and their readings of the Old Testament so that the evil they
perceived in nature influenced their perspectives on scripture. Their “recoil” from
the suffering present in the natural environment reinforced their dislike of the Old
Testament.
Perhaps because he recognized the hermeneutic that Gnostic thought drew
between nature and the Old Testament, Origen drew parallels between nature and
scripture in his theology. Nature is like scripture, Origen wrote, in that some parts
reveal divine grace with great clarity, while others reveal it so obscurely that
human weakness cannot penetrate how such features of the natural world are
connected with the divine. Gnostics and other Christians resisted using allegorical
applications of the Old Testament (instead, reading it literally), which contributed
to their criticisms (Benjamins 13-15). However, allegorical interpretation was
essential to Origen, who taught that symbolic meanings intended for readers’
benefit are found even in obscure and seemingly irrelevant passages. Recognizing
allegory is necessary to discerning how the Old Testament foreshadows the
redemption testified of in the new (Benjamins 15). Like scripture, the whole of
nature is intended for human good, although in parts its providence is hard to
discern. Those who truly accept scripture (and nature) will not find the obscurity
in nature and scripture to be a barrier to their faith, but instead a means of
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strengthening their perception of deep and mysterious divine truths. As Origen
writes:
But as the doctrine of providence is not at all weakened in the eyes
of those who have once honestly accepted it, so neither is the
divinity of Scripture, which extends to the whole of it, on account
of the inability of our weakness to discover in every expression the
hidden splendor of the doctrines veiled in common and
unattractive phraseology. (qtd. in Benjamins 14)
Origen trusted that even those parts of nature and scripture that appear to lack all
providence or those parts that involve suffering and ugliness are connected with
God’s grace and purposes, even if this is in ways human eyes and minds cannot
comprehend. In its first appearance as a Christian analogy, the book of nature
served as a means of understanding and accepting the presence of evil and
suffering in the world.

BASIL
Basil of Caesarea (c. 330-379) took a similar approach as Origen as he developed
a natural theology written partly in response to Manichean beliefs that evil is a
power opposite and equally powerful to good. Like other Gnostics, the
Manicheans believed evil was a force at work in the creation of the world. Basil
also appears to respond to criticisms of Christian beliefs about creation and
questions concerning apparent evil in nature (e.g. poisonous animals, etc.) (Groh
30). His solution to the problem of such adversities in nature was simple: even the

12
seemingly evil things are good; we must only discover the use God created them
to have (Groh 29-30). Basil believed that creation theology allows readers to
perceive sources of faith and the power of God’s word in nature (Groh 28, 30).
Ambrose of Milan (339-397) followed in Basil’s footsteps by defending the
goodness and use of even evil parts of nature. While nature was affected by the
fall, he suggested, even fallen things still have their use. Ambrose also used an
analogy that would often be used later in the medieval era; nature is a mirror to
the divine, which otherwise cannot be seen (Groh 31).

AUGUSTINE
Augustine of Hippo (354-430) also used the “book of nature” analogy in order to
respond to Manichean beliefs about the presence of evil in the world, as well as
Gnostic dualistic worldviews. Augustine first used the analogy in Contra Faustum
Manichaeum, a treatise arguing against the writings of Faustus, a Manichean
leader in North Africa (Groh 33). Faustus’s writings argued that Christians should
reject major aspects of the Old Testament and the New, including Jesus’s physical
birth, his “circumcision and sacrifice,” baptism, and temptations (Drecoll 39).
After reaffirming that scripture should be accepted in its entirety and arguing
against the particular rejections Faustus makes, Augustine draws a parallel
between nature and scripture to illustrate how problematic rejecting major aspects
of scripture are (Drecoll 44-45). In Augustine’s mind, to “read” scripture is also to
read God’s physical creation through the history of Christ and his people, just as
to read nature is to read God’s works or words:
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But once you contemplate all of creation in such a way that you
recognize God as creator, and if you then dislike something that
you read in the great Book of Nature, so to speak, it is better that
the reason remain concealed from you as a human being, than for
you to dare disapprove of anything God has created. (qtd. in Groh
33)
To Augustine, nature was full of complex manifestations of God that could only
be understood through religious faith. As Dieter Groh explains Augustine’s
perspective, “The ‘Book of Nature’ … is not filled with statements but with
difficult signs, hieroglyphs which can be understood only by those who are able to
match the statements revealed in scripture” (34). To have faith that God’s grace is
present in either scripture or nature is to have faith that this grace prevails in both
“texts,” even if it is not at first perceptible. Augustine used the analogy of the
“book of nature” as a way to defend the possibility that suffering is not
necessarily an evil that must be rejected or suppressed in nature and in religious
narratives. Faustus disbelieved certain parts of scriptural narratives that witnessed
that Christ was a divine embodied being who suffered. Like the view that the
Christian God could not create a world where life suffers, this perspective avoids
associating the divine with suffering. In contrast, Augustine’s argument appears to
imply that as readers of scripture, we should accept what seems evil in nature
without casting judgment on scripture or the natural world because God accepts
the presence of evil and suffering Himself. This applies not only to the natural
world He created, but also to suffering as a part of living in the world as evident
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in Christ’s acceptance of human physical suffering and temptations. The presence
of suffering in the natural world is one of the never-fully revealed meanings of the
“book of nature” (although sacred meanings and purposes are revealed at times
through suffering, such as in Christ’s act of atonement). Augustine’s argument
may help us see why sacred texts are such a vital question as we scrutinize moral
relationships with nature. Meanings that claim to come from outside humanity
have power to make sacred what otherwise seems ordinary or evil, and which
otherwise does not seem worthy of our respect or our restraint from suppressing.
This brief sketch of the book of nature’s origins in Christian theology
suggests how closely the problem of evil and the tension between manifestation
and proclamation are linked. As we contemplate the presence of evil and suffering
in our world, it is not only as if we are “reading” nature as a text itself, but this
also interacts with how the texts shape our phenomenological worlds as readers.
A simplified version of the “reading” of the early critics of the Bible and Christian
belief in the goodness of creation is that because suffering is part of both the
natural and phenomenological world, and the world portrayed in narratives of the
Old Testament, neither the readers’ world nor the world of the text can reveal
divine meanings. Origen’s, Basil’s and Augustine’s responses reflect opposite
beliefs about suffering. All things have their purpose according to the divine.
Suffering does not prevent nature from revealing the divine or sacred meanings,
and may even serve as a way of revealing sacred meanings and purposes. Nature
is comparable to a mirror reflecting God’s face, or a book written with his hand.
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According to these early theologians, the analogy of the “book of nature”
suggests two things about the problem of evil and the tension between
manifestation and proclamation: (1) that despite the evil and suffering present in
nature, God’s grace is manifest in nature, even, at times, in things that appear evil
themselves, and (2) that human capacities to perceive this grace are increased by
scripture. Written sacred texts do not carry stagnant meanings, but meanings that
have potential to revitalize purposes we perceive in our relationships with the
natural world.
In the medieval era, interpretive relationships with nature and scripture
became closely intertwined. This tradition would eventually diminish. However,
attempts to reconcile scripture with the presence of evil did not end. The book of
nature’s relevance to the problem of evil and the tension between proclamation
and manifestation continues to be apparent in perspectives of the Bible’s
influence on the environmental crisis.

CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES OF THE “BOOK OF NATURE”
As some environmental writers have addressed the Bible and medieval exegesis,
they have raised these problems in our time with two questions: (1) how can we
understand the Bible, a text that claims to be sacred, when it can now be
questioned whether its influence was for good or evil in relationship to the natural
world, and, (2) how can we make sense of the evil and suffering occurring in our
world created through the explosion of technology? In his 1967 article, “The
Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” Lynn White Jr. argues that despite the
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dwindling of Christian faith in Western culture, the West continues to hold to
readings of the Bible, particularly the counsel to “subdue” the earth in the Genesis
creation account. White also blames medieval natural theology, arguing that it is
the direct ancestor of modern science. The belief that nature could reveal the
divine like a book combined with the idea that creation is for man’s use, he
claims, led to the idea that scientists should seek to unravel God’s mysteries in
nature and use their discoveries to benefit mankind (188-91). White proposes that
the West needs a new religion, or at least to drastically rework its religious
traditions (193).
Christopher Manes also identifies the book of nature as a foundation for
attitudes that caused the environmental crisis. The influence of medieval exegesis,
Manes claims, promoted Renaissance humanistic anthropocentricism, the main
culprit of the silencing the voice of nature in modern culture (19-21). Medieval
natural theology imposed reductive meanings on natural life so that the latter
became merely an extension of the biblical text. An eagle, for example, was
reduced to a mere symbol for Saint John. As Manes describes, “Exegesis swept
all into the net of divine meaning,” usually linking symbols in nature with human
salvation (19). Religious and secular texts dominated over meanings in nature,
destroying manifestations of natural meanings with anthropocentric language.
Manes suggests that if we are to emulate a medieval tradition today, it should be
the contemplative tradition, which he perceives as creating a more genuine
dialogue with nature, if only because words were more sparse (25-6).
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David Abram similarly perceives relationships with biblical text as having
overpowered the authentic voice of nature. Abram theorizes that the Hebrews
once had some sense of the sacredness of nature in their use of the alphabet and
written texts, specifically through how they understood air, breath and wind
through the word ruach. The Hebrew language did not contain vowels, leaving
gaps to be filled with the reader’s breath, which like the wind and divine breath,
were considered sacred. Ruach, or breath, filled the gaps in human language,
providing a sacred connection between human life, wind, and the divine (239-43).
However, over time, even this sense of the sacredness of the air was lost as
vowels were added to the alphabet (250-51). Christianity, with its New Testament
written in Greek, de-animated nature as it spread (253-54). Written scripture
gradually replaced nature’s sacredness in Western culture. Beyond ancient
Hebraic culture, in animistic cultures, the sounds of words and their meanings
were once interwoven into the sensuous experience of nature, but once words
were written, this connection between the natural world and living words was
severed (140-41, 183-85). The West ceased to care about the cleanliness of the
air, the natural courses of rivers, or to value the lives of animals. Abram suggests
that individuals in Western culture need to reconnect with the personal, embodied
experience of living in nature and create new narratives like the ones oral cultures
used to help reconnect our identities and our personal moral practice to the land
(269-74).
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RETHINKING THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CRISIS
Each of these arguments is concerned with understanding the problem of
suffering in nature, as well as the tension between how the sacred reveals itself in
nature and texts. However, they stand in strong opposition to those of the early
Christian theologians who helped develop the analogy between nature and the
sacred text and the interpretive tradition of both. This raises a difficult problem in
how we might understand the book of nature today from a Christian perspective.
If Christian thinkers once asserted that interpretive relationships between nature
and scripture are intended to help us accept and perceive divine grace in nature,
how could the same hermeneutic possibly have led to such destructive use of
technology toward nature? How could scripture have become the source of evil
itself, rather than a healing balm?
Weaknesses in the environmental criticisms are apparent in their
resemblance to past reductions of the sacred quality of scripture in relation nature.
To blame Judeo-Christian texts and traditions for the evils of the environmental
crisis resembles how Gnostics rejected the Old Testament as a misleading text
without reading the text carefully in their critiques. At times the environmental
critiques appear to assume (if only inadvertently), like the Gnostics, that ultimate
sources of moral evil can and should be identified, and that the religious texts of
Judaism and Christianity are misleading with regard to our relationship to the
natural world.
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The limited scope of the environmental perspective becomes more
obvious by comparing their responses to Christianity with interpretive turns
during the early modern period. Readings of nature and scripture in the early
modern period espoused some of the problematic assumptions of earlier Christian
Gnostics. As Arthur Nock describes, although Gnosticism belongs to a specific
time, its obsession with the problem of evil, its approach to human knowledge as
saving, and its tendency to “recoil” from human “environment[s]” have often
been taken up by others (256). The early modern period serves as one example of
this phenomenon. Two major trends, the first related to the tension between
manifestation and proclamation, and the other to the problem of suffering, made
Western culture more anthropocentric as it came to rely more on human rather
than sacred sources of knowledge. Like the Gnostics, the early moderns failed to
look more carefully at the balance between the manifestation and the
proclamation of the sacred, and at the moral implications of their negative
responses to the problem of suffering in nature.
First, loss of faith in a divine creator, in scripture as divine language, and
in nature’s capacities to reveal sacred meanings during the late-medieval and
early modern periods resonates with the Gnostic perspectives in late antiquity that
I have discussed. During the Middle Ages, there was a common belief that not
words, but only concepts could grasp reality (Dupré 103). This belief conflicted
with another medieval perspective that literally every word of scripture is sacred
and manifests the divine (Otten 257-8). (The book of nature was often similarly
used to assert that every life form was revelatory of divinity [Manes 19-20]).
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However, skepticism toward words won out as late-medieval nominalist theology
drew strength. Nominalist thought weakened links between words and reality,
particularly relationships between the divine words of scripture and the natural
world. Unfortunately, this also led to a loss of faith that God had created the earth
with special purposes for how men should live and develop. As Renaissance
humanist movements begin, the human mind rather than the divine word became
the source for deriving the purposes of nature, both for theorizing natural laws and
for imagining potential uses of nature (Dupré 103-6). As Western culture lost
faith in a God who created nature with specific meanings and purposes in mind,
they lost faith that human society and nature were meant to be meaningfully
connected through divine revelation. Readings of the book of nature slipped out
of more genuine interest in relationships with the divine. For example, late
medieval Chartrians (a Christian group of thinkers that Otten considers “Gnostic,”
but which is of course part of a different movement than Gnostics in late
antiquity) attempted to reason out God’s mysteries in the late medieval period
through science using the “book of nature” analogy, rather than to uncover
religious wisdom, which foreshadowed modern separations of nature from the
divine. The influence of such new readings of nature is perceptible in writings
from the period such as Alan of Lille’s Plaint of Nature (Otten 267-82). As Louis
Dupré explains, two great schisms that continue in Western culture resulted from
changes during the late-medieval period: a separation between creator and
creation, and a separation between the individual and cosmic meaning (3-4).
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The schisms Dupré describes are encompassed in an ‘anthropocentric
shift’ in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries outlined by Charles Taylor. New
and objective perspectives arose in which the world was perceived as working
through a “self contained,” “impersonal, immanent order” which can be
“understood in its own terms” regardless of its divine origins. God’s hand was at
work in the world only indirectly through this natural order (290). What resulted
was a paradigm shift toward “purely human flourishing” that “narrowed the
purposes of Divine Providence.” Previously, Judeo-Christian traditions had often
included beliefs that God expected more than human benefit as an end to creation.
Not only was it expected that human progress should be purposed toward
becoming more divine, but it was also assumed that there were greater purposes in
human relationships with nature than human progress and well-being (221-22,
290). Objective approaches to nature promoted anthropocentric practice in that
they diminished belief in divine requirements for humans to treat nature according
to certain moral and spiritual principles.
Religious readings of nature also diminished through a loss of belief that
the sensory experience of nature can be sacred and symbolic. Changes in readings
of the book of nature were part of a transformation of Western culture from a
visual to a word culture as a consequence of the Catholic reformation. As Peter
Harrison describes, “visual experience was denigrated as intrinsically unreliable,
and easily susceptible to the perpetration of impostures” (2-3). The visual
language of symbols was replaced with the mental language of math and reason
as the book of nature was deployed by those promoting the development of
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science (Harrison 4-5). Nature was visually emptied of hidden manifestations and
made much more transparent. Charles Taylor characterizes such changes in the
early modern early as a “second anthropocentric shift,” an “eclipse of grace.”
“The order God designed” he explains, “was there for reason to see.” Previous to
this time, even those with great faith in human powers to reason would have
added the stipulation that humanity’s fallen state necessitates divine grace (222).
Now the world was perceived as “a natural order … purged of enchantment, and
freed from miraculous interventions and special providences from God, operating
by universal, causal laws (290). Undoubtedly, there are many ways that this
disenchantment benefited Western culture’s relationships with nature. However,
in relation to religious faith and previous perceptions of God’s influence in the
world, this transformation created an approach to nature much more centered on
human needs and purposes.
Second, the perception of nature and suffering as something evil and nonsacred, evident in modern uses of technology, resonates with Gnosticism’s
tendency to reject the natural world, and to rely on knowledge as a saving power
for humanity. Tendencies to allow scientific discourses to dominate relationships
with the natural world at the beginning of the modern era changed perceptions of
suffering. Science justified its divorce from moral philosophy (which had
traditionally checked it) by promising to radically diminish human suffering
(Borgmann 26). However, the “eradication” of “trouble” would also tend to
obscure the presence of divine grace, which like suffering, is ultimately out of
human control. Today, attempts to suppress suffering through technology
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diminish recognition of human needs for a healing, divine presence in our world
(Borgmann 65, 78-79). This trend is also closely connected with the
“anthropocentric shift” toward “human flourishing” in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries Taylor characterizes. Divine purposes for nature outside of
human welfare and the necessity of God’s grace were eclipsed by reliance on
human capacities to discern and order world through natural laws (221-23, 290).
Technology was applied to explain and control sources of suffering to promote
human well being above other forms of life. As Michel Serres suggests, nature
came to be treated not unlike an enemy (11) as technology came to be used to
suppress suffering by extreme measures. Such tendencies to suppress suffering
eclipse the sacredness of religious texts. As Heidegger suggests in “The Question
Concerning Technology,” modern technology teaches us to reduce nature and
other persons to instruments for technology’s own ends, failing to recognize what
is non-technological not only in nature but in the religious. God Himself can be
reduced to an efficient cause, or a transparent explanation for the way the world is
(“Technology” 331). Jean-Luc Marion builds on Heidegger’s argument to suggest
that suffering is also reduced to something ultimately traced to human actions.
With such a worldview, it is easy to redirect blame from humanity toward to the
divine as the ultimate cause of all evil (Marion 6). Modern technology’s
tendencies to attempt to control suffering can be destructive of relationships with
the sacred. Heidegger suggests that modern technology’s problems started before
the technologies themselves were invented, when the West began to have faith in
human rationality to tap nature according to exact measures in the seventeenth
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century (“Technology” 327). Moral stumbling blocks do not necessarily start with
practice, but with decisions to approach the world with excessive confidence in
human knowledge to manipulate nature’s workings to solve humanity’s problems.
These criticisms of the influence of science and reason in the early modern
period on relationships with nature are not intended to dismiss the good that has
come through the Enlightenment in the West’s relationships with nature.
Questions surrounding modern science and its influence on moral practice are
difficult if only because science has been and continues to be a means of
overturning deceptive worldviews and empowering humanity to perform greater
good. What I wish to emphasize is that innovations during the early modern
period altered perceptions of how religious texts and nature reveal knowledge
toward an anthropocentric direction, whatever benefits or vices came from these
newly founded beliefs in relation to nature.
Although they challenge the West’s anthropocentric worldviews and
exploitive uses of technology, the discussions White, Manes, and Abram raise do
not succeed in reconciling reductions concerning interpretation of religious texts
and nature that early Christian Gnostics and the early moderns made..First, they
offer an incomplete perspective of the tension between manifestation and
proclamation. Their perspectives are interested in the denigration of the sensory
experience of the sacred in nature that has taken place, which is apparent in
Abram’s argument that Western culture needs to reconnect with the “sensuous”
experience of nature personally, in White’s suggestion that Christianity needs
something like a pagan “sacred grove” (189-91), and Mane’s suggestion that we
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need to learn to hear nature’s true voice again through altering human-centric
tendencies in our language to become more like animistic cultures (15-16, 24-26).
To some degree, they extol the kind of experience that Ricoeur calls hierophany
or manifestation in an effort to correct the mistakes of past generations.
Nevertheless, they fail to approach the possibility that scripture is comparable to
nature’s voice in our moral relationships with the world because scripture presents
itself to readers as something more-than-human. Their approaches contrast with
Gnostic treatments of the problem of evil in nature in that they seek (rather than
deny) a sense of unseen sacred purposes in nature. They contrast with early
modern innovations in that they overturn the assertion that relationships with
nature should center on human flourishing. But their arguments resonate with
early Gnostic perspectives of how manifestation and proclamation in that they fail
to think carefully about how religious narratives extend sacred meanings that can
strengthen perceptions of the sacred in nature. Although Manes, for example,
attempts to acknowledge that experiences with the book of nature must have been
much more complex than he can account for in his article, he nevertheless tends
to treat scripture and exegesis as imposing artificial and degrading meanings on
nature a priori in his brief discussion of them (19-29).
The problem of evil is also present in their discussions, but reduced in an
anthropocentric way that reflects, rather than challenges, paradigms that have
upheld modern technology. Like Gnostic thinkers, they take a somewhat
distanced approach to living relationships with the natural world in that they do
not fully address the presence of suffering in nature. Rather than recoiling from
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nature’s adversities consciously as in Gnosticism, their arguments do not address
how human suffering and attempts to suppress evil through extreme measures is a
dimension of immoral uses of technology. One might phrase the question raised
not as “How should we respond to the presence of suffering in nature in order to
overcome immoral practice?” but “Whom do we blame for human suffering and
the suffering and damage inflicted on the natural world?” To some extent, their
writings assume it is possible to identify specific sources of the evils of the
environmental crisis in order to find solutions. Such assumptions are comparable
to Gnostic interests in inquiring into the sources of evil and human suffering and
early modern attempts to use science to repress the causes of human suffering.
Attempts to trace the origins of the environmental crisis in religious texts and
traditions can be interpreted as an unintentional way of treating what is holy as an
explanation for the world’s workings.

THE “BOOK OF NATURE” FROM A RELIGIOUS, ECOCRITICAL
PERSPECTIVE
The pertinence of the problem of evil and the tension between manifestation and
proclamation to the book of nature provides a space in which to address the book
of nature’s significance in the context of the environmental crisis from a new
perspective: how might an understanding of the book of nature help us to respond
to the presence of evil and suffering in the world and how texts and nature reveal
sacred meanings?
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Yet creating a religious perspective of the medieval book of nature poses a
special challenge. The tradition is distant from us, and its cultural prevalence
during the Middle Ages only makes the analogy more difficult to characterize
today (Otten 261). I will offer a contemporary religious perspective of the book of
nature by interpreting Shakespeare’s comedy As You Like It in light of
contemporary religious philosophy. Shakespeare’s work can serve as a way to
imagine what relationships between nature and scripture might have once been
like, or perhaps only what they should have been like.
Shakespeare’s depictions of the “book of nature” are relevant to
contradictions between contemporary and medieval perspectives of the
hermeneutic because of his early modern position. He lived in a time when the
divide between divine words and nature that transformed the modernized West
had just begun to be noticeable. Shakespeare’s plays, like many literary works
from his time, respond to a sense of illusoriness and deception in the external
world (Dupré 98-99). During Shakespeare’s life, the book of nature had been
revived as a subject of interest and speculation. As Paul Willis argues, it is
probable that Shakespeare was conscious of this as he wrote As You Like It.
Protestant thinkers of his time tended to believe that the book of nature was a
legitimate religious analogy and experience, although they also usually added
disclaimers that nature and humanity both have limitations— nature to reveal and
humans to perceive revealed truth. Michel De Montaigne expressed perhaps the
greatest cynicism toward the book of nature. He responded to Raymond Sebond’s
essay that argued that men could perceive divine meaning with clarity in nature
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with a strong attack on human capacities to properly “read” nature (Willis 66-67).
Montaigne’s “defense” of Sebond’s view became a full-fledged assault on human
reasoning and philosophy. However, Montaigne thoughtfully argued that the
“knot” that should connect humanity with divine through nature is divine grace,
not human reasoning (Montaigne 395). Shakespeare’s play continues the critical
thinking of his time about the book of nature. Like Montaigne and others,
Shakespeare appears to have been doubtful of human abilities to perceive divine
truths in nature with accuracy, but his scenes also uphold the possibility that
nature can manifest the sacred. As Willis suggests, Shakespeare overthrows the
“cliché” of the book of nature in order to reveal the “complexity” behind it rather
than to discredit the tradition itself (Willis 72). He examines the tension
Montaigne identified between reading nature through human reason and reading
nature with the help of divine grace. His scenes can be interpreted to juxtapose
anthropocentric “readings” of nature that were developing during his time with
more open religious perspectives of nature.
As You Like It could be considered to be what Jonathan Bate calls an
“ecopoetic,” work, a piece of literature that reveals something about what it
means to live with and in nature and has potential to transform relationships with
nature. Bate draws on Martin Heidegger’s concept of poiesis. Poetry and the arts
are ways of creating comparable to the workings of nature. Unlike modern
technology, which challenges and disguises nature, they reveal truths about what
it means to live in the world with natural life. Ecopoetics asserts that despite the
division between nature and humanity created by the technology and the
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environmental crisis, culture and nature are not completely severed; poems can
speak powerfully to us about how relationships with nature can and should be
(251-62). Poetry may be an essential tool in overcoming the environmental crisis
(282-3). As Heidegger suggests, poetic language is a form of techne that can fill
our needs to overthrow contemporary moral blindness perpetuated through our
use of technology (“Technology” 339-41). Unlike modern technology’s exploitive
practices, poetic language performs constructive work in our moral relationships
with nature. Ecopoems can allow us to step outside of the thinking of
technological culture and to reconnect with true relationships with nature, while
looking to both past and future (Bate 282-83). Shakespeare’s As You Like It might
help us look at interpretive relationships between nature and scripture in the past
and future with new eyes.
As I discuss how the play applies to a phenomenological understanding of
interpretive relationships between nature and scripture, I will draw on
contemporary religious philosophical writings, including essays by Paul Ricoeur
on interpretive relationships with scripture collected in Figuring the Sacred, JeanLuc Marion’s “Evil in Person,” in Prolegomena to Charity, and Albert
Borgmann’s “Contingency and Grace” from Power Failure: Christianity in the
Culture of Technology. Ricoeur’s writings suggest that despite the desacralization
of nature and culture in the West, reconnecting meaningfully with sacred
narratives from the past is possible and an important as we address contemporary
problems (Wallace 1). Ricoeur offers detailed observations of how interpretive
relationships work between scripture and the phenomenological world, partly as a
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means of demonstrating that scripture can offer meanings and religious hope
amidst contemporary problems as we choose to engage it earnestly. Ricoeur’s
writings can help explain how interpretive relationships between nature and
scripture work in the play. Marion’s and Borgmann’s writings offer
phenomenological descriptions of the experience of suffering and grace that are
applicable to As You Like It. Their writings focus on how responses to suffering
must be carefully considered as we attempt to shatter technological paradigms
that have desacralized our world.
While the book of nature has been accused of serving as a source of evil
and deterioration in Western culture, Shakespeare’s play, as in the writings of
Origen and Augustine, suggests something quite the opposite: religious readings
of nature can help us find sources of relief and hope in the face of evil and
suffering. As it was in late antiquity, the “book of nature” analogy can be used to
help us understand that: (1) scripture and nature can work together in meaningful
ways that enrich, rather than diminish, our moral relationships with nature, or in
other words, that manifestation and proclamation are interdependent; (2) grace (or
the presence of the sacred or divine) and suffering are contingencies outside of
human control and are encountered on a personal level; and (3) that grace is
perceptible in the midst of evil and suffering, and that suffering is not necessarily
evil. The next three chapters will explore each of these facets of the “book of
nature” in the play in the order above. By exploring how the book of nature is
related to the problem of evil and the tension between how nature and texts reveal
the sacred, this thesis will argue that the “book of nature” hermeneutic transcends
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the logic of the criticisms of medieval exegetical traditions I have discussed. In
addition to this, “the book of nature” carries important implications we can learn
from as we continue to approach the problem of how to understand how texts and
nature reveal truth and how to respond to the presence of suffering and evil in the
context of the environmental crisis.

The Interdependence of Manifestation and Proclamation:
Overturning Environmental Pastoral Reductions
In the last chapter, I argued that environmental perspectives that claim
Christianity has reduced the West’s sense of the sacred in nature are unfairly
disinterested in reconnecting with religious texts. The argument that JudeoChristian traditions are causes of the evils of technology is prone to reduce
interpretive relationships with scripture and nature by assuming that while
hierophanies, or manifestations of the sacred in nature like those animistic
cultures once experienced, are good, proclamations, or written scripture and its
interpretive traditions, are bad.
In “Manifestation and Proclamation,” Paul Ricoeur describes how the
“religious” (proclamation) and the “sacred” (manifestation) may seem
irreconcilable. However, Ricoeur suggests, both ultimately center on reception of
the sacred, voices that speak to, rather than are spoken by, humanity (65). In a
world in which the sacred no longer speaks to humanity through nature or
scripture, the only way to restore our sense of the sacred through manifestation
might paradoxically be through proclamation.
The assumption that reconnecting with nature through manifestation-like
experiences is more important than relationships with religious texts is a pastorallike reduction of the sacred dimensions of human society and its relationships
with nature. Relationships with nature are assumed to be simpler and purer than
those with religious texts, which are entangled in the complexities and moral evils
32
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of culture. Similarly pastoral-like reductions of interpretive relationships between
nature and texts are common in contemporary culture, including
environmentalism (Phillips 17-25).
Pastoral assumptions that reduce the hermeneutic between the sacred in
scripture and in the natural world can be challenged. Shakespeare’s As You Like It
can help us to engage this problem. In criticism, the play has sometimes been
assumed to uphold conventions of pastoral romance. Yet a closer reading suggests
that country and court resist any simple division from each other. Life in the
country is as adverse and complex as life in the court. The conflict of the play is
not so much about the moral superiority of the forest and the corruption of court
life, but between two ways of living represented by two leaders: Duke Frederick,
who denies and destroys non-human sources of hope, and Duke Senior, who
openly seeks them. The play seems to suggest not that experiences with nature are
needed to refresh a corrupt society as much as it suggests that religious meanings
are needed to create a better world in response to evil and suffering. Encounters
with nature are only one half of the solution in the play. The other necessary
solution is freedom to believe that human relationships with natural entities might
be more meaningful than they at first appear. Only as the characters become
receptive to the sacred in both nature and other sources, including religious
preaching and love (which we might compare to proclamation) are the schisms
between country and court resolved. Like the characters in the play,
environmental writers need to remain open to the importance of engaging the
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sacred not only in nature, but also other sources like scripture as they seek
solution for our society’s moral challenges.
Shakespeare’s As You Like It presents us with “readings” of the “book of
nature” that suggest that manifestation and proclamation are comparable to each
other because of their capacities to convey sacred meanings, and that they work
together. Neither religious proclamation nor manifestation can be reduced or
dismissed as irrelevant to the problems of the world of the play. The “book of
nature” hermeneutic does not necessarily entail imposing religious meanings on
nature. Instead, it helps the sacred be perceived in both nature and other sources
of spiritual meaning within society. As You Like It and Ricoeur’s essay on
“Manifestation and Proclamation” suggest that when the natural world becomes
desacralized and isolated to society, proclamation is sometimes necessary to
strengthen abilities to sense the presence of the sacred in the phenomenological
world.

CONTEMPORARY PASTORAL PARADIGMS AND ENVIRONMENTALISM
Dana Phillips characterizes post-modern conceptions of nature and culture as a
pastoral-like paradigm. In pastoral, nature is simple and isolated from society,
which is complex and corrupting. Today, relationships with nature are reduced by
assumptions that human discourses and technologies have become such essential
sources of meaning that nature no longer shapes what it means to be human.
Faced with the conflicted (and corrupt) voice of culture, nature’s purer and
simpler voice is drowned out and isolated from humanity. As Phillips suggests,
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post-modern culture sometimes even seems to delight in the supposed defeat of
nature’s voice by the current society (24, 27). Pastoral worldviews apply
particularly to the way we envision our relationships with texts and nature. As
Jonathan Bate describes, in post-modernity it often seems that “all marks” have
become “textmarks” (175), or that human discourses prevent nature from
revealing itself as non-human. Even many of our attempts to value and relate to
natural life often end in ridiculous impositions of human meaning, and
“hyperreal” visions in which animals and other entities are understood primarily
through analogies to human activities, as Umberto Eco describes (Phillips 20-23).
Natural entities are treated as objects appropriated into culture by consumption.
Such reductive relationships between human discourses and nature appear
to be perpetuated by modern technology. As Albert Borgmann suggests, the
center of contemporary Western culture has become modern technology and the
commodities it provides. Individuals have become isolated consumers of products
they know virtually nothing about, and which are created in public spaces void of
any sense of “celebrating” the “commanding” presence of art, nature, and the
phenomenological world. Our “culture of technology” assumes that it is normal to
live alienated lives in which we consume and are influenced by what ultimately
derives from humans and technology and no longer engage religious or sacred
meanings (Borgmann 29, 37-41, 85-91, 121-27). As Phillips describes, it often
seems as if now when we encounter nature, it is only through media of technology
(Philips 25). Human discourses feed off of technology’s deception that humanity
(as opposed to non-human entities) is the only real influence on events. Humanity
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does not allow itself to be “spoken to” by what is non-human as it isolates itself
from nature through modern technology (Heidegger, “Technology” 332).
In a world in which human texts and technologies mask nature’s “voice”
and its otherness, it seems reasonable to credit Judeo-Christian scripture and
interpretive traditions for the advent of modern technology. Extending meanings
from Judeo-Christian texts to relationships with nature, environmental writers
claim, helped jumpstart the West’s obsession with treating nature as a transparent
text deciphered through human discourses. To White, medieval religious culture
and Judeo-Christian texts led to immorally anthropocentric worldviews. In light
of this, the loss of pagan animism in the West is somewhat tragic. In the future,
religious cultures must somehow learn to rediscover a sense of sacredness in
nature (189). Manes describes how in the animistic world, humans listened to
voices in nature in addition to human language, preventing the use of
anthropocentric speech and practice (15-17). The Bible played a role in justifying
the humanistic attitudes that would lead to an obsession with anthropocentric
language in the West (19-21). To Abram, the alphabet which spread with Western
book religions replaced the animistic qualities of nature, leading us to justify
polluting the air and the world generally as it lost its sacredness (239-42, 250-60).
While scripture, or proclamation, has proven harmful, animism provided moral
relationships in the ancient world because of the ways it allowed cultures engage
the natural world as a non-human presence.
However, as, Phillips argues, environmentalists fall into some of the same
pastoral traps that afflict contemporary culture in general, which is evident in
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these perspectives of the distinction between manifestation and proclamation. In
its early years, ecocriticism was often criticized for favoring idyllic visions of
nature and ignoring nature’s complex relations to culture (Levin 172). Pastoral is
a genre that ecocriticism has often drawn on, sometimes without scrutinizing its
conventions (Phillips 17). The problem with pastoral in ecocriticism runs on a
deeper level than any preference for idyllic literary worlds. Environmental
writers, Dana Phillips describes, often appear to have experienced a life-changing
realization. While wrestling with difficult texts, they recognize that while nature
seems simple and good, culture is endlessly complex and often bad (3). Yet, while
ecocritics are critical of the influence many discourses have had on nature, they
also have great confidence in the power of poetry to restore personal relationships
with nature through representation (Phillips 7). Culture and texts are looked to as
both culprits and heroes in the environmental crisis, with power to save and
destroy relationships with nature, much as city dwellers can be both evil and
corrupt or romantic and heroic in the world of pastoral literature.
The arguments of White, Manes and Abram maintain a somewhat
exaggerated role of human texts and language prevalent in post-modern pastoral.
This comes at the expense of a more thorough discussion of scripture as a sacred
text. In some instances, the words of the Bible themselves are assumed to have
been such a dominant force in interpretative traditions that the text has proven
itself culpable of choking nature’s sacred voice. For example, Abram theorizes
that a respect for the air as symbolic of God’s sacred breath was once connected
to the act of interpretation in Hebrew tradition. Hebrew had no markings for
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vowels, which may indicate the fact that active participation was required on the
part of the reader to bring the words to life with his breath, analogous to the
breath of God providing the world with life. But this recognition was lost once the
text was translated into languages with written vowels. Abram leaves us to
assume that formal use of language trumps the significance of God’s ruach that
remained to be uncovered in text, or that connecting ourselves to nature through
language matters more than the sacred meanings themselves that could continue
to connect the text with sacred understanding of the phenomenological world
(239-51).
Although Abram, White, and Manes suggest that we need to learn to hear
nature’s voice for ourselves by experiencing nature personally, the solutions they
pose also rely on the power of language to reshape these relationships. They
suggest the West create new narratives and ways of using language that avoid
anthropocentrism. Although he refers to the possible importance of reinterpreting
Judeo-Christian texts, White also suggests that the West may need a new religion
to deter its anthropocentricism. (192-93). Reconnecting with the sacred in nature
through some means appears to take precedence over judging whether texts are
holy and discerning their moral implications. To Abram, solutions lie in writing
stories that weave human experience into local landscapes, which is the closest
way we can imitate moral relationships animistic cultures have with the land
(272-74). To Manes, nature can begin to speak again if we deliberately choose to
rid human language of its anthropocentric center (25-26). Confidence in our

39
powers to change the West’s language and culture for the better is a key to
reconnecting with the sacred in nature in their discussions.
Because it is associated with complex historical questions, Judeo-Christian
scripture is treated somewhat as a literary or historical text comparable to nonreligious narratives and or philosophical writings. Paul Ricoeur suggests that in
scholarship that treats scripture as a historical text, the possibility of uncovering
sacred meanings is cut off, as the text is severed from the living religious dialogue
(religious reading, speaking and writing) it is intended for (Figuring 220).
Jonathan Bate writes that environmental criticism needs to retain the possibility
that despite post-modernity’s assumption that “all marks are textmarks,” or that
the only meanings we engage are human-derived, “certain textmarks called poems
can bring back to our memory humankind’s ancient knowledge that without
landmarks we are lost” (175). We can extend this idea beyond literature to
scripture, which is itself a special kind of poetry, with a second level of reference
to the real world (Ricoeur, Figuring 44-45, 58). In many cases, environmental
thought might hold closer to the prospect that religious texts, and even particular
texts and traditions, offer vital meanings for our relationships with nature. Even
though it is enmeshed in the history of Western culture, Judeo-Christian texts may
play an irreplaceable role in allowing us to recognize that “without landmarks we
are lost,” or that without engaging nature as something sacred, our culture is left
to the impoverishment of our society’s isolation from nature.
In order to approach relationships with nature and scripture more
thoughtfully, environmental writing needs tools to move beyond the pastoral-like
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paradigms that reduce the vital quality of scripture as a sacred text. One possible
way to challenge pastoral-reductions of relationships between texts and nature is
to engage literature that addresses the pastoral by exploring pastoral’s tendencies
to isolate and simplify nature. Terry Gifford suggests an alternative to pastoral
perspectives that avoids reductive idyllicism as well as the pessimism of antipastoral modes: “post-pastoral.” Post-pastoral isn’t necessarily aligned with postmodernism; it encompasses literary works from all time periods that suit its goal
of using pastoral as a means of trying to heal schisms between nature and culture
(in this case we might add, between nature and scripture). Unlike some antipastoral modes, it doesn’t relinquish hope that relationships between society and
the natural world can become harmonious. Post-pastoral criticism seeks to ask,
“What would be the features of writing that can point towards a right way to live
at home on our planet earth?” (Gifford 17-18). In relation to the tension between
environmentalism and Christian texts, we might specifically ask, “What features
of Judeo-Christian scripture may point towards a right way of dwelling on the
earth?”

AS YOU LIKE IT
As You Like It fits Gifford’s description of a post-pastoral work because of the
way that it challenges the pastoral conventions of its time. The play has often
been received as a traditional pastoral work (Daley, “Dispraise” 300-1). At first,
this seems reasonable. The plot of As You Like It draws heavily on a
contemporaneous pastoral romance, Thomas Lodge’s popular Rosalynde (Latham
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xxxv-xlvi). The setting is not the deep forest but shepherds’ country, a mix of
woody areas and sheep pastures (Daley, “Woods” 172-75). At times descriptions
suggest that Duke Senior, the benevolent leader banished from his court, creates a
“golden world” or idyllic society in the country, a place of festive feasts and
charitable sharing of nature’s abundance in which the sensory experience of
nature replace the arts, letters, and music of the court (Daley, “Dispraise” 300).
Forest life appears morally superior to the court, the ceremonies of which
Shakespeare belittles (Daley, “Dispraise” 312), as if to uphold pastoral’s
traditional schism between country and city. While the court is corrupting and
false, nature is refreshing and cleansing. Political evils are only purged as
courtiers experience a retreat in the forest.
Yet the difficulties experienced in shepherds’ country cannot be so easily
separated from the adversities at the court. If Shakespeare affirms pastoral ideals,
he also overturns them. When the characters refer to the forest, it is usually with
“dispraise” rather than admiration (Daley, “Dispraise” 306). Nature and fortune,
representative of conditions out of the characters’ control (Montrose 28), often
lead to a bleak outlook. The ideal of a “golden world” is juxtaposed against the
reality of human hunger and exhaustion in the forest, as well as the necessity of
killing animals to live. Shepherds’ work is described in detail, including the
greasy, tarry hands that come from handling and performing surgery on sheep
(III.ii.53-64). Touchstone’s famous song about lovers and springtime contrasts
with the chilly winter’s wind in other lyrics and scenes in the play (V.iii.16-33,
II.vii.174-90). Rather than the fair-haired shepherdess of Lodge’s poem, Phebe
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resembles the inconstant and somewhat “foul” or plain “dark lady” from
Shakespeare’s sonnets (Daley, “Dispraise” 311-12; III.v.8-48). This alteration
seems to signal, like Shakespeare’s “dark lady,” (a figure he used to challenge
Petrarchan conventions), that the work is intended to explore questions raised by
contemporaneous poets, but in ways that probe such problems with greater depth
by focusing on the mundane rather than the ideal. If being ignored by an ideal
beloved like Petrarch’s “Laura” is bad, what does being betrayed by an obviously
flawed one feel like? Or, in the context of pastoral, if moral dilemmas arise in an
idyllic countryside, what is it like to face realistic problems in relationships with
the natural world? Shakespeare sometimes seems to directly challenge pastoral
conventions by exposing their absurdity. Scenes such as the discovery of
Orlando’s poorly written poetry about Rosalind pinned on trees and Corin’s and
Touchstone’s conversation about the dirty work of a shepherd seem to openly
mock pastoral traditions (III.ii.87-153, III.ii.52-76).
The play’s unusually realistic portrayal of a pastoral countryside is also
evident in its allusions to political issues of the time, including primogeniture. In
Lodge’s work, primogeniture was reversed so that the younger son inherited all
the father’s love and land, but in Shakespeare we find a realistic use of the
tradition (Montrose 34). Shakespeare also appears to be mindful of struggles in
rural society in Elizabethan England. The development of agrarian capitalism
shaped early modern schisms between nature and culture and the development of
pastoral poetry. In England, the land was now treated more as a tool for
aristocratic profit rather than as the center of agrarian communities (Williams 20-
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22, 297). As You Like It has sometimes been understood as a reaction to the
enclosure riots of Elizabeth’s time (Wilson 1-4). One of the tensions in traditional
pastoral poems had been the threat of eviction in country life, but in the
Renaissance, this function of pastoral to portray human connections to nature as a
“living world” was forgotten (Williams 17-18). Shakespeare reconnects pastoral
with loss of working one’s own land. We see this in one of the first scenes in the
Forest of Arden, where the shepherds at work do not own their own land, which is
soon bought up by Celia’s aristocratic gold, much as country life came to be ruled
by the finances of the elite (Wilson 16; II.iv.71-100).
Shakespeare’s portrayal of nature as mundane overturns pastoral
conventions particular to the Renaissance. In pastoral romance, the shepherd is an
“idealized mask” for the aristocrat (Williams 20). Traditionally, the pastoral
country was often a site of social equality; the origins of moral virtue were
irreducible to either country or city. Pastoral romance dismissed such conventions
by affirming the legitimacy of social hierarchies and the court’s superiority
(Kronenfield 334). It promoted the interest of the aristocratic society prospering at
the cost of agrarian communities. Nature is portrayed through lenses of science
and tourism (the “real interest” is court life rather than “country life in any of its
possible forms” [Williams 20-22]). In these ways, pastoral romance is more
reductive of relationships between court and country than older bucolic
conventions. Shakespeare’s mundane forest is juxtaposed against romanticized
and alienated portrayals of human relationships with the land. Even in the one
incident he upholds a romanticized depiction of nature, Oliver’s attack by a lion,

44
he does so somewhat satirically (IV.iii.98-132). Shakespeare overturns the ideal
in the country for the real paradoxically as if in effort to restore pastoral’s former
capacity to assert ideals of equality between court and country. He juxtaposes
Christian teachings of equality and humility with courtly assertions of moral
superiority (Kronenfield 332-48).
As Albert Cirillo suggests, what we find in Shakespeare is not
conventional pastoral, but pastoral “gone awry,” which exposes the pastoral as a
convention in tension with real relationships between the country and city (19),
both of which present moral challenges. The world of the play, in both the
country and the court, is in need of “moral regeneration” (Daley, “Dispraise”
303). The distinction drawn in the play is not between agrarian life and the court
life as good and evil, but between two ways of living: the usurping Duke
Frederick’s at court and the banished Duke Senior’s in the forest. As Stuart Daley
explains, the question raised by the play is how to make a better world, or how to
respond to the ethical challenges in it (Daley, “Dispraise” 303). This more
specifically becomes a matter of which ruler’s way will prevail, and which can
create a better world that responds appropriately to evil (Daley, “Dispraise” 312).
Nature is part of this world and solutions that are uncovered, but is not a primary
solution in itself (Daley, “Dispraise” 303).
We can apply the question raised in the play to gain a new perspective of
questions raised about Judeo-Christian traditions in contemporary culture.
Contemporary culture’s tendencies to isolate itself from nature that environmental
perspectives respond to resonate with the alienation of English society from
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nature that Shakespeare shows interest in. One of the questions raised in the play,
as in the environmental perspectives of Christianity, is how moral regeneration
can occur when alienation from nature is coupled with a loss of sacredness.
Shakespeare treats conventional pastoral distinctions as too reductive to address
this question; neither the country nor the court alone provides clear solutions.
Something more is needed to help restore moral relationships in both. The issue
can be elucidated by drawing a further distinction between the worldviews of the
two Dukes. While Duke Frederick’s worldview tends to eclipse sacred meanings,
including ways of engaging natural life in the forest as something more-thanhuman, Duke Senior deliberately seeks to perceive non-human meanings in the
forest and from other sources. The two worldviews are distinguished not as much
by association with country and court (the influence of each ruler can actually be
sensed in both), but by their openness to sacred sources of meaning and hope.
Similar to how neither court nor country is the ultimate determinant of moral
virtue in some pre-Renaissance pastorals, Shakespeare makes divine wisdom and
providence (something irreducible to country or court) a source of moral virtue.
The tension between lowly shepherds and cultured aristocrats found in pastoral
romance is transformed into a tension between “lowly” Christian virtues and
human-imposed hierarchies (Kronenfield 334-42).
The ambivalent portrayal of nature in the play correlates with the
worldviews of the two leaders. Those who follow Duke Frederick, or have at least
been tainted by his worldview through the abuses at court, tend to “read” nature
as bitter or empty of meaning, and society’s relationships with it as tragic. Those
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who follow Duke Senior are able to perceive hope and beauty in nature despite its
adversities. When Duke Senior’s society is being described, it is often an Edenic
view of nature, or a world in which the vices of evil and suffering are no longer
keenly felt.
I will first discuss Duke Frederick’s worldview and the modes of
“reading” nature it promotes. We first find examples of such perspectives of
nature in the opening scene in the de Boys’ home. The eldest brother Oliver
withholds his younger brother Orlando’s inheritance, in time even plotting to kill
Orlando for his own gain. Orlando the younger brother is well-liked and naturally
good, but the abuse of his brother leads him to take a dismal outlook, which
encompasses his perceptions of the natural world. Orlando feels his life has been
degraded to be no more meaningful than those of his brother’s farm animals (I.i.916). That which “nature” has given him (including his moral virtue), his brother
can easily take away (I.i.17-19). To Orlando, any providence in nature can be
trampled by human evils. Orlando brings this worldview with him into the forest
after being nearly killed by his brother (II.iii.17-76). He appears to assume that
the murderous desires of his brother are mirrored by the threat of starvation in a
“savage” forest. Although it is agrarian land, the country seems an uncultivated
“desert” to him (II.vii.94-107, III.ii.125).
Nothing “speaks” to Orlando in the forest; the fact that he sees the trees in
need of “tongues” suggests this. In order to make the forest more livable to
himself, Orlando hangs and carves poems on the trees (III.ii.127). The voices he
provides the trees with express his personal hopes and fears. On the “fairest
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boughs,” Orlando attaches Petrarchan love sonnets about Rosalind (III.ii.135-40).
On others, he writes poems about human strife, betrayal and death (III.ii.129-34).
The posting of poems on trees is a romantic pastoral convention, one of the
“poetical commonplaces” the play shares with its sources (Latham xxxi-ii).
Shakespeare plays on inscribing trees as if to suggest the absurdity of using poetic
language to engage nature. Orlando’s poems betray his ignorance. They and his
act of hanging them on the trees are quickly mocked by Touchstone (III.ii.88116). The image of the trees having tongues comically alludes to the medieval
tradition of the book of nature. While “reading” nature as savage and in need of
some culture (aided by his poems), Orlando does not truly “read” anything
because he imposes vacant meanings. His poems stem not from religious
interpretation, but from experiences at the court, especially betrayal. They are
man-made meanings that prevent nature from revealing itself as anything besides
destitute or full of false hopes. Orlando compares Rosalind to infamous
mythological characters to describe her beauties, making his praises empty and
even insulting (III.ii.141-54). His hopes seem so fragile that he cannot risk mixing
them in poetry with the fears he feels lest they are destroyed.
Duke Frederick’s worldview, which has tainted Orlando, is comparable to
a desacralized world in which nature has lost its “commanding” presence 1 as
something non-human. Human voices have come to dominate relationships with
nature. Orlando wishes to aid his own demoralized relationship with nature using
1

“Commanding” presence in reference to Borgmann’s discussion. Borgmann suggests
the phenomenological world has lost its “commanding” quality in contemporary
technological culture (29, 85-89).
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language to “cultivate” it, but fails miserably. He has nothing but the evils of the
court and its narcissistic ideals to draw on. Such a worldview “reads” nature in
correspondence with the experiences of the court, treating it as a transparent text.
Frederick’s influence resonates with the threat of a secularized culture removed
from the sacred and the religious, which was a common theme in theater during
Shakespeare’s time (Grady 26). Shakespeare’s portrayal of Orlando’s reading
appears conscious of shifts in early modern thinking I discussed in chapter one in
which interpreting the sacred in nature through religious discourse was overturned
in favor of the authority of human texts to unfold truths with clarity. “Readers” of
nature began to reason out its mysteries through mundane rather than sacred texts
(Harrison 6-18).

THE LOGIC OF CORRESPONDENCES
One way nature was sometimes approached like a semi-transparent text during the
Renaissance was through the “great chain of being.” One of Christopher Manes’s
complaints about medieval exegesis is that it promoted the development of this
philosophical idea. Each life form was placed in its hierarchical place in relation
to God, placing humanity on the top of creation (20-22). However, the concept is
likely much more ambiguous in regards to immoral interpretive turns than Manes
asserts. By examining medieval and Renaissance writings, Lovejoy demonstrates
how humanity was usually placed in the lower middle section of the chain, above
the animals but below God who was at the top with a multitude of heavenly
beings between. In Western thought, it often served as a source of humility,
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though at other times it was used to justify the belief that all forms of life lower
than humanity were created solely for human benefit (Lovejoy 184-91).
One aspect of the great chain of being that appears in Shakespeare’s play
is the logic of correspondences. The logic of correspondences structures nature
and humanity rationally according to similarities, opposites, and causal
relationships. Like follows like; the macrocosm predicts the microcosm (Whall
34). The logic of correspondences fulfills the great chain of being’s goal of
hierarchically ordering nature. It proves morally dangerous when it orders
creation according to human rationality while claiming to do so according to
divine design. Helen Whall suggests that the human relationships in
Shakespeare’s play are structured in ways intended to allude to the Renaissance
logic of correspondences. For example, Oliver and Duke Senior are good, their
brothers are bad. Duke Senior has a daughter; his brother has a daughter. Duke
Frederick’s usurpation and exile of his brother’s court is mirrored by Oliver’s
abuse and exile of his brother. Rosalind at first justifies loving Orlando because
her father loved his father (Whall 34-35). Social structures in the city mirror and
counterbalance those in the country.
We see that Frederick draws correspondences of this kind himself in that
he hates others when they are associated with his enemies. He exiles Rosalind
despite her good character because she is her father’s daughter (I.iii.53-65). He
hates Orlando despite the wrestling skills he would otherwise praise because he
hated his father (I.ii.225-30). As he exiles his enemies to the forest, a “logic of
correspondences” between city and court is established. Both country and city are
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adverse and brutal; the country is evil because it is the proper place to punish
Frederick’s enemies. When meanings in nature are “read” in correspondence with
Frederick’s evils, nature unfolds itself as a mirror to the tragedies of society. In
addition to Orlando’s reading of the forest, we find such parallels between the
evils of the court and in nature in the responses of Duke Senior’s men (who
voluntarily join him in his banishment out of compassion [I.i.98-104]) to a dying
stag they come across in the forest. As one of them describes:
To-day my Lord of Amiens and myself
Did steal behind [Jacques] as he lay along
Under an oak, whose antique root peeps out
Upon the brook that brawls along this wood,
To the which place a poor sequest’red stag,
That from the hunter’s aim had ta’en a hurt,
Did come to languish; and, indeed, my lord,
The wretched animal heav’d forth such groans
That their discharge did stretch his leathern coat
Almost to bursting, and the big round tears
Cours'd one another down his innocent nose
In piteous chase; and thus the hairy fool,
Much marked of the melancholy Jacques,
Stood on th’ extremest verge of the swift brook,
Augmenting it with tears. (II.i.29-43)
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If deer languish, weep, and groan in their own way as they suffer, they do so very
differently than humans do, but the imagery here is not animal. The words, “hairy
fool,” and “coat” also indicate this (humorously, the deer appears to be compared
with Jacques, and the melancholy he feels due to human evils). The courtiers are
trying to perceive the deer’s experience apart from the evils of hunting, but
ironically, they do so in ways that only emphasize their dominance over the deer.
The deer is a victim of human culture, but is nevertheless understood through
corresponding its experience with those of the exiled hunters. This perspective is
comparable to post-modern tendencies to assert empty impositions of human
meaning on nature, even when compassionate relationships with nature are
intended. Although the courtiers desire to improve the morality of their
relationship to nature, their interpretations of nature eclipse other-than-human
sources of understanding.
Jacques’s response to the deer makes the correlation between tragedy in
the human court and nature within Frederick’s worldview even more obvious. To
Jacques, the passing deer correspond directly with courtiers. They are “velvet,”
“fat and greasy citizens” indifferent to their fellow dying deer (II.i.50-55).
Jacques’s interpretation discerns parallels between nature and culture with great
transparency; he “pierceth through / The body of [the] country, city [and] court”
(II.i.58-59). In the center of both country and city lies betrayal and suffering
understood in human terms. Nature does not provide sources of hope or
consolation any more than the corrupt society. Jacques suggests that even as
voluntary exiles (who have kept their loyalty to Duke Senior), the Duke’s men are
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nevertheless “usurpers” and “tyrants” because they must “fright the animals” and
“kill them up” in their “native dwelling-place” (II.i.60-63). Duke Senior seems to
him more an “usurper” because of his hunting than his abusive brother (II.i.2628). Jacques appears to feel both victimized as he compares his own situation to
that of the dying deer and guilty as someone who must use animals to live.
Shakespeare’s portrayal of correspondences between nature and culture
appears dismal based on the scenes in which Frederick’s worldview prevails. The
courtiers’ readings of nature resonate with Manes’s argument that the great chain
of being fueled anthropocentric worldviews. Analogies that correlate nature with
human “texts” smother nature’s ability to speak as something non-human.
However, based on Paul Ricoeur’s discussion of how human experience is
correlated with sacred meanings, arguments that nature is silenced by interpreting
religious texts and that scripture is irreconcilable with manifestation is false.
Manifestation, in addition to proclamation, works by drawing correspondences
between human experience and natural entities. The connective bridge is the
sacred, or religious meanings irreducible to human metaphors. Animistic cultures
do not teach us that there are pure ways to access meanings in nature, but instead
that sacred meanings in nature and human experience tend to entangle themselves
in a messy bundle as we use language to engage nature religiously, similar to how
Abram describes relationships with nature in animistic cultures to work (139-63).
Nature does not have one authentic sacred voice to humans; instead, it is part of
what Phillips calls, “nature-culture,” the inseparable mixing of human narratives
and interpretation, natural entities, and all the ways they interact with each other
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(35-39). Religious narratives, like myths and the language of animistic cultures,
reveal sacred meanings by mixing human experiences with entities in the natural
world.
Paul Ricoeur describes the phenomenological experience of manifestation
in animistic cultures in his essay “Manifestation and Proclamation” as a variety of
ways of corresponding the human with the non-human. These include: (1)
correspondences between creation narratives or natural appearances and human
actions (specifically, ritual action), (2) “the correspondence between the
macrocosm and the microcosm—for example, the hierogamy of earth and sky
agrees with the union of male and female,” (3) correspondences between natural
entities and states/parts of the human body, and (4) the correspondence between
the body, the house, and the cosmos (54-55). Although manifestation is not
limited to correlations between the human body, human spaces, and human
experiences in general, perhaps the richest meanings in natural entities reveal
themselves through such connections.
This does not mean, however, that all is solely a matter of human choices
of interpretation. In a culture of manifestation, Ricoeur explains, sacred and
religious symbols are “bound” to the land. Religious meanings are not possible, or
cannot be what they reveal themselves to be without the presence of natural
entities. Nature as a non-human presence shapes human experiences and
meanings. The difference between symbols and metaphors, Ricoeur suggests, is
that true symbols derive from encounters in nature, while metaphors can be purely
the products of culture and the human mind (53).
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Yet, if correspondences between the natural and the human are the means
through which nature manifests its own voice, why do correspondences between
nature and court in the play completely muffle nature’s meanings in the play?
Correspondences between court and country are drawn in a society that has lost
its connection to the sacred. This desacralization occurs through the overturning
of a compassionate leader by a cruel one. By treating the forest, the court, and
other humans as tools for his own gain, Frederick spoils the sense of unseen and
more-than-human purposes in the forest and the court. No one is safe from exile
or his abuse. Because they live in a world that has been stripped of sacred
correspondences between human experiences and culture, the perspectives of the
exiled courtiers do not exhaust the way correlations between human nature and
culture might work. Instead, their readings appear to demonstrate what happens
when capacities to engage the sacred, whether in nature or other sources, are lost.
Environmental perspectives are concerned with living in a world in which nature
and sacred texts have been desacralized rather than with a world in which
religious meanings are vibrant. Like Frederick’s court, the ecological crisis
forecasts that country and city are both becoming unlivable in a very literal way.
Like Jacques’s or Orlando’s worldviews, pastoral environmental reductions can
lead to despair at the suffering and evil in nature and human culture, and at failed
attempts to escape the desacralization of the sacred that our society falls prey to.
This sometimes includes assumptions that we are left to derive vital moral
meanings in relation to nature from a society distanced from sacred sources of
meaning, including religious texts.

55
Although a return to personal encounters with nature may seem a wise
path to regaining a sense of sacredness in nature, this is a serious challenge in a
somewhat desacralized society like ours, as we find in Frederick’s desacralized
world. Forming sacred and moral relationships with the land is not always as
simple as meeting the physical presence of nature personally. Today,
environmental epiphanies often fail to shatter the dominance of desacralized
culture and its instrumental relationships with nature as long and as powerfully as
needed to change moral practice. Many who identify themselves with
environmental movements nevertheless struggle to see past exploitive lenses of
consumerism (Deluca 67-68), much as Orlando fails to move beyond artificial
impositions on nature despite his desire for deeper sources of hope.

MANIFESTATION BURSTS THE HUMAN-CENTERED LOGIC OF
CORRESPONDENCES
Orlando’s experience in the forest at first seems to contrast greatly with the
Duke’s, who is said to live in an ideal world without care:
They say he is already in the forest of Arden,
and a many merry men with him; and there
they live like the old Robin Hood of England. They
say many young gentlemen flock to him every day,
and fleet the time carelessly, as they did in the golden
world. (I.i.114-19)
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This allusion to the “golden world,” or the paradise-like classical past, is one of
the few descriptions of the Duke’s society as idyllic. In this passage, the Duke’s
brotherhood is also compared to what was in Shakespeare’s time a fad in theater
of the time, Robin Hood tales (Knowles 372), which involve idleness and heroic
taking from the rich and to give to the poor. However, when we move into Arden
itself, we find the Duke’s real relationship with nature to be quite the opposite.
His charitable giving comes with difficult sacrifice, including hunting and
sacrificing meals to others. Even to Duke Senior, festive feasts are more of a
memory of past better times at court than a reality in the present (II.vii.12026).The Duke’s experience of nature is much the same as Orlando’s. He also has
been banished by a jealous brother. Yet his perceptions of nature are quite
different. When Shakespeare’s audience first encounters Duke Senior in the
forest, he is essentially “reading” the “book of nature,” although his manner of
going about it is quite different than Orlando’s:
Sweet are the uses of adversity,
Which like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head;
And this our life, exempt from public haunt,
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything. (II.i.12-17)
As Stuart Daley notes, the Duke’s reading (like Orlando’s) plays off of literary
and religious clichés; “good prince” figures and Christian theologians
traditionally promoted finding good in adversity, and Shakespeare’s readers were
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familiar with this (“Dispraise” 302, 309). His reading, like Orlando’s poems, may
appear to expose the book of nature as imposing empty metaphors on nature.
However, when contrasted with other readings of nature in the play, the Duke’s
reading actually overturns reductive perspectives of the “book of nature”
hermeneutic and invites the audience to engage the tradition anew, much as Paul
Willis suggests the play does as a whole (72). We know little detail about what
the Duke reads in nature. He is open to nature escaping his explanation and its
own appearances. The evils of the court do not stifle his ability to perceive
sources of wisdom in nature that are not obvious. Unlike the perspectives of his
men or Orlando, his reading can be considered religious. The medieval book of
nature encompassed the idea that divine grace and purposes were perceptible in
natural entities through cross referencing nature with scripture (Benjamins 13).
The Duke perceives charity and humility as lessons extended to him by his
experience in nature, which seems apparent not only in the way he perceives
adversities in nature as “counsellors” that teach him “what [he is],” but also in his
choice to create a life “old custom” (II.i.2), which refers to an Eden-like state of
peace and brotherly compassion in the woods. In Shakespeare’s time, allusions to
Adam’s time were sometimes used in protest for social equality (Barnaby 38485). The Duke’s reading appears to be one example of the ways Judy Kronenfield
characterizes that Christian virtues of equality are juxtaposed against aristocratic
hierarchies throughout the play (335-36).
Openness to religious meanings shatters the logic of correspondence in
which nature can only be read in light of the evils of the court. To the Duke, the
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forest unfolds “sermons” and “books” that challenge rather than affirm
Frederick’s narcissistic way of life. Shakespeare’s allusion to the book of nature
in this passage makes it possible to discuss the Duke’s interpretation as one of
more than just manifestation, but also meanings uncovered through scripture. It is
obviously not the case that the Duke and his men do not “feel” adversities in
nature like the “winter’s wind” as he claims is the case. If he did not feel the
wind, it would not serve as a “counselor” to him (II.i.5-11). Meanings perceived
through something more than the sensory experience of nature alone allow him to
experience the winter in this way, freeing him from dependence on his
experiences at court for hope. In addition to a golden world or Adam’s time, we
might extend “old custom” to refer to the world before nature and sacred texts
were emptied of meanings, or desacralized by Frederick’s court. The “tongues in
trees,” “books” in “brooks,” and “sermons in stones” that the Duke perceives are
more than impositions of a human-centered text. They derive from “life” when
removed from the court, as if they are sacred symbols bound to the experience of
living in the forest. The Duke’s words suggest that nature offers alternative
meanings to those found in “public haunt.” Even the small parts of creation (such
as the toad, or the stone) are valuable and carry hidden religious meanings. We
can juxtapose the Duke’s interest in the details of the forest with Orlando’s
description of Rosalind as having a “distill’d” measure of nature’s “graces,” that
“heaven” otherwise “show[s]” only a “little.” Orlando writes his poems to teach
“all who read” (who read the poems, but also the “book of nature” in extension) to
know / The quintessence of every sprite” through glorifying Rosalind as
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something supreme to the world around her (III.ii.138-44). The “book of nature”
in the Duke’s reading scene contrasts with such anthropocentric perspectives of
humanity’s place in nature. Here the lowest parts of the chain become sources of
humility rather than pride or justifications to exploit lesser forms of life.
In As You Like It, only religious meanings, or what we would compare to
proclamation of the sacred, allow characters to overcome desacralized
worldviews. Helen Whall argues that the logic of correspondences through which
human relationships are initially structured is overturned by deliberate choices to
love, which allows characters to draw alternative analogies or correspondences
that shatter the tightly ordered relationships in the play. Celia is the first character
to overthrow destructive patterns of correspondence. She is loyal to Rosalind
despite her father Frederick’s hatred of Rosalind’s father, loving her despite
associations rather than because of them (Whall 35-36; I.iii.85-105). In a similar
way, purposeful choices to seek and receive meanings concealed by Frederick’s
worldview shatter correspondences between nature and the evils of the court.
The quality of proclamation that enables it to restore manifestation is that
it bursts the bounds of what might otherwise be perceptible in nature. The first
instance of this is when Orlando’s encounter with the Duke’s charitable
worldview in the forest begins to loosen the grip of the court’s worldview on his
mind. Orlando comes across the Duke and his men in the woods as they are about
to eat, and when Orlando fears his servant Adam is going to starve. In
desperation, Orlando threatens to attack them if they eat before Adam is revived.
Duke Frederick’s warm invitation to the table leads to a very different response
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from Orlando, who says, “Speak you so gently? Pardon me, I pray you: / I thought
that all things had been savage here … (II.vii.106-7). Although Orlando continues
to refer to the forest as a “desert” (III.ii.125), his encounter with the Duke
partially explains how his ability to perceive hope grows throughout the play.
Duke Senior’s worldview helps Orlando become open to the possibility that the
abuse he received at home and in Frederick’s court need not dictate the kinds of
relationships he will have in the future. In time, Orlando finds courage to face
risks and fears he suppresses in his poems, which I will discuss more in later
chapters.
In other instances, the reception of more direct religious meanings alters
characters’ relationships with the natural world. At the play’s end, Duke Frederick
has decided to go into the woods himself to kill his brother. However, his plan is
overturned by his reception of unexpected sacred meanings. As Jacques de Boys
(the brother of Orlando and Oliver, who makes his first appearance in the last
scene of the play) explains:
And to the skirts of this wild wood he came;
Where, meeting with an old religious man,
After some question with him, was converted
Both from his enterprise and from the world;
His crown bequeathing to his banish’d brother,
And all their lands restored to [them] again
That were with him exil’d … (V.iv.159-65)
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In Frederick’s experience, religious words, or proclamation, appear necessary to
learn to sense sacredness in nature and in human relationships with the land.
Frederick is converted away “from the world” and from his hunger for power in
both the court and the forest. It does not seem to be a coincidence that it is on the
edge of the wood, like a sacred gateway, that Frederick’s transformation occurs;
proclamation works in connection with manifestation in his conversion. It appears
that encounters with nature alone were not enough to change Frederick in the past.
Although the audience does not witness the conversion so that little detail is
known about this transformation, it is nevertheless significant that only religious
teaching from an unexpected source proves capable of overthrowing Frederick’s
tyranny. The seemingly ad-hoc solution to the schisms between country and court
in the world of the play seems to emphasize how moral change stems not from the
country or court alone, but by reception of sacred religious meanings. As I will
discuss more thoroughly in chapter three but will note here, unexpected religious
teaching transforms Jacques in a similar way. When hearing of the Duke’s
conversion, his former readings of nature are overturned. Jacques decides to learn
from the religious man and to meditate in the forest, leaving the wedding
festivities at the end of the play (V.iv.180-82, 195-96). Sacred meanings
uncovered in religious language prove necessary to help him perceive nature as
something more than a reflection of human evils.
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RECONCILING PROCLAMATION AND MANIFESTATION
What I have suggested about proclamation’s capacity to restore a sense of
sacredness in nature is doubted for good reason. Environmental perspectives of
scripture as having frequently eclipsed the sacred in nature appear affirmed by the
history of the Hebrew people recorded in the Bible itself. The Israelites constantly
struggled with and were warned against animistic cults. As Ricoeur suggests,
Judeo-Christian cultures introduced a polarity between the sacred in nature and
the religious word in which the word outweighs the revelation of the sacred in
natural entities (56). Prophecy tends to require the uprooting of the people from
sacred spaces and entities, which seems to destroy all possibility of sacred cosmic
symbolism (57). The word does not appear to be grounded in natural symbols, but
to completely remove itself from connection to a sacred sense of the earth.
Ricoeur explains how the uprooting of sacred symbols works in scripture
by examining the structures of New Testament parables and proverbs. At first
they, like Old Testament prophecies, appear to eliminate the possibility of sacred
space in nature. First, rather than the numinous or magical, the parables’ settings
draw portray what is mundane or non-mythical (57). Also, the plots or sayings
function through metaphorical poetic reference, which obscures first-order
reference to a sacred phenomenological world (58). Third, the parables present
not an orderly universe bound by symbols, but a natural universe whose sacred
meanings are overthrown through reference to something more than the world
lived in by readers (60). The rupturing of meaning in the universe occurs through
what Ricoeur calls limit-expressions, sayings or plot elements that drive the
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power of the text to influence the reader’s interpretive experience to the limits of
poetry’s capacity to shape readers’ lives.
Limit-expressions in scripture work through hyperbole, paradox, and
extravagance of language and plot. Ordinary settings and events are ruptured
through the extraordinary. They are structured to challenge the forms of wisdom
normally found in a symbolically bound and orderly universe as if to destroy
correspondences that make up a sacred natural world. For example, the
expression, “the Kingdom of God is among you” bursts conventional cosmic
symbolism in such a way that “Every literal temporal scheme capable of
providing a framework to read the signs of the kingdom collapses” (59).
Naturally-directed correspondences, like those one would find in an animistic
world, are burst. “What is the universe burst toward?” Ricoeur asks, and answers:
The Gospels say the kingdom of God. But what must be
understood here is that this symbol [the kingdom] entirely escapes
from the circular symbolic of the cosmic interplay of
correspondences. The kingdom of God is polarly opposed to
paradise, not only as the future is opposed to the past but as every
limit-expression is opposed to the whole interplay of
correspondences. (60)
Scripture appears to offer something in opposition to the kind of world that is
experienced in manifestation. Sacred correspondences between human action and
natural entities seem very purposefully redirected toward the word alone, or at
least toward something outside the natural world we know.
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Yet manifestation’s relation to proclamation is more complex than this;
the two are more similar than Judeo-Christian traditions have often assumed them
to be. Manifestation, like proclamation, points toward human needs to believe that
nature is more than what it appears, or in other words, that it bursts its own visible
meanings. As Paul Ricoeur explains, manifestation works partially through beliefs
that disorder is overcome in nature because nature conceals forces not readily
apparent:
The sacred power of nature is first attested to by the fact that it is
threatened and uncertain. The sacred universe, after all, is a
universe that emerges out of chaos and that may at any instant
return to it. The sky is ordered and life is blessed only because the
chaotic depths have been and must unceasingly continue to be
overcome. (52)
Manifestation, can be associated with desires to believe that benevolent forces
respond to the chaos in the world in order to make it livable to humans. Nature
points to something more than its own visible workings. Manifestation allows us
to perceive how nature bursts its own ordinary as entities become “numinous.”
Ricoeur suggests:
That a stone or tree may manifest the sacred means that this
profane reality becomes something other than itself while still
remaining itself. It is transformed into something supernatural—or,
to avoid using a theological term, we may say that it is transformed
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into something superreal … in the sense of being superefficacious
while still remaining a part of common reality. (49-50)
The “stone or tree” is both mundane and extraordinary at once. The logic of this
does not contradict Christ’s saying that the kingdom of God is among his
disciples on earth. Finding the extraordinary within the ordinary permeates
manifestation in addition to proclamation. Both point toward human capacities to
sense the presence of more than what is readily apparent in nature, or for
“readers” of nature to find more-than-human sources of meaning and hope in the
phenomenological world. An example of this parallel between manifestation and
proclamation that Ricoeur recognizes is how the promise of salvation
(proclamation) resonates with the ordering of chaos by unseen forces in
manifestations (66).
Proclamation does not necessarily destroy the possibility of manifestation,
though it may claim to warn against false perceptions of sacredness in nature and
open our eyes to a fuller sense of sacredness in the world. As Ricoeur suggests,
this is evident even in the history of the early Israelites, to whom new cosmic
symbols were revealed (65). Cosmic symbolism is not eradicated, but
reinterpreted in light of proclamation; proclamation transforms and shapes
manifestation (66).
The capacity for nature to burst its normal bounds is something that can be
heightened through the religious meanings of scripture. Manifestation and
proclamation work together. We see this in Duke Senior’s reading of nature. He
sees the extraordinary within the ordinary, like the “precious jewel” in the
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poisonous toad’s head, or “sermons in stones” (II.i.14, 17). His “reading” of
nature challenges kinds of correspondences that, like the Renaissance great chain
of being, or the schisms growing between nature and human society during
Shakespeare’s or our own time, are hierarchical and engage nature through
destructively human-centered worldviews. It affirms a form of correspondence
between nature and human society in which even the seemingly ordinary and
small aspects of nature are revealed as full of sacred meaning.
As Paul Ricoeur describes, if the religious word sometimes destroys
instances of manifestation, it also establishes and reaffirms it:
The word, we said, breaks away from the numinous. And this is
true. But is it not so to the extent that the word takes over for itself
the functions of the numinous? … A word that is addressed to us
rather than our speaking it, a word that constitutes us rather than
our articulating it—a word that speaks—does not such a word
reaffirm the sacred just as much as abolish it? (65)
The quality that manifestation and proclamation have in common is both provide
ways non-human created meanings can speak. It is for this reason that Ricoeur
describes scripture as a voice speaking to humanity rather than one spoken by it,
much like the voices of natural life and entities David Abram describes that
cannot be reduced to human abstractions (31-56).
Duke Senior’s perception of religious meanings while reading the “book
of nature” allows him to perceive sacred meanings in nature. Proclamation bursts
the desacralization caused by the human-centered perspectives of the nature in the
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court. Like scriptural parables, which draw on domestic settings like sheepherding
(Ricoeur, Figuring 57-60), Shakespeare’s alternative vision of the pastoral
romance ruptures the ordinary with extraordinary hope that affirms the sacredness
of everyday interactions with nature.

INFORMING CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVES
Not unlike White, Abram, and Manes, Ricoeur responds to problematic
assumptions that the world has lost much of its sacredness and because of this,
whatever religions survive must make themselves compatible with a desacralized
world (61-62). In response to such worldviews, Ricoeur raises the question, “Is
religion even possible without the sacred?” Not unlike White, Manes and Abram,
Ricoeur argues that the culture of technology and science that has developed in
the West is largely grounded in nihilism, a deception that tends to make
manifestations of the sacred imperceptible. Recently, Ricoeur suggests, Western
culture has begun to ask whether, contrary to assumptions of the culture of
technology, life is desirable or even possible without the sacred. Ricoeur’s answer
is no. When death, sexuality, birth, and place are stripped of sacred meanings,
humanity is reduced to a mere “utensil,” and life loses its meaning (Figuring 64).
Ricoeur’s argument suggests the importance of revisiting Judeo-Christian
proclamation traditions in order to engage a sense of the sacred in nature. In light
of his view of the relationship between the proclamation and manifestation, doing
so may even prove an essential step in addressing problems with contemporary
relationships between nature and culture. When the religious is completely
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removed from sacred symbols in nature, Ricoeur suggests, society loses its sense
of the meanings and purposes of both nature and human experience. The religious
is intended to be grounded in belief in a sacred phenomenological world (64).
Because proclamation is intended to work interdependently with manifestation,
engaging the religious is a way to reengage the sacred in nature. (White argues,
like Ricoeur, that our need for renewed religious belief may be a matter of
reinterpretation of Judeo-Christian texts and traditions (191-93). His argument,
however, is more ambivalent toward the possibility that drawing on these specific
traditions may be essential in some cases). The return to Judeo-Christian
proclamation is possible because scripture is irreducible to a product of culture.
Proclamation is not a human-focused dialogue between human texts and readers’
conceptions of the phenomenological world. In religious interpretive
relationships, scripture and nature both extend meanings to humanity and renew
readers’ relationships with the phenomenological world. Addressing concerns
with the influence of religious beliefs on relationships with nature might not
necessarily require us to find or form a new religion, alter our use of language
deliberately, or create new narratives to replace old ones, but it might require us to
interpret sacred narratives we have inherited anew with greater openness to the
possibility that they can alter our relationships with the natural world.
Environmental paradigms become reductive when they dismiss scripture’s claim
that it, like nature, is something other-than-human, and as such may overthrow
immorally human-centered or self-centered worldviews.
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In As You Like It, religious perspectives of nature do not affirm
deceptively human-focused modes of ordering relationships between city and
court, but suggest that something more than culture, and even more than the
physical presence of nature, must aid the courtiers as they seek more hopeful and
more compassionate relationships with nature. Environmental thought can move
beyond treating the religious as a reflection of our human evils, much as the
courtiers need to move beyond seeing nature as such a reflection of Duke
Frederick’s abuses.
Perhaps if nothing else, environmental perspectives that lean toward
casting blame on religious culture should become more “neutral” toward JudeoChristian texts and interpretive traditions, much as Phillips suggests they should
become toward poetic texts in general (18-19). As Ricoeur suggests, scripture can
both abolish and reveal the sacred in nature (Figuring 65). Scripture might be
treated as neutral in shaping our relationships with nature partly because
perceived meanings depend on readers’ interpretive choices. As the play suggests,
there are many ways to “read” meanings in nature, and some of these, like Duke
Senior’s, manage to retain openness to nature’s ability to inform humanity, and
others, like Orlando’s or Jacques’s do not. This raises a difficult question that I
will address throughout the next chapter: how can we ever tell if our interpretive
relationships are genuinely open to perceiving sacred meanings?

Perceiving the Sacred and Suffering as Contingencies: The
Peregrination of Wisdom in the Wind in As You Like It
By identifying Western culture’s need to reconnect with the sacred in
nature, White Manes, and Abram begin to overthrow the technological
worldviews they scrutinize, but do not completely avoid their influence. Another
part of contemporary culture’s silencing of the sacred is the silencing of religious
texts. Just as we might argue that human relationships with nature will be
unethical until we attempt to listen to nature’ s own “voice,” as Manes and Abram
suggest, we can similarly argue that our relationships with scripture will be
immoral until we learn to be receptive to its sacred meanings, its voice rather than
ours.
The same worldviews that perpetuate modern uses of technology and
prevent the West from perceiving sacred meanings in nature also affect the
engagement of religious texts. According to Martin Heidegger’s “The Question
Concerning Technology,” the core way we experience technology is “enframing,”
or the process of reducing natural entities, human others and the world in general
to instruments and resources for human and technological ends. Although
technology is not necessarily evil in itself, the way it has come to present itself to
us as a means of claiming mastery over the world is immoral and deceptive (31112, 332-33). Not only nature but also the religious can be made transparent
through enframing (331). One reason modern technology alienates us from the
otherness or sacredness of nature and religious texts is that our relationships with
70
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both involve “contingencies” that modern technology tends to desensitize us to
(Borgmann 65, 78-79). “Contingencies” encompass what escapes human
prediction, explanation and control. In nature, the presence of contingencies is
evident in the weather, disease, or natural disasters. In religious narratives,
contingencies are involved not only in the experiences related in the narratives,
but also in the process of interpreting them. Loss of contingency can lead to a loss
of meaningful relationships with both scripture and nature.
In order to overthrow the foundation of the West’s immoral treatment of
nature through technology, we should focus on moral struggles in the West that
perpetuate reductive relationships with scripture in addition to nature. Technology
itself, Heidegger seems to suggest, should not be treated as the “root” of
enframing. The “essence,” or the way we have come to experience modern
technology is what leads us to problematic reductions. The cause of enframing is
elusive, and even irrelevant in that human experience now usually involves being
thrown into a world in which uses of technology deceive us with the appearance
of providing human mastery over nature (323-31). We blindly buy into reductions
that mask the otherness of non-human entities and the contingent qualities of
moral human relationships with the world. In a way comparable to how the
essence of technology does not ultimately lie in technologies themselves, the
“root” of the ecological crisis goes beyond our religious heritage. Immoral
religious perspectives (when accurately identified) would serve, like modern
technologies, as manifestations of tendencies to suppress contingencies and
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reduce natural entities and others for instruments for human advantage. The
ultimate origins of such moral struggles are evasive.
Propensities to ignore the reality of contingencies can deceive us into
misunderstanding the interpretations of past generations. This is apparent in
environmental perspectives. Lynn White’s argument, for example, that medieval
readings of the creation narrative are anthropocentric conceals medieval
perspectives that oppose his position. Paul Ricoeur’s reading of the Genesis
account in “On the Exegesis of Genesis 1:1—2:4a” challenges White’s
assumption that the narrative and past readings can be fairly treated from a
distanced perspective. A careful, religious reading of the creation narrative’s
themes challenges the assumption that the narrative is human-centered. Themes in
the creation account and Psalms about how God dispels chaos, how His presence
wanders on the earth, and how created beings bear witness of Him suggest ways
natural life is an area of interest in its own right. In addition to this, Ricoeur also
uses themes from his exegesis of the creation account to model the contextual
process of interpretation in which unexpected divine wisdom reveals itself
through personal religious reading.
In As You Like It, sacred meanings unfold only as the characters
acknowledge the presence of both suffering and grace as outside of their mastery.
Religious meanings and hope, like adversities, uncover themselves unpredictably
and personally. As Paul Ricoeur and Shakespeare’s As You Like It suggest, the
sacred is a presence that “peregrinates” or wanders like the wind or God’s breath
through religious and the natural world, waiting for us to encounter it personally
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and with openness to the meanings it unfolds. Only by accepting suffering and
religious hope as contextual, personal, and unpredictable (like the experience of
meeting the wind) are the characters able to overcome their tendencies to reduce
nature and religious meanings and to suppress suffering. Engaging the sacred in
nature and scripture are very similar. We must acknowledge and accept the
unpredictable ways both “texts” uncover meanings without attempting to make
their significance transparent or non-sacred, much as Augustine and Origen
suggested in their writings concerning scripture and adversities in nature.
Ricoeur’s writings suggest that in order to reconnect with the sacred in scripture,
we must learn to interpret the text by following where its meanings lead us and
extend themselves to us and give up desire to master the text. This does not mean
that we can control risks of misconstruing the meanings of text, or that the sacred
is a pure voice that makes itself heard apart from everyday experience. Sacred
meanings are woven into the real mundane world and into readers’ personal
experiences. Learning to acknowledge contingencies in interpretation or to listen
for the wisdom of the text can also be distinguished from willful ignorance or
passivity. Following the wisdom of the text, unlike being blindly obedient, is an
active role in which we seek ways to avoid claiming immoral forms of mastery.
We allow ourselves to be mastered by moral constraints and purposes for the
natural world we sense to be greater than ourselves.
This chapter will draw on Paul Ricoeur’s essays on the phenomenological
experience of engaging the sacred in religious texts and discourse, such as
“Naming God,” and “Toward a Narrative Theology.” Paul Ricoeur suggests a
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“letting go” in interpretation and religious discourse that resonates with the letting
go of mastery over nature that Heidegger writes may help us escape the dangers
of modern technology. Overturning immoral uses of technology and overcoming
reductive religious readings both involve renouncing desires for mastery. Ricoeur
also suggests that Western relationships with the natural world and our religious
heritage may improve as we become more aware of the contingent presence of
suffering, both today and in past generations. We can begin to gain such
awareness of the West’s exploitive approaches to human and natural others by
engaging religious narratives on a personal level. The destructive worldviews that
repress the sacred in nature cannot be separated from ones that have led us to
ignore and repress the presence of sacred meanings in scripture. Because of this,
reengaging scripture personally may help us regain capacities to perceive the
sacredness of nature.

ENFRAMING NATURE AND THE RELIGIOUS IN TECHNOLOGICAL
CULTURE
In “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger illustrates how applying
science to technology has led Western culture to reduce nature to an instrument of
human culture. Our applications of technology may not at first appear to have
changed much since antiquity or the Middle Ages; the basic definition of
technology is a means to an end, which still holds true today (312-13). Yet at the
same time, we often argue that the application of sophisticated sciences to
technology puts our technology in a completely different category than all that has
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come before (319). Why do we sense that science has altered our experience of
technology so greatly? Ancient uses of technology, Heidegger argues, were
fundamentally different.
Heidegger writes that we can distinguish ancient and modern technology
by examining the “four causes” identified by Aristotle, or the four sources that
come together in the creation of an object. The ancient concept of causality
suggests there was once a greater sense of how more than human rationality and
technology are to thank for acts of creation. Each cause—the material from which
it is made, the form it is given, the cultural context in which the object is
circumscribed, and the craftsman—are all things to which an object is “indebted”
for being brought forth as what it is. As Heidegger notes, the causa efficiens or
craftsman is not an efficient cause in the modern sense (the ultimate source of the
object). Although the craftsman does play a special role by bringing the other
causes together, he is one among three other things the object can credit for being
revealed as it is and is aware of this (315). Technology is more than just a means
to an end; it is meant to be a mode of revealing things as one thing or another
(318).
In modern technology, indebtedness is replaced with causality and
instrumentality (316). The modern conception of causation assumes all is
transparent to science. Objects are not indebted to the material etc., and the
creator is not indebted to the other causes. Instead, the four “causes” are reduced
to nothing more than efficient causes in the modern sense. The causes are treated
as the resources of technology, which becomes the only acknowledged cause. In
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this new conception of causality, objects are seen as merely “reporting” the ways
they are produced and tapped by technology (328). The only kind of revealing
that modern technology does is a revealing of things as technology’s instruments
(326).
Acknowledging indebtedness to something more than human
determinations in creating objects is coupled with a loss of a sense of uncertainty.
As Heidegger explains, techne was once “reveal[ing] whatever does not bring
itself forth and does not lie here before us, whatever can look and turn out now
one way and now another” (319). When creating did not apply exact science, the
craftsman did not attempt to master exactly how things would turn out; they could
turn out “one way or another.” The final object depended on the unique qualities
of the natural materials used, the particular purpose the object was intended for,
and everything else that is conditional in the process of making an object.
However, in modern manufacture, awareness of such contingencies is lost. As
Heidegger explains, rather than allowing the materials to be brought forth or
unconcealed as one object or another, modern technology challenges and conceals
the natural by ordering it to adhere to its conditions. As he asks, “What kind of
unconcealment is it, then, that is peculiar to that which results from this setting
upon that challenges? Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be
immediately on hand …” (322). Modern technology is about forcing things to
cohere to human purposes in such a way that does not respect nature’s role as
anything more than a resource. Older forms of technology, Heidegger goes on to
explain, worked in harmony with the unpredictable conditions of nature, such as
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weather. The windmill, for example, is not intended to tap the wind’s energy and
make it accessible even when the wind is not, but modern turbines are designed as
if to challenge forces of nature themselves (320). Rather than attempting to master
natural inconsistencies as turbines do, the windmill works as if it submits itself to
be mastered by the power of the wind.
The loss of a sense of indebtedness and uncertainty to our world,
Heidegger suggests, alters our relationship not only with nature, but also with the
divine. The reductive tendencies of Western culture manifest in technology can
also lead us to misinterpret the religious. As he explains:
In whatever way the destining of revealing may hold sway, the
unconcealment in which everything that is shows itself at any
given time harbors the danger that man may misconstrue the
unconcealed and misinterpret it. Thus where everything that
presences exhibits itself in light of a cause-effect coherence, even
God, for representational thinking, can lose all that is exalted and
holy, the mysteriousness of his distance. In the light of causality,
God can sink to the level of a cause, of causa efficiens. He then
becomes even in theology the God of the philosophers, namely, of
those who define the unconcealed and the concealed in terms of
the causality of making, without ever considering the essential
provenance of this causality. (331)
We blind ourselves to the “the true” in the presence of nature much as the essence
of technology blinds us to the sacred in religion (331). Contemporary culture’s
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insensitivity to the contingent qualities of nature and the religious prevent us from
engaging the sacred.

REDUCTIVE APPROACHES TO BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION
We can apply what Heidegger suggests about how enframing blinds us to the
sacred in nature and the religious specifically to the act of interpreting scripture.
As modern manufacture degrades the open and uncertain act of creating,
worldviews that conceal the contingent qualities of creating also degrade the open
and contextual process of interpreting. Textual interpretation, like making, is a
mode of revealing that depends on something that escapes human determinations.
Meanings that unfold are indebted to more than choices of the human interpreter,
including personal experience and circumstances, cultural and historical contexts,
and texts which, like natural entities, can reveal themselves and be revealed in an
indefinite range of ways. Like revealing an object, the act of interpretation
involves uncertainty. Like creating, interpretation reveals the text things “now one
way and now another” (319); it is not fixed, neither by the text itself nor the
reader.
Similar to how “the essence of technology” conceals the “true” or sacred
qualities of natural entities manufacture is indebted to, attempts at mastery can
conceal the true and revelatory in scripture. Although the essence of technology
may tempt us to believe that nothing is so concealed or sacred that it escapes its
grasp of understanding, as Heidegger suggests, this is only a deception that
conceals other ways that nature can be revealed (330). Modes of revealing that
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attempt mastery challenge and conceal instead of reveal, even to the point of
concealing the possibility of perceiving things outside of modern technology’s
reductions (330-33).
At times, modern science has had an influence on biblical interpretation
and scholarship. Heidegger writes that modern science changed history so that
history became a science in its own right. History is “equated” with “the
chronicled” (329) so that the distant past is concealed even more than it normally
would be by the limitations of texts. We can see the influence of this kind of
thinking on the interpretation of biblical texts toward the end of the nineteenth
century, when biblical scholarship was becoming empirical as it became a form of
historiography. As Elisabeth Fiorenza explains:
The "scientist" ethos of biblical studies was shaped by the struggle
of biblical scholarship to free itself from dogmatic and
ecclesiastical controls. It corresponded to the professionalization of
academic life and the rise of the university. Just as history as an
academic discipline sought in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century to prove itself as an objective science in analogy to the
natural sciences, so also did biblical studies. Scientific history
sought to establish facts objectively free from philosophical
considerations. It was determined to hold strictly to facts and
evidence, not to sermonize or moralize but to tell the simple
historic truth—in short, to narrate things as they actually happened.
(10-11)
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To contrast this with the kind of hermeneutic suggested by the book of nature, we
might say that in place of nature, science served as the companion text to
scripture, much as it began to during the early modern period when the book of
nature was used as a scientific metaphor. Science, rather than personal
experiences in the phenomenological world, became the primary key to using
scripture and hermeneutics to see the past and the text in the context of the
present. The perspective that biblical studies took upon itself in the early
twentieth century emphasized the distance and foreignness of the biblical text as a
religious work (thereby trying to make its history more transparent). The goal was
to present the Bible and its interpretive history from a non-personal, objective
reading (Fiorenza 11).
In dialogue with Heidegger’s essay, we might say that the Bible, its
interpretation, and even God Himself can be enframed when we choose to treat
scripture in this way. When we use scripture and religious faith to explain causes
of cultural shifts that have resulted from religious interpretation, it is possible that
we treat what claims to be divine or holy as an efficient cause.
The influence of the modern approaches to biblical interpretation can be
sensed in the environmental arguments I have discussed, which are at times
similarly distanced from past interpretation and the contextual quality of reading.
An extreme example of this problem is found in White’s retelling of the creation
narrative in Genesis and its interpretations in late antiquity:
Finally, God had created Adam, and, as an afterthought, Eve to
keep man from being lonely. Man named all the animals, thus

81
establishing his dominance over them. God planned all of this
explicitly for man’s benefit and rule: no item in the physical
creation had any purpose save to serve man’s purposes. And,
although man’s body is made of clay, he is not simply part of
nature: he is made in God’s image … Christianity is the most
anthropocentric religion the world has seen. As early as the 2nd
century both Tertullian and St. Irenaeus of Lyons were insisting
that when God shaped Adam he was foreshadowing the image of
the incarnate Christ, the Second Adam. Man shares, in great
measure, God’s transcendence of nature. Christianity, in absolute
contrast to ancient paganism … not only established a dualism of
man and nature but also insisted that it is God’s will that man
exploit nature for his proper ends. (189)
The reductive retelling of the narrative appears intended to model problematic
qualities of past interpretations, yet White fails to address his concern with
questions of interpretation directly. He leaves us to assume that this is the one
interpretation the text invited or received and what he means by “Christianity” is
ambiguous. Is it Christian culture and interpretation, or Christian scripture itself
that he refers to? Throughout the article, it is cultural and agricultural changes,
such as new plowing technology (188) that he uses as evidence for problems in
Christian culture. White offers a genetic analysis of culture, in which a religious
text is treated as a source of cultural problems. White’s article is written from a
partially self-critical Christian perspective that draws on shock value in effort to
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distance readers from Christian culture and the meanings of the narrative. Perhaps
by disassociating his audience from the narratives, he sees a path toward engaging
them more carefully on a religious level, but if this is the case, he does not make
his intentions clear enough. Greater consideration of the complexities of
interpretation is needed to nuance his perspective of medieval Christian
perspectives.
In addition to reducing the act of interpretation itself, White’s discussion
of medieval exegesis is misleading. In a book on the history of the exegesis of
Genesis 1:28, Jeremy Cohen argues that in Jewish and Christian medieval
traditions, discussion of the counsel to “subdue the earth” given to Adam and Eve
was understood as subject to special conditions because of the fall and human
error. Dominion and human superiority (due to humanity’s special capacities of
reason) over other parts of creation was limited because of Adam’s disobedience
(229). Thus, the creation account was interpreted in such a way that the Genesis
1:28 counsel should work as a compelling source of humility and restraint. There
was actually little emphasis placed on divine counsel to “master the earth” (and
much more on the issue of procreation in the same verse) (229). This jeopardizes
White’s argument that anthropocentric readings were used to justify new hopes to
master nature through technology. His distanced approach to interpretation may
be part of what prevents him from acknowledging medieval perspectives that
strikingly oppose his argument.
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SUPPRESSING SUFFERING IN SCRIPTURE AND NATURE
Reductions of the uncertain way nature and religious meanings are revealed can
blind us to a specific kind of contingency: suffering. Suffering unfolds in nature
and scripture (in recounted events and prophecy) as something out of full human
control. According to Albert Borgmann, contemporary culture treats suffering as
subject to human explanation, foresight and mastery. Applications of exact
science to technology perpetuate this worldview (66-76). Denying the uncertain
qualities of suffering tends to numb us to religious experience as we cease to
recognize needs for divine grace. Failing to appreciate the presence of one
“contingency,” suffering, eclipses the presence of grace, another contingency
outside human control (78).
Ricoeur identifies a problematic interpretive turn starting in the
Renaissance that suppressed the presence of suffering in the biblical text and
distanced readers from its sacred meanings in a way comparable to the eclipse of
grace and suffering as contingencies today. This shift is not something Ricoeur
correlates with modern technology. However, it, like modern uses of technology,
can be understood as a manifestation of ways Western culture suppresses
suffering and contingencies. As Ricoeur describes, a theology based on a linear
concept of history was applied to the Bible that assumed the book is one great
narrative about human salvation, rather than a complex collection of diverse
discourses and narratives that require individual attention. This historical
approach to scripture tended to flatten out the text so that each passage is
considered to carry equal significance to the others (237).
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Ricoeur draws a correlation between acknowledging the thematic
complexities of the text and appreciating the presence of suffering in its
narratives. Blindness to the significance of individual narratives and their
structures obscures the suffering that is represented. As Ricoeur explains, it “tends
to abolish the peripeties, dangers, failures, and horrors of history for the sake of a
consoling overview provided by the providential schema of this grandiose
narrative” such that “Concordance finally conquers discordance” (238).
Paradoxes and unresolved questions in scripture are covered over by an
artificially optimistic narrative. Forgetting the suffering of the past in this way
perpetuates numbness to sources of evil we face ourselves. Failure to engage
narratives personally is something Ricoeur begins to correlate with the
exploitation of the natural world. As he explains:
The destruction of any genuine sense of tradition and authority in
conjunction with the abusive prevalence of the will to dominate,
exploit, and manipulate the natural environment of humankind—
and consequently human beings themselves—amounts to an
increase in forgetfulness, especially of the past sufferings of
humankind, which is the ultimate cause of the impinging death of
the capacity for storytelling. In that sense the fight for a ‘rebirth of
narrative’ … is a specifically Christian task. (238)
In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur similarly suggests that forgetfulness of the
sacred and hierophanies in nature is a price we pay for our mastery of nature in
order to stave off hunger (349) (we might extend this to avoiding physical
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suffering in general). Ricoeur resists tracing a clearly defined source for the
overturning of religious traditions and the formation of exploitive practices now
part of Western culture. Yet he does suggest that forgetting past challenges and
disconnecting ourselves from personally interpreting religious and other
narratives perpetuate these problems. Reconnecting with scripture is a possible
way to help our culture remember the suffering of past generations and become
more sensitive to the continued presence of suffering in our own, including
human and non-human suffering caused by exploitive uses of technology. Our
capacities to perceive sacredness in nature and other human lives is strongly tied
to our abilities to interpret religious narratives personally. Much as Borgmann
describes, grace or sacredness in religious faith and the phenomenological world
are hidden when we fail to engage the meaning of suffering religiously and as
something that escapes our mastery (75-79).

RICOEUR’S ALTERNATIVE INTEPRETATION OF THE CREATION
ACCOUNT
The first step in finding solutions to the problem of technology, Heidegger
suggests in “The Question Concerning Technology,” is to engage its essence, to
attempt to see the ways it shapes our relationships with the world by thinking
deeply about it. Only then might we begin to engage the world honestly and
escape its enframing essence (336-37). Heidegger suggests that to confront the
problem of technology, we can do so in “a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to
the essence of technology, and on the other, fundamentally different from it”
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(340). Art and poetry work well for this purpose. To question technology through
engaging art is a way of acknowledging that our culture has failed to “guard and
preserve” art’s revealing of itself and of truth to us (341). This is a way of
breaking out of technological paradigms by deliberately recognizing what resists
enframing: the personal, contextual revealing of truths about living art offers its
audience.
Like art, scripture might serve as a way of breaking out of tendencies to
suppress contingencies. Interpretation of scripture is also a techne, a creative
process that can be compared to technology, as well as a kind of revealing which
is “fundamentally different from [modern technology].” Like art, scripture is
something that our culture has sometimes failed to guard the “essential unfolding
of” (341). Scripture, like art, is something with poetic reference to our being in
the world (our relationships with the world and with others in it) (Ricoeur
Figuring 42-45). Careful consideration of how hermeneutic relationships with
scripture work, or how sacred texts reveal themselves to us, might serve as an
additional way to challenge technological reductions of the sacred.
In his essay published in Figuring the Sacred, “On the Exegesis of
Genesis 1:1—2:4a” Ricoeur uses the creation narrative to demonstrate how using
one mode of explanation for the text’s meanings is never enough to exhaust
possible ways of interpreting the text that the text itself invites. Genetic analysis,
or analysis that traces the cultural and historical origins of ideas in the scriptures
in order to interpret them, can be challenged by careful structural analysis that
reveals meanings not apparent when one only considers the cultural sources of the

87
text. Genetic and structural analysis only begin to point to a deeper kind of
analysis—personal interpretation of the text that searches for how symbols and
themes in the narrative extend levels of reference in the world of the reader (13940). As I suggested, White’s perspective on the Genesis creation narrative is
limited because it is a genetic explanation for cultural events. Ricoeur’s
interpretation of the Genesis creation narrative demonstrates that there is reason to
understand the story as non-anthropocentric and focused on the role of nature in
creation when it is interpreted with care.
When a cultural/historical approach to explaining the text is taken,
Ricoeur suggests, perspectives of possible connections within the text are limited.
Gerhard von Rad argues that, based on a Jewish myth about a struggle against the
dragon of chaos, God’s absolving of chaos in His act of creation is intended to be
woven into the later themes about salvation throughout the Bible; it is a
“prologue” to the salvation of God’s people (132). But von Rad also writes that
passages in the Psalms that show an interest in how the cosmos bears witness of
God should not be tied to redemption themes in creation because they are of
Egyptian origin, passed on to the Israelites by “travelling teachers of wisdom”
(von Rad qtd. in Ricoeur 132). As Ricoeur says, this culturally-determined
perspective of the theme of the cosmos bearing witness of God in Judeo-Christian
scripture requires readers to hold the text’s interest in creation theology “at a
distance” rather than to treat is as a vital topic in itself. Using such a perspective,
one should focus on non-human parts of creation only when they concern human
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salvation. The creation of man is the sole focus and crowning event of the
creation account, which appears to build up to this point (131-32).
However, Ricoeur describes, cultural and historical perspectives must
always be checked by careful observation of structures of the text that allow us to
interpret the narratives anew. In relation to the creation narrative, he explains,
“Unless we pay attention to the text itself, we will not be attentive to the
counteraccents by which it resists any simple ordering in terms of the creation of
humankind.” Themes in the narrative, particularly separation in the act of creation
and images surrounding the ruach of God, challenge an anthropocentric reading
of the text (134). The creation account in Genesis cannot be, as it is for White,
explained through an understanding of culture or the history of the text. We must
look at the narratives more carefully to interpret it for ourselves, letting its
meanings extend to us personally, allowing it to turn out “one way or another”
rather than forcing it to cohere to one historical explanation. Not only the
historical medieval readings as Jeremy Cohen suggests, but also the narrative
itself point toward a non-anthropocentric reading.
It is through separation that God both creates the earth and orders chaos.
In the act of creation, separation is not only a manifestation of God’s violent
dispelling of disorder, as in the Jewish myth about the dragon, but also a
manifestation of the meditative wisdom demonstrated by God as He ordered
creation (142). Ricoeur’s religious understanding of the narrative’s past
interpretations enhances his ability to interpret the text anew. Through the theme
of separation, he explains, readers can link God’s power over chaos as a
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redemptive act with the theme of creation bearing witness of his wisdom in
Psalms. This later theme can be cross-referenced with the salvation themes in the
creation account in such a way that the central messages about God’s saving
power do not work independently from the principle that the natural world bears
witness of His creative acts.
We find another connection between salvation in creation and
manifestation of the divine in the cosmos in the themes surrounding the Hebrew
word ruach. The same spirit or breath, or ruach of God wanders over the waters
in the act of creation, and provides man with the breath of life and salvation. The
ruach Elohim is also that way God manifests Himself to save his people in war.
These images of God as creator and savior, Ricoeur suggests, might teach us
about a special link between how nature and the proclamation of salvation both
reveal the divine in connection with the proverbial passages that von Rad
attributed to Egyptian culture:
… [T]his theme of the cosmic peregrination of wisdom, which
emerges in Proverbs and Job, is in fact an ancient theme of
wisdom. Might it not then be the function of wisdom to assure the
linkage between the values of salvation and the cosmic values? Is
it not the same ruach that moves over the waters and that stirs
among the people? Was not the same breath that settled upon a
holy people after having conquered all obstacles already at work
with the first word? If this be so, we need to say that a cosmic
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exploration in the style of wisdom is just as ancient as is attending
to the historical aspect of the ruach. (142)
Divine wisdom, or revelation of the sacred, connects the cosmic-centered and the
redemptive themes in the Old Testament. God’s wisdom manifests itself in both,
challenging assumptions that creation is not a focal point in his plan of
redemption and in Old Testament narratives. Historical explanations of religious
meanings put us in danger of missing the full significance of the creation
narrative. God’s wisdom wanders and appears mysteriously and inexplicably
through both the natural world and the narratives of scriptures through his breath,
or his word. The Old Testament text suggests that divine wisdom is a link
between the salvation and commandments proclaimed in scripture, and the
sacredness manifest in nature. In the natural world and through God’s word,
divine wisdom appears unexpectedly and personally. It serves as a constant
contingency in our lives if we are sensitive to it. As Ricoeur suggests, its
movement provides us with a model for interpretation of the sacred. He writes,
“Interpretation … models itself on this movement, which is the very movement of
wisdom …” (142). Perceiving sacred meanings in interpretation involves
becoming sensitive and receptive to the unexpected nature of its wandering—in
the text, and also in the phenomenological world.
The contingent quality of sacred wisdom uncovered in themes surrounding
ruach is also addressed in David Abram’s argument about the sacredness of
breath and wind in Hebraic interpretive traditions. Abram ties the absence of
vowels in the Hebrew Torah with the sacredness of God’s breath in acts of
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creation and a sense of the sacredness of the air in Hebrew culture. The missing
vowels in the text can be considered symbolic of how interpretation must be
active and open. The words were incomplete without the active voice of a reader,
whose breath made sacred meanings audible (243). The insufficiency of the words
without interpretation, Abram argues, made it so that the text did not dominate
over relationships with the phenomenological world. The same mysterious
manifestation of the divine that vitalized interpretation, God’s ruach, also
enlivened the earth through the wind (242-3). Interpretations, he suggests, were
also tied to a sense of the divine as it manifested itself in nature. As Abram
explains, “Just as the consonantal letters of a traditional Hebrew text depend, for
their communicative power, upon the sounded breath that animates them, so the
divine letters and letter combinations that structure the physical universe are
dependent on the divine breath that continually utters them forth. All things
vibrate with ‘the Breath of His Mouth’” (248).
Ruach links three things that can be easily reduced to things within human
explanation and mastery by the essence of technology Heidegger describes: divine
words, or scripture; the presence of divinity or sacred meanings in the natural
world (whether through manifestation, or simply belief that God’s influence is
present in the world); and the presence of suffering as something unforeseen in
the natural world. Like the divine, the wind is something humanity cannot control
and is subjected to as part of living in the world. Heidegger uses the wind as an
example of natural forces that resist mastery. The windmill is subject to the
wind’s contingency, while water defies the turbine’s attempts to trap its energy
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consistently (320). The wind is not only a contingent source of energy, it also
causes adversity. It blows ships in the wrong direction. It brings pestilence and
storms. Its chill can aggravate illness and prevent necessary work from being
performed. This is not to equate adversity with the divine, but to suggest simply
that both are presences in the world that resist technology’s reductions of events
as subject to human control, and that it is difficult to recognize the uncertain
quality of one if we deny that of the other.
Whether and how much the divine has a hand in the presence of suffering
is not a question I will explore. However, we can connect Ricoeur’s and Abram’s
observations about ruach to what early Christian theologians suggested about the
book of nature. As Augustine suggested, suffering is mysterious in a way
comparable to the concealment of divine meanings in nature. We do not always
know why God, who dispels chaos and has power to save his people, allows
certain forms of suffering to persist. Because we cannot fully account for the
causes of suffering, we are not justified in blaming the divine. God, Augustine
suggested, may have wise and hidden purposes in allowing physical suffering and
evil into the world, and because of this suffering is part of what we must accept if
we wish to perceive sacred meanings at hand in God’s creations (qtd. in Groh 33).
As Origen suggested, we can correlate passages of scripture that are difficult to
understand or accept with parts of nature that seem evil (qtd. in Benjamins 14). To
accept such things is to become more receptive of divine mysteries. Accepting
suffering as never fully explicable can help us open ourselves to perceiving the
sacred in scripture and nature.
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THE WIND AND WISDOM IN AS YOU LIKE IT
As You Like It can be read in ways that demonstrate how the way we interpret the
presence of evil and suffering is connected to capacities to find religious
meanings and hope. Although I will not thoroughly address the Edenic themes in
this chapter here (chapter four will include more discussion of them), it is useful
to note here that the play is interested in the events in the Genesis creation
narrative. The conflicts between Oliver and Orlando and the two Dukes allude
frequently to the conflict between Cain and Abel, the first heinous occurrence of
evil in the Old Testament. It is “Adam,” a servant, who accompanies Orlando into
the wilderness as he faces trials, much as Adam was cast out of Eden to face an
adverse wilderness with Eve. We also see a connection to the creation and fall of
Adam in themes that resemble what Ricoeur and Abram suggest about ruach, or
the correlation between divine breath, human breath, and wind that we find in the
Old Testament. Traces of divine wisdom and hope unfold in the forest, where
suffering is also present. The play approaches how the reception of the sacred is
challenged by the presence of suffering as something that resists human control,
including through imagery surrounding the winter’s wind. The characters are
faced with cold, fatigue, the threat of exile and death, and hunger. Adam’s breath,
something breathed into the biblical Adam him by God in the creation account, is
coming near its end as he faces winter with Orlando in the forest in his old age.
Sometimes suffering tempts the characters to give up their search for
meaning and hope. Sometimes it leads them to try to suppress it in order to derive
sources of hope and force things to work out for their good. When this happens,
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hope is either completely out of reach or empty of meaning. In order to find
genuine sources of meaning in their relationships, the characters must learn to be
open to contingencies they face in nature and in human relationships (both
suffering and grace).
Grace and wisdom seem to peregrinate almost unnoticeably through the
forest, like the wind. Amiens, one of Duke Senior’s men, sings of how the wind,
although sometimes bitter, is less “unkind” than other kinds of adversities. The
wind can at once be interpreted as a symbol of divine grace and adversity or
suffering:
Blow, blow, thou winter wind,
Thou art not so unkind
As man's ingratitude;
Thy tooth is not so keen,
Because thou art not seen,
Although thy breath be rude. (II.vii.174-79)
Here, the wind has a mouth (teeth and breath) that resembles the imagery
surrounding ruach in the Old Testament, in which God’s breath is a source of
divine power in the natural world and divine words. But, of course, the wind here
also represents the physical adversities that the Duke’s brotherhood faces in the
forest. In the Forest of Arden, the Duke and his men feel both a sense of peace in
being removed from the court and through their formation of a charitable and
loyal band, but they also feel the sting of sacrifices that come with living in the
forest. Their sacrifice is an act of love and loyalty to the Duke to accompany him
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(not unlike Adam’s choice to accept the fruit which brought adversity and death
and follow Eve) into the forest. They face “No enemy / But winter and rough
weather.” Even though the “green holly” that Amiens goes on to praise and may
prick, life in the forest is a “jolly” compared to living among feigning friends
(II.vii.180-81). At least the wind’s bite is honest, even if it hurts (much as,
Touchstone’s bride Audrey thanks God she is honest, even if she is foul, or plain,
and Rosalind and Celia discuss how “those [nature] makes honest” tend to be
made “ill-favoredly” [III.iii.33-34, I.ii.37-42]).. The peace and grace of the forest
come at the cost of being subject to struggles. The wind is a symbol not only of
the contingent qualities of adversities but also the grace and peace felt in their
charitable brotherhood. Although Amiens bids it to blow (showing his willingness
to endure it), the wind may stop, start, and turn wherever it will.
To some degree, Amiens upholds a cynical attitude like Jacques. He
sarcastically responds to the Duke’s reading of nature by saying the Duke is lucky
he can “translate” misfortune so pleasantly (II.i.18-20). Here he may not entirely
bid the wind to blow where it will. He wills the wind to blow almost as if he wills
the grace found in the Duke’s brotherhood to persist, something also not in his
control. But at least Amiens willingly accepts the wind as a facet of the presence
of adversity. Unlike Jacques, he makes a distinction between human evils and
adversities in nature, accepting those in nature without bitterness. His “reading”
of nature is open to conceal meanings in suffering. Because the source of the
wind’s unkindness cannot be seen, unlike human evils, Amiens will not become
resentful toward it.
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The Duke’s reference to the wind is less ambiguous and less bitter toward
humanity. Rather than a victim of “man’s ingratitude” he feels he is in fellowship
with Adam’s suffering to the extent that he can bear up the “penalty of Adam”
without feeling its sting. The chilly winter’s wind is a source of religious wisdom
for the Duke, much like “tongues in trees” or “books in the running brooks:”
Here feel we not the penalty of Adam,
The seasons' difference, as the icy fang
And churlish chiding of the winter's wind,
Which when it bites and blows upon my body,
Even till I shrink with cold, I smile and say,
‘This is no flattery: these are counsellors
That feelingly persuade me what I am.’ (II.i.5-11)
We can compare the Duke’s perspective of the wind (and to some degree,
Amiens’s) to an open, personal interpretive mode that “follows” the unpredictable
wisdom of text in the way Ricoeur describes. Unlike others in the play, the Duke
and Amiens do not reduce their experiences by equating human evils with the
suffering they face in the natural world. As Amiens says, the wind is “not seen;” it
is a force of nature that is strongly felt but never visible except through the ways it
alters the movement of other things (much as the presence of sacred meanings can
alter the way we see an entire text, or the world). It cannot be reduced to human
choices and evils. Like grace or religious meanings in interpretation, we
encounter it very personally; it is physically enveloping (much as the Duke
describes it biting his body). Like the ruach Elohim, it wanders. The Duke is
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willing to accept the wandering manifestation of the wind, even when it causes
him suffering, because he accepts its mysterious nature and causes. The wind is
not a sermon, but a “chiding,” something that restrains Duke Senior from doing
evil rather than tempting him to perpetuate it by causing others to suffer.
Although it is painful to receive, it “[counsels]” him “feelingly” (as if earnestly)
allowing him to feel “what [he is].” We can also compare the Duke’s thoughts to
early conceptualizations of the book of nature that suggested that to perceive
religious meanings in nature, one must accept seemingly evil things as having
mysterious purposes.
The Duke’s words, like Amiens’s, address the question of how we respond
when nature faces us with the most difficult kind of contingency we face in
nature: suffering. We can interpret this in light of how Albert Borgmann builds on
Heidegger’s argument that enframing and mastery make us insensitive to the holy.
Borgmann argues that contemporary culture’s rejection of suffering leads us to
reject the contingency of grace and to be unreceptive to the West’s Christian
religious heritage. Failing to perceive how suffering is outside of human control
tends to lead us to become more indifferent to receiving divine revelation and
grace (65, 78-79). As Ricoeur suggests, God’s grace and wisdom is a something
that “wanders” from our perspectives as readers; it is an uncertainty we face as we
interpret scripture. As Borgmann argues, to restore a desire to sense God’s grace
in our world, we need to seek a sense of “significant contingency,” all that is
unexpected and uncertain, to acknowledge that technology does not bring the
world, and particularly suffering, under our mastery (65). In light of Borgmann’s

98
argument, we might interpret the Duke’s reception of suffering and grace at once
as showing how suffering is the “twin of grace” (Borgmann 78), or that the Duke
perceives divine grace because he understands that not all suffering is not to be
repressed, and serves the purpose of humbling instructing him.
Jacques’s and Orlando’s experiences also suggest how acknowledging
suffering and grace go hand-in-hand. They each use questionable metaphors that
fail to appreciate the wind’s contingent nature and its connection with sacred
wisdom. Jacques says that he wishes he could spread his foolish wit with the
power of the wind:
… I must have liberty
Withal, as large a charter as the wind,
To blow on whom I please, for so fools have … (II.vii.47-49)
Jacques has just decided that instead of being a melancholy cynic, he wants to
take up the identity of a fool and wear a “motley coat” (II.vii.43-44). He has
encountered Touchstone’s playful and carefree approach to life, and perceives
some fragment of wisdom in this alternative approach, in which Touchstone
reveals the foolishness of others through his own foolish wit (like a “whetstone”
whose “dullness” can either deaden or sharpens others’ “wits” [I.ii.45-56].
Jacques also says that Touchstone’s brain is “as dry as the remainder of a biscuit
after a voyage” yet nevertheless “crammed with observation” [II.vii.38-41]).
Jacques’s metaphor is opposed to the Duke’s description of the wind as something
that spreads religious instruction. Here Jacques describes himself as being like the
wind in spreading his foolish wit, but human foolishness does not have the same
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mysterious qualities as divine wisdom. To Jacques, foolishness pervades all of
humanity, even the wise (II.iv.53-54). He treats it much like suffering in nature;
he wants others to recognize it (for example, he invites Orlando to “rail against
[their] mistress the world, and all [their] misery” together [III.ii.278-79]), but he
find no means of aiding human folly. Suffering and foolishness are not
unforeseen, but pervasive and irremediable. Jacques sees the revealing of the
foolishness of the wise as a “medicine” for an “infected world” (II.vii.53-61). In
response to the Duke’s brotherhood’s song praising the goodness of their life in
the forest and inviting others to join them where they face “No enemy / But
winter and rough weather” (II.v.1-8), Jacques creates his own ballad about how
all who have been forced to become fools through adversity can join with him and
he will reveal how all men are fools (II.v.38-57). Jacques is not open to the
possibility that suffering, as a contingency, is paired with more-than-human
wisdom as a contingency outside of his power to unveil at will. As he fails to
sense the possibility of deeper meanings behind suffering, he also fails to
appreciate wisdom as something unpredictably encountered like the wind.
Touchstone’s approach to adversities in relationships is genuinely foolish,
and reveals the wisdom in others’ actions in the play. His response to suffering is
to avoid it altogether. As he is about to marry Audrey and Jacques is attempting to
convince him that he should not be married by the parish priest, Oliver Martext,
Touchstone says:
Farewell, good Master Oliver: not
‘O sweet Oliver,
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O brave Oliver,
Leave me not behind thee;’
but
‘Wind away,
Be gone, I say,
I will not to wedding with thee.’ (III.iii.98-105)
The three lines starting with “Oh sweet Oliver,” refer to a popular ballad, though
the last three appear to be unique to Touchstone (422n). The use of the name
Oliver, though it refers to the parish priest, “Oliver Martext,” who is to marry
Touchstone and Audrey, can here be understood in connection with Orlando’s
older brother Oliver in the play. Oliver is one of the figures associated with
hatred, envy, and all the troubles that come in human relationships. Touchstone
rejects the original lyrics of the love ballad, saying goodbye to “Oliver” as if he is
saying goodbye to the risk of all such adversities in marrying Audrey. Even
though for now, Touchstone puts off the wedding as if he is following Jacques’s
counsel to have a proper ceremony that will keep the pair from separation,
Touchstone has also just told Jacques that “being not well married,” or not having
a formal ceremony, pleases him because he will be able to better justify leaving
Audrey (III.iii.90-94). Audrey is “foul” or plain, yet honest, or loyal. Unlike
Amiens, who prefers the harsh yet seemingly honest quality of the forest to
dishonest friends at court, Touchstone does not at first like the combination of
honest, or loyal and plain, or mundane. He tells Audrey he’d rather have her
“feign[ing]” than honest, and that to place honesty into a plain woman is like
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putting “good meat into an unclean dish” (III.iii.16-37). Disloyalty in ordinary
relationships seems inevitable to Touchstone; the mundane and adverse are not
mixed with the truthful and desirable. Touchstone’s approach is to flee problems
when they arrive and ruin shallow pleasure. It seems in this same spirit that
Touchstone says he will not “marry” the “wind.” He will not commit himself to
what cannot be controlled by his personal choices and that presents him with
everyday challenges. Touchstone’s marriage with Audrey can be juxtaposed with
a later scene when Celia falls in love unexpectedly with Oliver (V.ii.1-12). Oliver
is reconciled with Orlando, which transforms him. Oliver’s alteration challenges
Touchstone’s assumption that even the worst relationships should be abandoned.
A person as seemingly evil as Oliver can change without expectation and become
worth falling in love with (even for a princess like Celia). Touchstone’s approach
also contrasts with Rosalind’s and Orlando’s experience coming to accept the
mundane realities of relationships, which I will discuss below.
Jacques’s and Touchstone’s references to the wind reflect their
unwillingness to accept adversities and contingencies. This prevents them from
engaging in more meaningful relationships with others. We see how learning to
embrace both hope and adversity as personally encountered contingencies alters
“readings” of nature in the experience of Orlando. Before he develops a
friendship with the disguised Rosalind, Orlando, like Jacques, misconstrues the
personal way the wind is encountered in a poem he writes for Rosalind:
‘From the east to western Inde,
No jewel is like Rosalind.
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Her worth, being mounted on the wind,
Through all the world bears Rosalind.
All the pictures fairest lin’d
Are but black to Rosalind.
Let no face be kept in mind
But the fair of Rosalind.’ (III.ii.88-95)
The wind spreads Orlando’s Petrarchan idealization throughout the whole world
in Orlando’s metaphor. It is as totalizing, impersonal, and predictable as his poetic
images of Rosalind and his idealized hopes of a relationship with her. In both
Jacques’s and Orlando’s metaphors, the wind is something instrumental and
controllable to be tapped for their own use. But of course, the wind cannot be
mounted in this way, much as real wind cannot truly ever be fully tapped as an
energy resource.
Orlando’s use of the wind in his metaphor resembles his ideas about
suffering and hope in his love poems. He isolates the fragile, generic descriptions
of Rosalind’s qualities and love from his fears as if they would break his hopes.
Orlando wishes to avoid the pain that comes with having a close relationship, just
as he wishes to avoid the hunger and physical suffering he faces in the forest. For
him, relationships with nature and others have often been about mastery. He has
been mastered himself by two “tyrant[s],” Frederick and Oliver (I.ii.88), who
betrays him and forces him to live in the forest. There, Orlando seeks to alleviate
his and Adam’s hunger through threats similar to those he has received; it is “The
thorny point / Of bare distress” that leads him to such measures (II.vii.94-99). A
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desire to master suffering also appears to lead him to create superficially
exaggerated descriptions of Rosalind. No love could be painful or disloyal with
such a superlatively perfect woman, whom Orlando paints as the only woman
worth loving in the entire world. Only when Orlando more fully accepts that
certain risks are outside his control and thus master him in a sense is he capable of
perceiving personal reasons for him to hope. Rosalind tests the sincerity of
Orlando’s commitment by facing him with the dull interactions of daily life in
relationships. By disguising herself as a young shepherd, “Ganymede,” and
informing him of all the unpleasant, and painful things about love, Rosalind
compels Orlando to face the fears that uphold his naïve idealizations. Once he
marries her, she argues, Rosalind will be an awful wife by weeping when he is
happy, laughing when he wants to sleep, and becoming irritatingly jealous
(IV.i.146-56). Orlando’s response to this is simply, “O, but she is wise”
(IV.i.159). Only accepting the possibility of problems arising and committing
himself to Rosalind despite risks allows Orlando to recognize his own awareness
of the uncertain and unexpected presence of wisdom and hope. It is within the
personal context of a relationship with Rosalind (coming to know her, it seems,
behind the disguise) that Orlando comes to have genuine hope.
Jacques overcomes his reductive approach to human foolishness similarly
by learning to be receptive to unexpected sources of wisdom. His desire to spread
foolishness and cynicism is overcome by his desire to pursue an unexpected
source of religious preaching, the religious man in the woods with whom
Frederick met. Jacques sees there is “much to learn” from the teacher (V.iv.184-
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85). Rather than dressing as a “motley fool” and perpetuating foolishness, Jacques
now wishes to meditate on religious teachings in Duke Senior’s “abandoned
cave,” coming to know the natural world from a new perspective (V.iv.195-6).
The Duke’s sanctuary, where he had seen himself as a fellow in Adam’s
suffering, becomes Jacques’s desired place of refuge. That Jacques now wants to
enter this space himself seems to signify his decision to take up a relation to the
natural world more like the Duke’s, which is open to perceiving hidden meanings
amidst suffering. Jacques’s choice to identify his own foolishness seems to have
prepared him on some level to receive religious wisdom. Recognition that certain
sources of meaning or wisdom may master us makes way for wisdom. One reason
that the phenomenological world, including the arts and nature, demand our
attention as something “commanding” is that as we engage them, we recognize
they are not within our full control. To play an instrument, for example, is to
engage that something is “arduous to master.” Even though live amateur music is
technically inferior to perfected stereo sound, only the former can instruct us in
this way (Borgmann 30-34). Touchstone acknowledges the presence of hope and
meaning in the midst of adversities as the play draws close to its end. Although
Audrey is in some ways “ill-favor’d” she is his own, and he will “swear” himself
to her, because “honesty dwells like a miser, in a poor-house” much like a “pearl”
in a “foul oyster” (V.iv.55-61). Audrey’s loyalty can be compared to nature’s
commanding presence. Though Audrey is not ideal, her love masters
Touchstone’s foolish propensities. This idea is comparable to Rosalind’s image of
Oliver having “overthrown / More than [his] enemies” when she falls in love with
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him (I.ii.253-54). Paradoxically, while love is something we attempt to bring
under mastery, it is experienced as something that masters us, not unlike our
relationships with nature, or attempts to learn to play an instrument. Touchstone’s
pearl analogy is not unlike the Duke’s readings religious wisdom in nature.
Perhaps Touchstone only conceals his understanding of this wisdom earlier, or
perhaps he learns this as she becomes more “his [own],” which teaches him to
understand the relationship demands something more of him.
Orlando’s and Jacques’s choices to let go of attempts to master the
meaning of their relationships by acknowledging what is uncertain (as well as to
reinterpret their relationships in the context of unfolding events) can be compared
to a choice we can experience in our perspectives of religious language.
Following and listening for the wisdom, or sacred meanings, of the text involves
letting go of the desire to control or predict them, or to credit meanings to
ourselves as interpreters. Writing about preaching, Ricoeur discusses what it
means to learn how to hear religious meanings:
Listening excludes founding oneself. The movement toward
listening requires … a letting go, the abandoning of a more subtle
and more tenacious pretension than that of onto-theological
knowledge. It requires giving up … the human self will to mastery,
sufficiency, and autonomy. (224)
Heidegger suggests we must give up the will to master nature if we are to attempt
to shatter the enframing essence of technology. Only returning to more personal
approaches to “techne” (creating as it was before modern technology) such as
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poetry, might allow us to reveal our relationships with the world in true ways
(339-41). In a similar way, only learning to interpret scripture personally rather
than objectively may allow us to reveal meanings in scripture. According to
Ricoeur, in order to perceive sacred meanings, we must let go of our will to
master religious language. Interpretation is indebted to something more than the
reader or even the author is responsible for, something never fully disclosed at
one time. We see this in the play in how unexpected meanings reveal themselves
in a way that is not reducible to the will of the characters.
Interpretation is an unpredictable art partly because religious meanings are
unveiled not only through themes in the text, but is also through the lived world of
the reader. Jacques and Orlando do not learn to “read” nature’s meanings well
until their readings become more personal. They both come to know the “book of
nature” through cross-referencing “the world of the text,” or nature, with their
personal experiences. Orlando comes to know Rosalind and find hope through
new relationships with Rosalind and the Duke that help him transform his
tendencies to master nature and see it as malevolent. Jacques’s acceptance of
unforeseen, but meaningful religious hope allows him to accept life in the forest
with peace.
The idea that both the sacred phenomenological world and themes of
salvation in scripture manifest divine wisdom that Ricoeur writes about plays out
in a direct way in our interpretive relationships with scripture. Religious meanings
unfold in both the text and in the life of the reader. Interpretation of the sacred can
only grow as these two “texts” are cross-referenced. As he explains, the meaning

107
of scriptural narratives “is not confined to the so-called inside of the text. It occurs
at the intersection between the world of the text and the world of the readers”
(Figuring 240). What the medieval book of nature suggests about the hermeneutic
between scripture and the phenomenological world is similar to this idea; the text
invites us to engage both worlds as we uncover new meanings. As Ricoeur
suggests, interpreting means, “to seek, in all other levels of signification crossed
by the same signifier—the cosmological level, [and] the social level … the same
functioning of meaning” (Figuring 143). Sacred meanings in scripture reveal
themselves only as we are perceptive to their connection to meanings that unfold
in our lives. The sacredness of the text lies not in its language but in this function
to transform the possible relationships we have with the world (Figuring 240,
243). The text refers not directly to “manipulable objects” in the real world, but to
ways of being in the world, to ways of relating, through an indirect, second level
of poetic reference (Figuring 221-23).
We can compare the “letting go” in interpretation and the “peregrination”
of unforeseen revelation in scripture that Ricoeur describes to the “wandering”
that Martin Heidegger describes in humanity’s search for the meaning of being
throughout history. In Heidegger’s essay “The Anaximander Fragment,” he
argues that the search for meaning and the act of interpreting history reveals
endless patterns of “errancy” or wandering in search of truth (26-27). Adding to
Ricoeur’s argument, we might say that the search for meaning through
interpretation in addition to the revelation of the sacred is something that tends to
“peregrinate” as religious wisdom does. In Heidegger’s philosophy, interpretation
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of the past and of ancient texts wanders because wherever truth manifests itself, it
also withdraws. Things reveal themselves in a certain way at one time, and then
pass away. Disorder, or the falling of things into chaos, is necessary for order to
be established and things to continue to reveal themselves (46-47). Heidegger
refers to every interpretation as a misinterpretation because there is no one
narrative or perspective to explain the truth of the past; the complete meaning of
being is never revealed at one given time (26). Discovering truths that do unfold
at a certain time thus requires us to wander in search of them, to open ourselves to
the possibility that truth might unfold in one way, or another. Because of this,
static interpretations (including, for example, reductive human-centered readings
of scripture) are always inadequate. As Ricoeur suggests, “frozen” interpretations
of scripture that have dominated in Christianity’s past have been blind to the everchanging way the text reveals what was at other times hidden. It was for
instrumental purposes (to prevent heresy) that Christian churches tended to stifle
personal interpretation (Figuring 69-72). They were unwilling to face the risks of
incorrect interpretations that would come with encouraging individuals to read
scripture in light of personal experience.
Heidegger suggests that Western culture has blinded itself to how beings
normally unconceal and conceal themselves through time. This is evident in
modern technology and science, which attempts to predetermine ways things are
to be revealed or interpreted in the future, whether texts from the past, or nature
(“Anaximander” 56-58). The West no longer recognizes the value of allowing
chaos or disorder to occur at times in order to leave what might be revealed open
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(“Anaximander” 46-48). We might compare this to Borgmann’s argument that we
need to acknowledge suffering, a major facet of the chaos we encounter in our
world, in order to interpret our Christian heritage openly (65-66, 78-79).
Heidegger suggests that earnest interpretation, or wandering, is something
performed by opening ourselves to the possibilities of the future. Interpretation is
always contextual, just as wandering places us in one space or another.
Medieval interpretations of the creation narrative suggest ways the
account may inform our understanding of what it means to seek divine guidance
in the midst of suffering and error. Once Adam and Eve are cast out, the narrative,
(like other creation stories that approach the problem of evil and its sources
[Ricoeur, Symbolism 356]), is about errantry, about human separation from the
divine and wandering in search of divine wisdom due to human inadequacies,
rather than exerting dominion and mastery. Seeking understanding of how to live
in nature involves wandering in search of truth, facing risks that always come
with interpreting.
Heidegger’s discussion in “The Anaximander Fragment” and medieval
perspectives of Adam and Eve’s search for truth suggest how acknowledging
contingencies is different from blind obedience or passive interpretation. Seeking
moral direction and understanding demands that we actively search, even if this
search inevitably involves periods of seemingly futile wandering. “Frozen”
interpretations of the Bible are better models of inactive interpretation, although,
paradoxically, they attempted mastery over the text and heresy. Deeper levels of
reference and wisdom in scriptural narratives are left unengaged. Acknowledging
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suffering as a contingency in nature can also be distinguished from passively
responding to suffering and evil. Recognizing our failure to master suffering (and
that instead, certain forms of suffering inevitably master us) should encompass
seeking to do our best to respond morally to evil and suffering. We might best
avoid immoral forms of mastery by learning what moral principles and which
contingencies in the phenomenological we should allow to restrain us.
Even interpretation that is open to unexpected sacred meanings and
oriented within a personal context involves uncertainty and risks. Inevitably, we
make some mistakes. In the play, Duke Senior foolishly compares deer to citizens
being murdered in their own city (II.i.21-25). This is ironic in light of the speech
he has made about reading mysterious religious meanings in nature. Another
example is how even though Orlando feels such love for Rosalind that no one can
dissuade him from seeking her and expressing his love, he nevertheless fails at
first in his attempts to poetically express his feelings about the friendship that has
begun between them (III.ii.259-84, 373-99, III.ii.125-54). The implications of
scripture in a given context are often not clear and obvious, and even when we try
our best we may interpret poorly. But being open to ways our readings of
scripture can challenge our views of the world or our past readings, as well as
how our experiences might challenge these readings can help us learn to engage
religious texts on new levels of meaning. Such openness may allow the text to
speak to us with truthful moral meanings that might otherwise be drowned out.
We must allow “the world of the text” to inform our worlds as readers, and our
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experiences in the phenomenological world to help form the meanings we derive
from the text (Ricoeur, Figuring 240).
While personal interpretations may never be perfect, we draw further from
the text if we take a distanced approach to the text and its interpretation.
Distanced cultural and historical theories can never fully explain the significance
of the text, its sources, or its influence on human society. As Ricoeur describes,
when the text is cut away from personal religious interpretation, its meanings
become dead. While believing that genetic explanations of the text, or its cultural
roots and interpretive history, can make its meanings transparent to us, such
discourses do not bring us closer to its sacred meanings (Figuring 220).
Objective approaches to scripture and its interpretation are sometimes
unethical because they usually fail to engage the rhetorical structures of the text
and the contexts in which the text has been interpreted (Fiorenza 13-16). By
distancing themselves so much from the past, scholars cannot begin to make
historical contexts intelligible. As Elizabeth Fiorenza points out, the Bible has
been used to justify many forms of immorality in Western culture, including
slavery, misogyny, waging war, and anti-Judaism (15). But if we are to take such
issues up, including issues surrounding the environmental crisis, we should
attempt to answer questions about how and why the text has been interpreted the
way it has within certain contexts, and whether these were fair readings of the
texts. As Fiorenza explains, “An ethics of historical reading changes the task of
interpretation from finding out ‘what the text meant’ to the question of what kind
of readings can do justice to the text in its historical contexts” (14). Reading the
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text meaningfully involves taking the cultural contexts of past cultures into
account. Evaluating past interpretations in this way, Fiorenza suggests, allows the
text to speak to its readers anew, “mak[ing] the assimilation of the text to our own
experience and interests more difficult and thereby keeps alive the "irritation" of
the original text by challenging our own assumptions, world views, and practices”
(14).
The kind of ethical approach described by Fiorenza applies to
understanding Judeo-Christian texts and traditions in light of the environmental
crisis. We need to be sensitive to the possibility that appropriate interpretation is
subject to conditions, that it is contingent on the circumstances of its readers. As
Heidegger suggests, doing so can help history to perform its function of revealing
how interpretations of the past are a kind of wandering in search of truth, rather
than definitive perspectives of texts and what they revealed to past generations
(“Anaximander” 26). Fiorenza’s argument is affirmed by Ricoeur’s suggestion
that in order to respond to our ancestors and their experiences ethically, we must
be willing to interpret scripture with new eyes, in consideration of challenges
faced in the past as well as those we face today, including exploitive uses of the
natural world.

Grace is Perceptible Amidst Suffering:
Overcoming the Logic of Accusation
If scripture can play a special role in restoring capacities to respond to the
sacred in nature, and if reconnecting with scriptural narratives can help us
remember and become sensitive to the suffering of past generations and the
immoral practices of our own, what does this mean for environmental
perspectives of Judeo-Christian texts and traditions? Disassociating ourselves
from the West’s religious heritage may lead us to perpetuate the immorality of our
generation. It may only spread the forgetfulness of how to create moral
relationships with the natural world. In this chapter, I will argue that in addition to
this, it is important to avoid accusing definitive origins of the environmental crisis
in order to engage the sacred in religious narratives and in the natural world.
Lynn White’s essay is interested in digging deeply into history to expose
the cultural and historical sources of exploitive uses of technology (185-86).
David Abram justifies identifying the logo-centrism of Hebrew and Greek
cultures as the “origin” of the environmental crisis (93-95). Christopher Manes
warns that “neglecting the origin” of nature’s “silence” is a dangerous way of
sustaining immoral relationships with nature (16-17). Although understanding
destructive cultural influences on relationships with the environment is a useful
tool in helping contemporary culture make needed changes, searching for specific
origins may be counterproductive. Identifying specific sources of evil may prove
an unintentional way of supporting worldviews that affirm the immoral uses of
113
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technology the environmental movement is designed to overthrow. Accusing
origins of the environmental crisis might be dangerous specifically in relation to
Judeo-Christian scripture, as I will continue to explain.
In theology and philosophy, a theodicy is a rational explanation for the
presence of evil. Theodicies seek to explain the question: if the world and God are
good, how is it that so much evil and suffering are present? Efforts to trace
ultimate causes of moral catastrophes like the environmental crisis sometimes
share assumptions with theodicy, including problematic ways of understanding
evil and suffering. Western philosophy has traditionally conflated evil with
suffering and assumed that satisfactory explanations for evil can be found. The
structures of religious narratives challenge this in that they do not offer precise
explanations for evil. Rather than seeking reasons for suffering and human evil,
Ricoeur suggests in his essay “Evil: A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology,”
our interest in the problem of evil and suffering should move from the realm of
theory and theodicy to that of practice. Rather than the problem of evil, we should
focus on questions concerning how to respond ethically to evil and suffering, a
problem that religious narratives are suited to help us engage.
Shakespeare’s As You Like It can be considered a retelling of parts of the
Genesis narrative surrounding Adam and Eve’s family and can help us address
questions raised about human evil and immoral mastery raised in that narrative
surrounding Adam and Eve’s family. The drama begins at a point parallel to when
Adam and Eve have been exiled in the wilderness and their son Cain grows
jealous of his brother Abel. Like the creation narrative, the play is interested in
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examining sources of evil. Shakespeare’s story suggests how definite causes of
suffering and evil are evasive. Instead of identifying specific sources of evil, the
narrative focuses on how individuals rationalize choosing to exploit others and the
natural world. As You Like It, like the Cain and Abel narrative, suggests that evil
is a pattern of self-deceptive accusation and revenge. This chapter will interpret
As You Like It in light of Jean-Luc Marion’s Christian writings on evil and
suffering, specifically his essay “Evil in Person,” which explores the special
significance of suffering in Christianity and the morally destructive qualities of
accusation and revenge. Evil, Marion argues, works on the assumption that
suffering demands suppression, which is only possible through blaming a
scapegoat and taking control of suffering by returning evil. From a Christian
perspective, only Christ’s willingness to suffer and resist accusing others offers an
alternative to evil’s logic, which is also suggested in Shakespeare’s exploration of
evil. Reading the Cain and Abel account in connection with Marion’s work and
Shakespeare’s retelling, we find that the narrative does not affirm evil’s
justifications to exploit and take revenge, but teaches how to avoid falling into
such attempts at mastery.
Theodicy-like searches to trace reasons for suffering and evil can be selfdeceptive and destructive of our abilities to make moral choices. Responding fully
to suffering does not necessarily entail searching for and constraining sources of
evil and suffering. As Marion’s Christian phenomenology suggests, doing so
often actually stifles capacities to act ethically in the face of suffering. Instead, the
search for moral ways to respond to suffering, including in relationships with
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nature, is more a matter of discerning what actions are immoral expressions of
mastery, and which are appropriate responses to suffering and evil. Christian
narratives bear special implications concerning how to respond ethically to evil
and suffering. Reconnecting with these narratives, rather than disassociating
ourselves from them, might help us challenge tendencies toward mastery, and
even help us to perceive moral constraints in our relationships with the natural
world.
As early Christians suggested as they conceptualized the book of nature,
despite our inability to trace causes or meanings in suffering and human evil, as
we engage scripture, we can become sensitive to the presence of grace amidst
suffering and evil in nature and humanity. From a Christian perspective, grace
encompasses the presence of the sacred in our world. More specifically, it
includes divine compassion for human suffering, and human capacities to respond
ethically to suffering without taking retribution. Christian narratives, and
particularly the suffering of Christ, teach that compassionate responses to evil and
suffering that refuse to accuse and take revenge are possible in the face of any
form of suffering and human evil. In response to the evils of the environmental
crisis, Christian narratives might also help us find strength to resist blaming past
generations, which goes hand in hand with efforts to resist responding to suffering
by exploiting others and the natural world.
Unmasking the logic of evil and its tendency to reduce all evil and
suffering to specific causes bears special relevance in the environmental crisis.
From Marion’s perspective, the essence of technology follows evil’s logic.
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Modern technology’s immoral practices, including its excessive measures taken to
repress suffering and its deception that suffering can be traced to specific human
actions, can be considered expressions of the greater problem of human desire for
mastery. The will for mastery and suppression of suffering runs deeper than any
one cultural influence. Rather than the question of who or what to blame, the
larger issue concerning desire for mastery over nature in the West is one of moral
practice. For this reason, environmental writers should be careful not to buy into
assumptions that accusation is a road to reconciliation. Turning to Judeo-Christian
narratives for moral guidance and giving up desires to trace precise origins of the
environmental crisis are legitimate moral responses to the West’s exploitive
practices.

FALSE GROUNDS FOR SEEKING THE ORIGIN OF EVIL IN THEODICY
In the last chapter, I discussed how we can perpetuate indifference to suffering
and evil by forgetting its presence in narratives and in history, which prevents us
from reading religious texts carefully. Another way religious meanings in the
narratives can be dismissed is engaging them for the sake of seeking causes of
evil. This may include approaching religious texts as sources of cultural problems,
which is comparable to interpreting scripture with the goal of making propositions
concerning the origins of suffering. Such approaches are encompassed in
theodicy.
In “Evil, A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology,” Paul Ricoeur
discusses why seeking explanations for human evil in theodicy has long proven
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confusing in Western thought. The major mistake that is made is equating
suffering with evil itself. The first stage of thinking about the problems of evil and
suffering traditionally starts with religious narratives, particularly creation
accounts. In interpreting these, it seems natural to seek logical explanations for
suffering and evil. However, while religious narratives provide groundwork
through which to talk about the beginnings of evil and suffering (in that they are
interested in the origins of the world, and raise the question why humanity
suffers), they pose a multitude of different possible readings to explain why
humans suffer and choose evil, something evident in more than the JudeoChristian tradition. The search for the origins of evil through religious narratives
and myths, Ricoeur writes, is likely a “blind alley” (251).
The second level is “wisdom,” or seeking explanations for personal
suffering. At this stage, seeking understanding of evil and suffering becomes a
kind of “complaint” in which one asks “Why me?” As we find with religious
narratives, concrete solutions evade us. Ricoeur uses the book of Job as an
example of how such questions fail to be answered. Job seeks, but receives no
rational explanation for his individual suffering, but only the promise of receiving
divine grace (251-52).
The next stage of contemplating evil is “gnosis,” which brings the
question ‘why do I suffer?’ to a new level, asking, what is the cause of evil and
suffering in general? Gnosis, or assertions of esoteric knowledge about the origins
of evil, serves as the link between wisdom and theodicy, and began with Gnostic
thought and its influence on Christian theology. As Ricoeur explains:
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Thinking would not have moved on from wisdom to theodicy if
Gnosticism had not elevated speculation to the level of a
gigantomachy, where the forces of good are engaged in a merciless
struggle with the armies of evil … From this perspective, we might
say that Western thought is in debt to Gnosticism, broadly
conceived, for having conceived the problem of evil in terms of
one all-encompassing problematic: Unde Malum? But even more
important is the inclusion of philosophical categories in the
speculation on evil set forth by Augustine in his fight against the
tragic vision of this gnosis. (253)
Both the Gnostics and Augustine explained causes of suffering in ways that
conflated evil with suffering. Gnosticism posed the idea that evil, encompassing
suffering, was an active (even divine) influence on the world. Augustine
attempted to deflect guilt for suffering away from God by asserting that evil is
without substance, but this led him to equate suffering with human error. Evil and
suffering are not a substantial force, Augustine thought, but always a
manifestation of how humanity turns away from the only substantial thing, God
and his goodness (253). Human evil and suffering are as if they are one and the
same; the presence of one entails that of the other.
It was from these assumptions, Ricoeur suggests, that Augustine was led
to the doctrine of original sin, or the belief that the penalty for Adam’s
transgression is born by all members of the human family. Augustine’s correlation
between evil and suffering does not entirely resolve the dismal worldview of the
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Gnostics that attributed evil to divine cause (253-54). Augustine redirects guilt
toward humanity, whose errors become the ultimate reason for suffering.
The confusion of evil with suffering that we find in Augustine’s thought is
an easy mistake to make. Because of the way we experience guilt (or evil action)
and suffering, Ricoeur says, it is very easy to conflate the two. Punishment that
comes as a consequence for evil is suffering, thus guilt leads to pain. To do evil,
to be guilty, is to cause suffering (often including our own). We can also feel
guilty in times of undue suffering. In doing evil, we can even feel that we are the
victims of greater evil influences at work in the world, a great history of evil
doing that we are helplessly enmeshed within (250). But, Ricoeur writes, we must
recognize that although they are complexly intertwined, evil and suffering are not
the same. Augustine’s doctrine of original sin, for example, cannot account for
unjust suffering (254).
The search for one joint cause of evil and suffering prepared the way for
theodicy, or the search for rational explanations for evil’s presence in a divinely
created, good world. Theodicy, Ricoeur writes, is a “battle for the sake of
coherence,” amidst what is irreconcilable. Its basis is problematic because it
assumes that a satisfactory answer to the origins of evil can be found, and that evil
encompasses suffering (249). Both human evil and suffering undercut attempts to
trace their sources to satisfying answers. Kant expressed this when he wrote that
‘[t]here is no conceivable ground from which the moral evil in us could originally
have come.’ Ricoeur “admire[s] this ultimate avowal on Kant’s part” because
“[l]ike Augustine, and … mythical thought, Kant caught sight of the demonic

121
aspect of the ground of human freedom, yet he did so with the sobriety of a
thinking always careful not to transgress the limits of knowledge” (258-59).
Augustine had crossed the “limits of knowledge” when he attributed all suffering
to human guilt and cause. The Gnostics had crossed these limits by attributing all
suffering and evil to the divine. Theodicy in general goes too far by asserting it
has uncovered definitive sources of evil and suffering.

APPLYING RICOEUR’S DISCUSSION TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PERSPECTIVES
In relation to our ancestors and the evils of modern technology, and in the context
of the West’s traditional ways of approaching the problem of suffering, it is
tempting to perform something like a theodicy to explain the exploitive uses of
technology in Western culture. The religious texts and worldviews of our
ancestors may seem logical sources of problematic worldviews. But seeking
precise causes for the evils of the environmental crisis crosses the bounds of what
can be known and should be asserted, and perpetuates the West’s tradition of
conflating suffering and evil and tracing the ultimate sources of both. Thinking
about evil and suffering, Ricoeur suggests, begins with religious texts, but cannot
become a search for explanations of human evil and suffering. Religious
narratives are not given to inform us of definitive sources of evil. Instead, they
focus on practice, or how we must learn to respond to evil, which is always to
resist it (259). As Ricoeur suggests, our theoretical attempts to explain sources of
evil and suffering in the West could benefit from shifting to a focus on practical
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understanding of morality. Doing this, we should deliberately allow ourselves to
recognize our ignorance of why certain forms of human evil and suffering unfold
in our world (258-61). Religious narratives can play a role in this, but not the one
that they have often played in the West. Becoming more pragmatic and less
concerned with theodicy-like propositions, we can interpret the significance of the
religious narratives we have inherited anew to seek ways to diminish particular
evils and suffering.
Although the environmental publications I have discussed do not attempt
what we would call theodicy (partly because they are concerned with identifying
causes of a particular form of human evil, which can benefit from discussion of
problematic choices and cultural influences) their concern with the exploitive
practices of technology is entangled within a larger problem concerning evil and
suffering they do not directly address. We might summarize this question as, how
do human needs and suffering deceive us into justifying exploiting natural life and
others, perpetuating evil and suffering? Or in other words, how do our efforts to
relieve human suffering become an immoral form of mastery? Exploitive
practices in modern technology can often be considered to attempt to suppress
suffering by extreme measures. We can apply this moral question to JudeoChristian narratives.

MARION’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF EVIL AND SUFFERING
Christian narratives offer special ideas about how to respond to suffering that
overthrow the mastery asserted by technological worldviews. This appears to be
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what Ricoeur means when he writes that restoring the power of narratives to help
us respond ethically to suffering is a “specifically Christian task” (Figuring 238).
In “Evil in Person,” Jean-Luc Marion offers a phenomenology of evil and
suffering. He characterizes qualities of evil actions based on a Christian
understanding of Satan. The most basic assumption behind evil actions, Marion
observes, is that suffering is evil. Because suffering is evil, it demands that we
respond by repressing or mastering it. If suffering truly were evil, this might be
true. As Ricoeur describes, religious narratives instruct that evil is “what ought
not to be” (259), whatever form it takes. However, evil is deceptive. It teaches us
that only by identifying a “precise cause” of pain and returning evil can we find
peace and relief (1-5). Evil also deceives us into desiring to ward off feelings of
guilt and to establish our own innocence through revenge. When guilty, we feel
like victims, and then victimize others. Or, because unjust suffering makes us feel
fearful we ourselves have caused it, we grow eager to mark ourselves as
blameless by redirecting blame to someone else. Ironically, the very act of
revenge often increases our guilt rather than establishes our innocence as we
deliberately choose to inflict suffering on others (7).
As Marion describes, evil blinds us in our attempts to identify exact
causes. The impossibility of uncovering them with accuracy is evident in the fact
that most suffering offers a multitude of possible sources, despite our desires to
accuse a “face” or “name.” Some forms of suffering clearly offer no possibilities
of blaming at all (4). This is not to assert that human error and guilt are irrelevant
to suffering and evil, but that suffering usually does not have one cause. As
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Ricoeur writes, although human error is a major source of suffering, “we have no
idea” how to ever separate human and non-human causes of suffering, “to such an
extent does human violence impregnate suffering” (259). Error and evil affect
human suffering rather than effect it in ways we can determine with accuracy.

THE LOGIC OF ACCUSATION IN AS YOU LIKE IT
In As You Like It, characters’ accusations suggest the impossibility of blaming
precise causes of suffering and evil. Shakespeare retells the conflict between Cain
and Abel, allowing brothers to come to amends rather than end in tragedy.
However, they must first overcome their desires to accuse each other. The first
speech in the play is one long accusation by Orlando against his brother Oliver.
Oliver, as the oldest son, has inherited his father’s fortune and taken a father-like
role in determining the destiny of his younger brother, whom he keeps at home
without allowing him the education promised by their father. Their first argument
occurs in Oliver’s orchard (I.i.41), which emphasizes not only his resemblance to
Cain, who was a “tiller of the ground” (King James Version, Gen. 4.2), but also
the unfairness of his inheritance of their father’s estate.
Primogeniture is an example of how suffering and evil evade being traced
to ultimate causes. This is emphasized by the words of Jacques, who says that his
melancholy will lead him to “rail against all the firstborn of Egypt” if he can’t
sleep (II.v.60-61). In the book of Exodus, the firstborn of Egypt appeared as
villains to the Hebrews as the inheritors of a nation that oppressed them. But in
time, suffering turned tables. The Hebrews’ liberation required the lives of
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Egypt’s firstborn, who then became victims. In the Exodus narrative, there is no
ultimate source of injustice; all suffer and affect the suffering of others. Orlando
and Oliver seek to accuse each other and to victimize themselves, but the ultimate
causes of their personal suffering circumvent definition. The de Boys’ father
made the will that gave authority to Oliver, so Oliver is not solely to blame, but he
also misuses his authority to guard his father’s estate, promising Oliver only a
“part” of his inheritance (I.i.77-79). This was not their father’s intention. As
Adam reminds the brothers (much as the biblical Adam might have expressed to
Cain) their father would have had them “at accord” with each other (I.i.63-64).
Oliver, it turns out, justifies his actions by accusing Orlando, who is well-loved,
of serving as a source of injustice in his life:
… I hope I shall see an end
of him; for my soul (yet I know not why) hates
nothing more than he. Yet he’s gentle, never school’d
and yet learned, full of noble device, of all sorts
enchantingly beloved; and, indeed, so much in the
heart of the world, and especially of my own
people, who best know him, that I am altogether
mispris’d. But it shall not be so long, this wrastler
shall clear all … (I.i.164-72)
Oliver believes Orlando is better liked than he. Orlando’s popularity makes Oliver
feel “mispris’d.” Orlando, in turn, accuses Oliver of forcing him to “mar” his life
with “idleness,” making him no better than livestock (I.i.14-16, 31-34). Orlando
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compares himself to the prodigal son in the New Testament parable who begs to
eat “husks” with the swine, except he has spent no “prodigal portion” to justify
his brother’s unkind treatment (I.i.37-39). Thus, their conflict is tied to an
additional biblical narrative about brothers and accusation. Not unlike the
prodigal son, Orlando forcefully demands his inheritance. He also challenges his
brother’s right to manage their father’s wealth (I.i.66-74), which leads Oliver to
take further revenge on him. Although his younger brother has never threatened
Oliver, Oliver perceives him as having murderous intentions. Knowing Orlando
wishes to wrestle with Charles, the official court wrestler, Oliver gives Charles
permission to kill Orlando and deceptively warns him the fight could lead to
Charles’s death if he is not careful (I.i.139-58). In the wrestling match with
Charles, Oliver hopes to see “an end” to Orlando, which will supposedly “clear
all” of the conflict, leaving Oliver in peace and to take his brother’s spot within
their circle of friends in addition to Orlando’s inheritance.
In light of Marion’s phenomenology, Oliver adheres to the logic of evil,
and his actions suggest its self-deceptive nature. Oliver’s grounds for taking
revenge are obviously irrational to the extent that even he begins to recognize this.
In his “soul” he “know[s] not why” he should accuse Orlando. Oliver chooses to
identify Orlando as the cause of dissatisfaction in his life among a multitude of
other things that may have affected him. Having identified a source of suffering,
he feels compelled to suppress this cause. His dissatisfaction will supposedly be
relieved once Orlando is dead. Evil promises reconciliation through revenge,
when revenge (murder and suicide in its extreme forms) is the one thing that most
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prevents reconciliation and peace (Marion 14-17). Ironically, while he accuses
Orlando of being murderous, it is really himself whom he reveals as murderous
and cunning. The same idea is found in Duke Frederick’s attempt to enhance
perceptions of Celia’s virtue by banishing her cousin Rosalind (I.iii.81-83). Evil
promises that through perpetuating evil, we can claim innocence and virtue. Yet,
while accusation works through an “immutable” and seemingly flawless logic
through which suffering and others can be mastered, it actually increases guilt and
suffering (Marion 1, 5).
Oliver’s use of the logic of evil can be paralleled with Cain’s actions in
Genesis, which suggest the impossibility of accusing precise causes of evil, and
how attempts to do so can lead to immoral mastery. The first act of abuse and
exploitation, both of another human and natural life, recorded in Judeo-Christian
texts is Cain’s choice to murder his brother Abel. Cain could be considered the
originator of heinous human actions according to the narrative. The ultimate cause
of Cain’s murder is elusive, however. Cain and Abel both offered sacrifices. For
reasons not thoroughly explained in Genesis (although we do know Cain could
have made an acceptable offering if he had chosen [Gen. 4.6-7]), Cain’s was
rejected, while Abel’s was held sacred by the Lord. Cain identified Abel and his
accepted offering as a cause for his own suffering and worthy of revenge (Gen.
4.2-8). Marion uses Cain as an example of false accusation in which one blames
those who are happy for one’s own unhappiness, and of trying to claim innocence
by deferring suffering and responsibility to others (8). Cain treated Abel’s
acceptable offering as a source of evil to suppress, and doing so, justified killing
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his brother in the fields. Like Shakespeare’s retelling, the account of Cain and
Abel suggests how evil actions originate without just reasons or precise causes,
and that it works through a deceptive logic of harming others for one’s own gain.
(As Marion points out, the account of Adam and Eve’s fall, the traditional origin
of evil and suffering in Judeo-Christian scripture, suggests something similar
about the sources of evil. Responsibility for evil is deferred from Adam to Eve
and from Eve to the serpent. No one in the narrative is ultimately to blame [9]).
Oliver treats Orlando, who like Abel is better loved by others for his virtues as a
means to defer his responsibilities and alleviate his frustration.
Evil deceives and betrays both Cain and Oliver, as Marion characterizes
the logic of evil to work. Cain’s murder only serves as a source of greater
suffering and alienation, not only from his family and the Lord, but also the land.
According to the Genesis account, the Lord cursed Cain so that the earth would
no longer yield up its fruits for him, and hid His face. Cain describes his
punishment as being “driven from the face of the earth” in addition to being
driven from the Lord (King James Version, Gen. 4.12, 16). Any possibility of
making an acceptable or sacred offering in his relationships with the natural world
was now fully withheld. Oliver’s evil motives deceive and exile him in a
comparable way to Cain. His attempts to kill his brother force Orlando to flee into
the forest. When Duke Frederick learns that Orlando is missing, he seizes Oliver’s
land and exiles him into the forest. He tells him he must not return until he can tell
him what happened to his brother. Strangely, Frederick’s words are paralleled
with those of the Lord in the Genesis account, who chastens Cain for disowning
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his responsibilities toward his brother (III.i.16-18); King James Version, Gen. 4.9,
III.i.1-11). Despite Frederick’s hatred of his own brother, he tells Oliver that he is
only more a villain for trying to disassociate himself from his brother (III.i.12-15).
Frederick takes up the role of Satan when we consider the phenomenological
perspective that Marion provides. Satan, he writes, promises to stand by those
who heed his promise that revenge brings reward, but then “slips away” and
betrays the person, leaving him to be self-consumed by evil choices (23). Heeding
the logic of evil, Duke Frederick is an enemy even to those who hold his same
worldview.
We can connect the logic of evil and what is taught about the origins of
evil in the Genesis account with how Frederick’s worldview influences human
relationships and relationships with the natural world. Frederick’s leadership
relies on accusation, revenge, and mastery over others. The wrestling motif in the
play can be understood as a symbol of Frederick’s worldview (Daley, “Dispraise”
312) as well as the conflicts that occur between brothers. Oliver, Frederick, and
Cain all treat others and the natural world as instruments for their own gain.
Frederick’s worldview, like Cain’s, is something that demoralizes relationships
between humans and the land through usurpation. Oliver and Frederick fail to
adhere to the rightful connections between others and the land, much as Cain
failed to value the sacredness of Abel’s sacrifice. Like Cain, it is as if Frederick
and others are deceived into driving themselves off the “face of the earth,” and
away from what is moral and sacred through immoral mastery over others and the
natural world.

130

ACCUSATION’S RELEVANCE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS
As we learn in both in the play and in Marion’s phenomenology, while accusation
promises to be beneficial and bring reconciliation, it is actually deceptive and
self-destructive. It creates a cycle of perpetually greater alienation and suffering
(5-7). As the narratives I have discussed suggest, accusation alienates us not only
from human others, but can also alienate us from the natural world.
Although I am not attempting to identify particular environmental
arguments as immoral, we can extend what Marion and the play suggest about the
dangers of accusation to responses to environmental crisis. Choosing to accuse
and disassociate ourselves from others, including past generations, may
inadvertently uphold relationships with the environment that are exploitive. We
should be careful before we join searches for human guilt lest we risk
perpetuating paradigms in which suffering is blamed too heavily on others (much
as Frederick’s worldview demoralizes relationships with the natural world partly
through accusing and distancing himself from others). Marion suggests that the
logic of accusation, another name for the logic of evil, is affirmed and perpetuated
by the enframing essence of technology that Heidegger describes:
… [O]ur time—that of nihilism—offers the remarkable distinction
of furnishing a perfect (though not unexpected) support to the
infinite demand for accusation: the essence of technology in effect
qualifies man as potentially universally guilty, for it first of all
defines him as the worker of the universe, the master and possessor
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of nature, and therefore the one responsible for the world. He is
responsible for the world in all that he does—production as the
practical disposition of the world, as if it were a capital to
exploit—but also by what he does not do; for, by right, his mastery
has neither limit nor condition: all that “is produced” without his
having produced it, prior to or on the margins of his production …
[A]ll that which man does not produce, is imposed on him by the
essence of technology as something he must anticipate, and thus as
something for which he is responsible. The farther man’s
knowledge extends … the more his universal responsibility proves
correct. In this way, the essence of technology provides a decisive
confirmation of the logic of evil: for every evil, there is always a
cause: man. (5-6)
The mastery of nature and of suffering attempted in uses of modern technology
can be considered an expression of the logic of evil and its attempts to trace and
control causes, making humanity an ultimate cause. This passage from Marion
builds off of Heidegger’s discussion in “The Question Concerning Technology”
concerning how indebtedness to what cannot be reduced to human cause is
replaced by a reductive sense of causality in modern technology that deceives us
into assuming humanity masters events (316, 332). One of the particular ways the
essence of modern technology blinds us, Marion suggests, is that it conceals that
suffering and evil evade full attribution to human guilt. Its tendency to treat
humanity and nature as instruments is a manifestation of deeper moral struggles
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concerning human evil and mastery. Marion suggests that as we accuse human
evils, we inevitably cast blame back at ourselves, increasing our sense of despair
and guilt, rather than obtaining the disassociation from guilt and suffering that we
seek (7). The moral struggles surrounding the environmental crisis may lead us to
desire to prove ourselves innocent and others guilty for its evils, but seeking to
accuse specific sources to blame may only increase feelings of helplessness. As
Ricoeur describes, in performing evil ourselves we often feel like victims, or
pawns to greater forces at work in one great history of human evil, which lies
before everyone to see (250). To accuse, however, may put us in danger of
perpetuating technology’s deception that events can be precisely traced to human
cause and that suffering is to be mastered by our efforts.
The self-defeating nature of accusation in the environmental crisis can be
characterized by drawing on Michel Serres’s metaphor for the environmental
crisis in The Natural Contract. Human conflicts for power today, Serres suggests,
are comparable to two men fighting in quicksand without realizing that they are
both sinking into it. Serres illustrates this using Goya’s Men Fighting with Sticks.
Our disagreements and accusations reveal themselves as futile and selfdestructive in light of the reality that we have literally jeopardized the continuance
of our relationship with the earth (1-7). By connecting Serres’s discussion with
Marion’s argument about how the self-defeating nature of accusation is manifest
in modern technology, one might argue that in Serres’s metaphorical wrestling
match, both the earth and human others are treated as sources of suffering to
accuse and oppress whom we make our enemies. By seeking to prove our
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superiority to others, including past generations, we will only perpetuate
relationships in which we master the earth that endanger our moral and mortal
lives. Only by resisting the urge to accuse others (human or non-human) might we
escape our dangerous situation.
The wrestling motif in As You Like It, which we can compare to Serres’s
metaphor, seems to suggest how often those with whom we wrestle with should
be our friends and allies. We have closer ties to our ancestors and our religious
heritage than we might acknowledge. Through accusation and revenge, Oliver
makes an enemy out a brother whose character would otherwise make them good
friends. Orlando is also deceived by Frederick’s worldview to some extent, which
appears signaled by his desire to try his strength at court against Charles the
wrestler, and Oliver’s reference to him as a “gamester” (I.i.164).

Orlando’s

wrestling match with Charles works as an extension of the conflicts between the
two brothers; it is Orlando’s way of proving himself to his brother, and Oliver’s
means of using Charles as a tool to kill Orlando. Charles would pose no threat to
Orlando if Oliver resisted his urge to accuse Orlando; he even comes to the de
Boys’ home to persuade Oliver not to let Orlando fight (I.i.122-36). In a similar
way, in the quicksand metaphor, the earth poses no threat unless we engage in
self-destructive human conflict. It is only Oliver’s accusation that Orlando is
murderous that places Orlando’s life in jeopardy (I.ii.141-55). In Lodge’s
Rosalynde, wrestling matches similarly pose mortal danger, and end in three
deaths (Barton 399).
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Shakespeare’s scenes focus on ways that self-destructive patterns of
accusation can be overcome. Orlando’s wrestling match does not have the same
tragic end as Lodge’s. To the amazement of the spectators, Orlando escapes death
from “the sinowy Charles” (II.ii.14). Charles is a foe as seemingly unconquerable
as the rising quicksand, or the earth-made-enemy, in Serres’s argument. Orlando,
like the stick fighters, is oblivious to his weakness before such an enemy. In a
way comparable to how he miraculously escapes Charles, Orlando escapes the
perpetual conflict with his brother and the loss of his inheritance through
refraining from accusation, as I will discuss more at the end of this chapter. We
can cross-reference these events with Touchstone’s explanation of how one can
escape futile duels. As Nathaniel Strout describes:
… [T]he progress toward a duel, as described by Touchstone,
follows from the mutual responses of the two parties, and …
Touchstone concludes that a duel can be avoided even after the
seventh step has been reached through a mutually agreed on if
statement: ‘All these you may avoid but the Lie Direct; and you
may avoid that too, with an If.’ (290; V.iv.90-103)
The argument leading up to a duel draws on conventional retorts Jacques and
Touchstone are familiar with. This pattern is comparable to cycles of revenge,
such as between Oliver and Orlando. Touchstone suggests that there is always a
loop hole through which to escape combat: using an “If” statement. “If” provides
a way for two enemies to “[shake] hands” and “[swear] brothers” much as
Orlando and Oliver eventually learn to treat each other as brothers. What does
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Touchstone mean by “If?” “Your If is the only peace maker; much virtue in If” he
explains (V.iv.102-3). Touchstone’s words point toward the importance of
acknowledging unseen possibilities and shattering route responses through which
revenge is taken. Using “If” is a way of being open to the future being different
than what the present appears to forecast. It can also serve as a way of
acknowledging that offense often lacks premeditated causes, which helps open the
possibility of forgiveness. This reading of Serres's argument and As You Like It
can be extended to argue that seeking to accuse past generations, we may
inadvertently reinforce forms of immoral mastery. If we rely on accusation, we
put ourselves at risk of ignoring what is most important (in Serres argument,
avoiding the mud we are rapidly sinking into) and turning those we might be able
to learn from and work with, including our ancestors and religious past in addition
to the earth into our enemies. Choosing to be more open to unseen possibilities
and forgiveness may prove helpful not only in reconciling ourselves with past
generations, but also in improving our relationships with the natural world.
Frederick is one who would never use the “virtue” of “If,” even when
others are obviously innocent. Drawing on Marion’s discussion of the essence of
technology quoted above, we might say there are no “limits” or “conditions” in
which humanity is not “universally guilty” in his worldview. Accusation and
revenge are always appropriate, even when others are innocent. When he exiles
Rosalind, and she claims that she has never had evil intentions against him even
in thought, Frederick tells her:
Thus do all traitors:
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If their purgation did consist in words,
They are as innocent as grace itself.
Let it suffice thee that I trust thee not. (I.iii.52-55)
Duke Frederick parallels the term “grace” with innocence as well as mercy. To
believe in grace, or mercy, is to believe that there are conditions in which mercy
should prevail despite moral evil. To Frederick, even while words and actions
may claim just innocence, associations (Rosalind’s relationship with her father)
bear guilt because they could inspire traitorous acts in the future. It makes sense
for “grace” to be a superlative of innocence. To forgive is to refrain from
accusation, to refuse to inflict further suffering. But Frederick does not care to
show grace, even when those around him appear to be genuinely innocent. The
appearance of grace conceals that all are inevitably traitors. This resembles how
Marion describes that we are comforted in taking revenge by the fact that even if
we accuse unjustly, inevitably the person we accuse has been the cause of pain for
someone else. Frederick also seems to demonstrate the assumption that even if we
punish the innocent, this is just, because inevitably they will prove their guilt as
they inevitably fail to resist revenge (Marion 7). We see the similar ideas in
Oliver’s thinking. To him, Orlando’s moral virtue conceals the worst intentions.
Whatever “grace” Orlando has, his brother tries to take away (I.i.17-20). Grace,
which includes human capacities to endure suffering and forgive despite evil, is
only a manipulative façade, rather than a living virtue within the Frederick’s
worldview or the logic of evil. Because of the inevitability that they will affect
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suffering, it is as if humans bear punishable guilt and should be treated as one’s
enemies a priori.

UNMASKING THE DECEPTIVE NATURE OF ACCUSATION IN AS YOU
LIKE IT
Rather than seeking precise causes of moral evil in past generations, we should
recognize our inability to separate ourselves and our experiences from our
ancestors and the sacrifices they made on behalf of their religious traditions.
Inevitably, we have been affected by immoral choices past generations have
made. But we cannot trace contemporary evils to precise events in the past. We
should recognize that previous generations bore many of the burdens that are ours
today and that they too attempted to answer perplexing moral questions. Several
scenes in As You Like It when Jacques and others falls into traps of blaming others
can help elucidate the self-defeating nature of accusing others’ attempts to make
moral decisions in relationships with nature and to seek guidance through
interpretation.
First, our relationships with our ancestors’ interpretive and moral choices
can be compared to a scene when Jacques mocks one of Duke Senior’s courtiers
for killing a deer. He is ill-at-ease with the deer hunting of Duke Senior and his
men, which he sees as shameful. When he sees a deer shot with an arrow by the
Duke’s men, he is quick to ask “Which is he that kill’d the deer?” (IV.ii.1) and
goes on to say:
Let’s present him to the Duke like a Roman
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conqueror, and it would do well to set the deer’s horns
upon his head, for a branch of victory. Have you
no song, forester, for this purpose? (IV.ii.3-6)
Jacques intends the horns to make the hunter look like a fool. He mocks the idea
that hunting is a noble sport that demonstrates skill and strength (like a Roman at
war). Jacques seems to accuse the hunter because of the shared guilt, foolishness,
and weakness he feels himself (much as he wishes to mock others’ foolishness by
exposing his own by wearing a motley coat). He doesn’t seem to like the fact that
he relies on the Duke’s venison. The wearing of horns was associated with
cuckoldry (horns were a symbol of a man who is betrayed by an adulterous wife,
and ignorant of it), as is also referenced in Rosalind’s discussion in the previous
scene concerning the risks Orlando will take in becoming a married man (IV.i.5965). To Jacques, the hunter kills ignorantly and foolishly. One of the courtiers in
the hunting party does have a song to praise the hunter, but it suggests something
very different about the hunter’s actions than Jacques:
What shall he have that kill’d the deer?
His leather skin and horns to wear.
Then sing him home:
The rest shall bear this burden.
Take thou no scorn to wear the horn,
It was a crest ere thou wast born;
Thy father's father wore it;
And thy father bore it.
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The horn, the horn, the lusty horn
Is not a thing to laugh to scorn. (IV.ii.10-18)
In the forester’s song, the significance of being betrayed like a cuckold is not
necessarily dropped, but the symbol of wearing horns is considered with greater
seriousness. The horns in the song appear to refer to more than appearing foolish
and weak. They are also tied to the harsh realities of making undesirable sacrifices
(like killing animals) in order to live as we depend on natural life. Making these
sacrifices involves wearing the skin and the horns, receiving what is needed for
life (the skin, comparable to clothing) while making errors and facing adversities
that make us appear as weak and foolish (the horns). These are the reward and the
retribution for depending on natural life, what the hunter “shall have.” Errors can
lead us to be mocked by others (like Jacques, who scorns those who hunt so that
he may eat), even while we remain ignorant like the cuckolded man.
We can compare “wearing the horn” to the adverse relationships with
nature that Adam and Eve’s family entered into and the struggle to create moral
relationships with nature despite such stumbling blocks. “It was a crest err thou
wast born,” seems to indicate not that it was caused by one’s fathers, but that the
burden of the horn is as if it has always been; it is without definite origin. It is also
comparable to Adam’s curse which brought the necessity of laboring and using
(and killing) natural life. Wearing the “leather skin” resonates with the imagery
surrounding the coats of skins that the Lord made Adam and Eve when they
entered the wilderness, at which point the first animal appears to have been killed
in the Genesis account (Gen. 3.21). The horn, the song suggests, is both
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something not to “laugh to scorn” and that we should not be ashamed to take up
ourselves. It is necessary and as such we cannot blame past generations for having
taken up this same “crest” themselves. The horn is a symbol of humility that
comes as we depend on and taking from the natural world, rather than pride as a
crest would normally be. “The rest shall bear this burden” suggests the
inappropriateness of accusing those who have come before us for the mistakes
they made, and how it is necessary to bear up the errors of those who come before
us. The horn does not necessarily encompass exploiting nature (the way Jacques
sees deer hunts), but it does involve the moral risks that are inevitably taken as we
attempt to learn what is right and immoral in relationships with nature.
This interpretation of the forester’s song can be connected with the
argument I made about the conditional qualities of interpretation in chapter three.
“Wearing the horn” is comparable to the necessity of interpreting in “errancy,” as
if we are wandering in search of truth, that Martin Heidegger describes.
Interpretation is an experience comparable to the exiled states of Adam and Eve
and Duke Senior’s hunting men. Never obtaining perfect interpretations or moral
understanding, we take risks, including the risk of being rejected by others for our
actions later on. Like Adam and Eve, each generation faces the struggle to know
good from evil (Gen. 3:5-6). We must attempt to discern what kinds of actions
and interpretations uphold immoral forms of mastery, and to what extent
sacrifices in nature are required to respond morally to human needs and the needs
of other living things. The forester’s song suggests that to scorn our fathers for the
sacrifices they made is to deny the reality that we too walk as errants. This can be
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applied not only to our moral relationships with the natural world, but also our
interpretations of scripture. We sometimes fail to acknowledge that we too “wear
the horn” as we interpret texts and extend their implications to our relationships
with the natural world.
Similar themes about the risks we take in interpreting are found in the
ideas of “making” and “marring” in the play. Working and interpreting entail the
danger of “marring” or ruining what characters attempt to create. Marring, though
often unintentionally done, is met with accusation. Characters sometimes assume
that making and marring cannot happen at once, much as Oliver implies that since
Orlando isn’t formally taught to make anything through a trade, he must be
marring something (I.i.29-34). When Orlando takes up poetry, this brings censure
from Jacques, who suggests that he should “mar no more trees with writing love
songs in their barks” (III.ii.259-60). In response, Orlando asks him to cease
marring his poems by “reading them ill-favoredly” (III.ii.261-262). Neither
Jacques nor Orlando is completely in the right. Orlando is both making and
marring in that he is attempting to make something beautiful, but doing it poorly.
Jacques disregards (or mars) the sincerity of Orlando’s love for Rosalind but also
provides a useful critique.
Another instance of this theme is suggested when Touchstone and Audrey
meet with Sir Oliver Martext, who is to marry them. Jacques criticizes
Touchstone for wanting an ordinary parish priest to marry them, claiming that
Martext will not “join” them properly or be able to “tell them what marriage is”
(III.iii.83-89). The vicar’s name is significant; Martext, Jacques seems to suggest,
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will mar marriage vows the way Orlando mars trees or hunters mar deer. He will
interpret marriage, which because of Martext’s name appears compared to a
“text,” poorly. Nevertheless, Audrey observes that, despite Jacques’s concerns,
Martext would have been good enough for her satisfaction (V.i.3-4). To make a
marriage is more than to simply mar parts of the ceremony. In creating and
interpreting, the inevitability of erring must be accepted as part of the process. We
mar in part because we never act or interpret perfectly. This is very similar to the
idea surrounding “wearing the horn,” in which ignorance and betrayal are a part
of making judgments about which sacrifices are necessary. When Touchstone
criticizes Corin and shepherds generally for marring the customs of the court,
Corin points out it is the very act of working with the sheep that prevents them
from using court gestures like hand kissing (III.ii.45-54). It is easy for those who
do not labor or interpret to criticize the efforts from those who do when they do
not attempt the work themselves. What seems like “marring” is often only done in
an effort to carry out what is most appropriate.
In another scene Jacques casts blame for others’ errors by treating human
error as one large and impersonal history. His perspective resembles what Ricoeur
explains about how it is easy for us to see ourselves as part one large history of
evil which we have become the victims of:
All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and their entrances,
And one man in his time plays many parts,
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His acts being seven ages … (II.vii.139-42)
Jacques goes on to describe negative aspects of each stage or “act” of life, from
infancy to death. Men play like actors, proving their foolishness through every
step of life (II.vii.141-66). Each part is full of self-centeredness or vanity, such as
the “infant / Mewling and puking in the nurse’s arms” or the “justice ... full of
wise saws.” Jacques makes this metaphor in response to the Duke’s observation,
on meeting Orlando who is desperate to find food for Adam, that they are not the
only unhappy or trouble individuals because “This wide and universal theater /
Presents more woeful pageants than the scene / Wherein we play” (II.vii.137-39).
The two metaphors are similar, but each character’s beliefs of the moral
implications of evil and suffering are distinct. To the Duke, each person met on
the “stage” of life meets personal suffering that inspires empathy. Jacques
describes individuals in generic terms as predictable. They are merely senseless
tools for the stage’s plot. His solution is to go about humbling and revealing the
foolishness of everyone (II.vii.47-61). By revealing the universal foolishness and
vanity of humanity, Jacques treats others as victims of one great pattern of human
error. Duke Senior understands Jacques’s approach to be a way a “chiding” sin, in
itself a “foul sin” that will lead Jacques to only spread the evils he wishes to cure.
Jacques himself has set a faulty example and cannot expect good results from
chastising others for errors he has made himself (II.vii.64-69). We can compare
the implications of Marion’s argument that the logic of accusation affirms the
deceptions of contemporary technology to this scene. By accusing others, we may
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unintentionally spread complacent worldviews we wish to challenge through
environmental writing.
The encounter with Orlando and Adam challenges Jacques’s dismal
perspective of humanity and human suffering as vain. Orlando resembles both the
youthful “lover” writing “woeful ballad[s]” about things as insignificant as his
“mistress’ eyebrow,” as well as the soldier who is [quick in quarrel] Jacques
describes (II.vii.147-53). Adam is in Jacques’s “sixt stage,” characterized by a
laughable and child-like physical deportment (II.vii.157-62), which characterizes
him accurately to some degree. Yet Adam and Orlando are full of gratitude for the
Duke’s assistance and humility rather than self-centeredness or reckless
foolishness (II.vii.168-70). Although Orlando at first foolishly threatens the party,
even this is done out of unselfish concern for Adam, who “limped” into the woods
to follow Orlando in his exile out of “pure love” (II.vii.129-31). The same
characteristics Jacques mocks (the feebleness and “limp” of old age, and
Orlando’s youthful passion and quickness to argue) are ironically characteristics
that ennoble Adam and Orlando. These characters act, like the Duke, out of
thoughtful concern for others rather than as senseless pawns. Duke Senior’s
actions help revive Adam, and Orlando has the wisdom to withdraw his foolish
threat, “blush,” and “hide [his] sword” (II.vii.169-173, II.vii.106-19). Reducing
others to faceless victims of a “stage” driven by human folly proves false. As the
Duke seems to suggest to Jacques when he warns him against “chiding sin,” such
approaches may lead to feelings of helplessness rather than empowerment to
change ourselves and assist others.
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The message, in each case, that responds to efforts to accuse and/or punish
others in the play is that while accusation is often immoral, accepting and
responding with empathy toward others’ suffering and failings is moral. We can
connect this idea to what Marion suggests in his phenomenology of evil. From a
Christian perspective, the only alternative to the logic of evil is Christ’s way of
responding to human error and suffering (8). Christ’s logic is to willingly bear up
the burdens and errors of others to alleviate suffering and diminish evil. It
instructs us to refrain from accusation and revenge. Only Christ, Marion writes, is
capable of facing suffering and evil like a lamb to the slaughter, silent in His
refusal to blame others (8). Only He resists the urge to master suffering, and
instead allows human suffering and error to unfold itself to Him for all it is. The
question of mastery and how to respond to suffering that is raised in the Genesis
account of the first human family (and in the play in the conflicts between
brothers), finds answers in Christ’s suffering. Christ’s way is to labor and suffer
for the benefit and relief of others rather than cast the burden of one’s own
suffering on others.

THE POSSIBLE AFFECTS OF ACCUSATION ON RELATIONSHIPS WITH
JUDEO-CHRISTIAN TRADITIONS
When we buy into the logic of accusation, it can blind us to the value of this
message in Christian scripture. Within the logic of evil, Marion argues, the
suffering that Christ endured in His act of atonement can essentially be treated as
a mere means, or even as a way of casting guilt for suffering on the divine. It
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appears as nothing more than a confirmation of divine guilt for human evil and
suffering (or that God is the cause of all evil), or an instrument to proclaim human
innocence (10-11). Although such a misunderstanding of evil may not be found in
direct responses to Christian narratives, when we adhere to evil’s logic and
attempt to defer moral guilt, we can become desensitized to the significance of
Christ’s way of responding to human evil and suffering. Through accusation, the
narratives’ religious meanings can be concealed.
Taking accusation as a response to the environmental crisis too far may
place us in danger of desensitizing ourselves to what is good in religious texts and
traditions. Rather than empowering our capacities to respond to moral wrongs,
accusation can make us more inert. Jacques’s accusations against humanity’s evils
lead him to perceive things that are good, even in himself and his own culture, as
bad. After a life of travels, Jacques sorrows over world evil’s, which lead his life
to be saturated with a “melancholy of [his] own” (IV.i.15-16). In response,
Rosalind jokingly counsels Jacques to “chide God” for making him the
disposition that he is. This sarcastic advice also includes being “out of love with
[his] nativity” and “[disabling] all the benefits of [his] own country” (IV.i.34-37).
Rosalind exposes Jacques’s accusations as deceptions that take even what is good
to be evil. We can compare “chid[ing] God” and failing to appreciate the beauties
of one’s own country to the possibility of unintentionally failing to acknowledge
what is good in religious texts and traditions by going overboard in efforts to
uncover blameworthy cultural and historical origins. In response to Jacques’s
belief that “’tis good to be sad and say nothing,” Rosalind replies, “Why then ‘tis
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good to be a post.” Even though Jacques believes his constant disapproval of the
world is productive, Rosalind uncovers its futility and passivity. To favor either
“laughing” or “melancholy” (which we can respectively compare to carelessness
and obsession with censuring others) in “extremity” is “abominable” (IV.i.4-9).
Blaming faults in Western culture and traditions may be no better than reckless
indifference to the ecological crisis when taken to certain measures. As we
distance ourselves from the West’s religious tradition and seek sources of moral
wrongs, we need to be careful of entering other dangerous extremities.
An alternative response to Jacques’s ways of “chiding” is demonstrated by
Orlando. Jacques invites Orlando “to rail against our mistress the world, and all
our misery” with him, but he merely replies, “I will chide no breather in the world
but myself, against whom I know most faults” (III.ii.276-79). Like Jacques,
Orlando has encountered the evils of Frederick’s court, but unlike him, he
withholds accusation. He even acknowledges his ignorance of the whole of his
own faults, only claiming to know most of them. In time, as he reconciles with his
brother, Orlando proves that he has become willing to face evil and suffering
without returning revenge to others.

BREAKING CYCLES OF ACCUSATION AND EXPLOITATION
The cycle of revenge between Orlando and Oliver introduced in the first scenes of
the play begins to be resolved when Orlando chooses to forgive Oliver. After
Oliver is exiled by Frederick, he is attacked by a snake and a lion, and Orlando
finds him unconscious in the forest. Orlando determines to turn away from his
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brother twice, but ultimately risks his life to save his brother’s. “Kindness, nobler
than revenge” triumphs in Orlando (IV.iii.128). He chooses to be free of his desire
to take revenge and becomes willing to suffer on Oliver’s behalf despite his
brother’s past wrongs. Orlando’s choice to end the patterns of revenge is paired
with a transformation in his relationships with the forest. He no longer sees the
woods as savage and in need of strenuous cultivation. Disguised as Ganymede,
Rosalind helps Orlando learn to see the beauty of the forest and concealed sources
of wisdom and order in it. Ganymede, Orlando asserts in Act V, is truly “forest
born,” something he doubted before (III.ii.341-50, V.iv.28-30). Much as Orlando
learns to have greater faith in Rosalind’s “wisdom” despite the adversities in
marriage (IV.i.146-59), he learns to have faith in the magic Ganymede has
learned “obscured in the circle of [the] forest” (V.iv.34). Orlando’s sense that he
“can live no longer by thinking” (V.ii.50) compels him to have faith in
Ganymede’s promise to bring Rosalind as his bride in the woods. The superficial
hopes he once imposed on the trees are no longer enough. Orlando needs to form
a real relationship with Rosalind in the same way he has developed a more
authentic relationship with the forest by meeting some of its greatest adversities,
such as a lioness, face to face. As Ganymede, Rosalind performs a magic trick
through which she and Orlando, and the squabbling couple Phebe and Silvius are
brought together that Orlando has faith he can perform (V.iv.3-4). For Orlando,
the forest is no longer a lonely “desert,” but a place where human relationships
can be set in order through unforeseen sources of hope.
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Forgiveness transforms Oliver in addition to Orlando. As Orlando battles
with the lion, Oliver wakes from a “miserable slumber” which seems to refer to
the jaded and jealous perspective he once had (IV.iii.132). He tells Rosalind and
Celia later that it was and was not he that had sought Orlando’s life; in other
words, he has become a new person, the conversion to which is so “sweet” that
Oliver does not even feel shame to confess his former errors because they no
longer matter (IV.iii.135-38).
Duke Senior appears to play an important role in helping the brothers
overcome their patterns of accusation. Duke Senior’s response to human suffering
is the antithesis of Duke Frederick’s logic of accusation. Rather than continually
seeking revenge, he seeks the presence of grace amidst adversity. He believes in
human capacities to endure suffering while not seeking to blame and avenge its
cause, and forgiving even after evil is performed. Suffering and evil do not eclipse
the presence of grace for him. His perspective is comparable to Augustine’s and
Origen’s beliefs that by cross-referencing sacred meanings in scripture with the
natural world, we can perceive divine grace even in things that seem evil. After
Orlando is wounded, Orlando leads Oliver to the Duke who invites them to his
table. The Duke gives Oliver “fresh array” like the father who dresses his returned
prodigal son in robes. He also “[commits] Oliver “unto [his brother’s] love”
(IV.iii.143), as the same father in the parable entreats the older jealous brother to
forgive the younger (Luke 15.22-32). Both brothers are like the elder and younger
brothers in the New Testament parable; they have each affected others’ suffering,
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suffered, and feared the loss their inheritance, which we might compare to the loss
of good relationships with the natural world.
Forgiveness leads to good relationships with the land. Just after
Touchstone’s speech on the power of “If” to prevent duels even when they seem
inevitable, Hymen, the God of marriage who inexplicably comes to attend the
weddings, says:
Then is there mirth in heaven,
When earthly things made even
Atone together. (V.iv.108-10)
The “virtue” of “If” Touchstone describes is comparable to the miraculous way
that the brothers’ conflict is overcome. In the context of this concluding scene, to
“make even” and to “atone” refer to reunion (such as Rosalind’s reunion with
Orlando at this moment, as well as the brothers reunion), reconciliation (including
between the brothers, who marry Rosalind and Celia in the same ceremony in this
scene) and sacrificing in order to make past wrongs right. Forgiveness allows not
only human relationships but also relationships with the forest and other lands to
become moral. It allows the characters to “atone” for formally exploitive and
selfish relationships with the natural world, which seems encompassed in “earthly
things.” Much in the same way that Orlando no longer sees the forest and its
adversities as threatening after forgiving his brother, their reconciliation
eliminates all conflict over their father’s inheritance. The disagreement, which
nearly led to the deaths of both, had turned their inherited land and the forest into
enemies comparable to the suicidal quicksand in Serres’s metaphor. When their
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relationship is rid of patterns of revenge to suppress suffering, relationships with
nature undergo a similar transformation. Oliver decides to take up a shepherd’s
life in the forest and to give the whole of their father’s inheritance to Orlando
(V.ii.9-12). We find the same pattern in Frederick’s moral transformation; his
recognition of the wrongs he had committed against his brother leads him
immediately to give up his tyrannical leadership and “restore all [the] lands” of
those he exiled at once (V.iv.163-65).
The reconciliations that occur in the play suggest the importance of
relinquishing desires to accuse and repress sources of suffering in order to build
moral relationships. This does not entail that when we refrain from accusing
others, this is a way to justify moral evil in ourselves. Refusing to accuse is a way
to avoid inflicting suffering and exercising immoral mastery. Instead of
diminishing our capacities to respond fully to suffering, such restraint increases
them. Refraining from blaming others keeps us from distractions that prevent us
from building the honest relationships with the natural world, with past
generations, and with future generations.
Marion suggests that only learning to forgive and to cease to accuse others
allows us to break out of the cycles of revenge. Recognizing our inability to trace
sources of suffering and evil may help us to cease reducing suffering to something
within our control and which we must suppress in our material culture. As
Heidegger suggests about the essence of technology, only recognizing ways
technology invites us to enframe others and nature as instruments might allow us
to engage our world honestly (311, 325, 337-38). In a similar way, perhaps by
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resisting the urge to treat religious traditions and texts as sources of exploitive
practices we can engage our past and our religious heritage with clarity and hope
to overcome immoral practices. Being slow to lay blame on others can help us
refrain from tendencies to use others as means to establish one’s own innocence
from our society’s immoral practices. Forgiving our predecessors of their
mistakes might serve as one way to begin to “atone” for moral errors in our
relationships with the earth.

LEARNING FROM THE WEST’S DESACRALIZATION OF NATURE AND
SCRIPTURE
Rather than distancing ourselves from traditional religious narratives, we can
reengage them to learn about moral responses to evil. At the same time, we can
also learn from criticisms that claim Christian interpretation and scripture have
led to desacralization and immoral relationships with nature. Such perspectives
can be received as invitations to interpret more thoughtfully, especially in relation
to our efforts to build moral relationships with the natural world. The very
recognition of ways both scripture and nature have become desacralized in
contemporary culture may help empower us to revitalize capacities to engage the
sacred. One price of mastery over nature to stave off human needs, Ricoeur
suggests, is its desacralization. Yet, with this loss comes the possibility that the
religious and the sacred might be invested with greater significance than it has
ever had previously. This idea resonates with Heidegger’s idea that “where the
danger lies, lies the saving power also,” or that paradoxically, the blindness
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caused by the essence of technology, given the condition that we begin to
recognize our blindness and moral impoverishment, is the very thing that opens
the possibility that we can reinstate more truthful relationships with our world
than ever before, especially through art (333-41). As Ricoeur explains, in addition
to desacralization:
This also is a gift of our ‘modernity,’ for we moderns are the heirs
of philology, of exegesis, of the phenomenology of religion, of the
psychoanalysis of language. The same epoch holds in reserve both
the possibility of emptying language by radically formalizing it
and the possibility of filling it anew by reminding itself of the
fullest meanings … the ones which are most bound by the presence
of the sacred to man. (Symbolism 349)
Environmental criticisms of Christian scripture and interpretive traditions can
point us toward better ways of interpreting, which involves looking closely at
what the narratives teach us about the moral truth of living in the world. By
reconnecting with scripture personally, Ricoeur suggests, we can learn to “hear”
the sacred in the phenomenological world again (Symbolism 351).
The task applies particularly to our need for an understanding of human
guilt in the environmental crisis and how we should respond to it. Religious
narratives provide symbols of guilt, such as “deviation, wandering, captivity …
chaos, blinding, mixture, [and the] fall” which “speak of the situation of the being
of man in the being of the world. The task, then, is starting from the symbols, to
elaborate [on] the being of man” (Symbolism 356). This resembles Heidegger’s
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suggestion that engaging poetry might overthrow the influence of enframing
worldviews because art speaks truths about what it means to “[dwell] on this
earth” (Heidegger, “Technology” 340). In a similar way, religious narratives can
allow us to learn what it means to dwell on the earth by helping us perceive
sacredness and moral constraints in the face of evil and suffering. Interpreting
religious narratives in our relationships with the natural world might shatter
modern technology’s blinding essence.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE “BOOK OF NATURE” ON
ENVIRONMENTAL WRITING
While the book of nature is encompassed in Judeo-Christian traditions
environmental writers have sometimes dismissed or cast in a negative light,
surprisingly, its hermeneutic extends valuable lessons that may help us understand
and respond to the environmental crisis. Implications of the “book of nature”
analogy I have discussed in light of its Christian conceptualizations in late
antiquity, Paul Ricoeur’s essays on religious interpretation, and Shakespeare’s As
You Like It, invite us to consider the possible importance of scripture in moral
relationships with nature with greater depth in environmental writing. Lessons
from the “book of nature” I have suggested include the interdependence of
“manifestation” and “proclamation,” the necessity of accepting adversities and
contingencies in both nature and scripture to perceive sacred meanings, and how
Judeo-Christian scripture may help us perceive ethical responses to suffering
amidst adversities in relationships with the natural world. These extensions of the
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“book of nature” do not begin to exhaust ways we may explore the hermeneutic to
build needed bridges between religious and environmental perspectives. The
concept is a useful tool through which we might nuance environmental arguments
concerning religious readings which cross-reference meanings in scripture and
other religious texts with the phenomenological world. Because of its frequent
appearance in the West’s religious and non-religious history and literary works,
topics surrounding the “book of nature” may prove especially helpful in bridging
gaps between ecocritical writing and ecotheology. It also opens ways to examine
tensions between religious exegesis and scientific “readings” of nature. More
specifically, the historical, religious and literary contexts I had discussed uncover
only a few ways the “book of nature” may be used to defend the possible vitality
of religious belief and interpretation in the future of environmental writing and as
we seek solutions for the ecological crisis.
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